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 In the first essay, I examine informal information channels among fund managers (fund-
fund networks) and between the holding companies and the fund managers (fund-company 
networks). The empirical methodology measures the likelihood of a network existing 
between an information source and recipient as a function of geographical proximity. The 
main findings indicate that (1) fund-fund (fund-company) information networks help in 
generating positive risk-adjusted returns from holdings in absence of fund-company (fund-
fund) networks; (2) fund-company networks create information advantage only when the 
networks are relatively exclusive, but hurt when a large number of funds have access to 
similar information networks. The stock selections of superior networks in a portfolio quarter 
seem to predict positive future stock performance beyond the quarter, alluding to potential 
asset pricing implications of the existence of investor networks. 
 In the second essay, I examine the performance implications of mutual fund managers’ 
tendency to deviate from the strategies of their peers. In the presence of incentives to herd, 
mutual fund managers may choose to deviate from their peers’ strategies either due to private 
information, overconfidence or conflict of interest with shareholders. The performance 
impacts of the different motivations to deviate are distinctly different. Using both fund total 
returns and holdings’ based risk-adjusted returns, the results indicate a significantly negative 
relationship between the managers’ deviating tendency relative to peers and their ability to 
generate superior performance. The evidence does not support the notion of deviations being 
motivated by valuable private information. For within-portfolio analyses for a fund manager, 
evidence points to fund managers overweighting (underweighting) stocks that underperform 
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(outperform) in the future, again supporting the notion that the average fund manager is more 
likely to make erroneous decisions when they deviate from their peers. 
 The third essay investigates the determinants of target choices in corporate investment in 
acquisitions, specifically focusing on the geographical proximity preference in these 
investments. During 1990-2003, firms are found to exhibit a home bias that is strikingly 
similar to the well documented behavior of portfolio investors but more compelling in 
magnitude. The study reveals that there are various factors, independent of information 
asymmetries, which may drive this behavior. Logistic regressions show that an acquirer’s 
propensity to acquire in-state targets (i) increases with economic opportunities in the 
acquirer’s home state, (ii) decreases with the severity of anti-takeover regimes in the 
acquirer’s home state, (iii) increases with the propensity of other managers domiciled in the 
acquirer’ city and industry to choose in-state targets, suggesting a herding behavior arising 
out of local interactions, and (iv) decreases with the acquirer’ size and book-to-market ratio. 
Regression results are similar when we use the distance-based local bias, instead of the 




INTRODUCTION TO THESIS 
 
 The complexities of understanding the impact of information heterogeneities and 
frictions in financial markets are being increasingly acknowledged by researchers. While 
the existence of various factors like social influences on information generation and 
informal networks are acknowledged for participants in financial markets, the magnitude, 
nature and spectrum of their impacts still remains understudied. In my first two 
dissertation essays, I study information processes that impact the investment outcomes of 
mutual fund managers, and in my third essay I focus on corporate investment decisions, 
specifically in domestic mergers and acquisitions (M&A). The motivation to delve deeper 
into the implications of information frictions in financial markets is rooted in the 
evidence that there are information heterogeneities in capital markets. 
 The second chapter aims to provide important insights on the informal information 
processes that play a role in the portfolio investment decisions of money managers. The 
existing literature has not distinguished between managerial skills in picking stocks and 
the ability of managers to acquire differential information via networking. We focus our 
attention on two forms of information networks: (1) fund-fund information networks, 
which transfer information between fund managers about potential investment 
opportunities; and (2) fund-company information networks, which facilitate a manager’s 
acquisition of differential information about a company via networks with the companies. 
This essay proposes a simple framework of disentangling the marginal impacts of 
different information networks on stock selection ability, and investigating the interplay 
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between them. The study contributes to the literature on informed traders by identifying 
information environments that can drive the performance of investments. Academic 
papers have separately acknowledged, explicitly or implicitly, the existence of each of the 
information channels considered here. However, to the best of my knowledge, this paper 
is the first to investigate the relative and conditional efficiency of these information 
processes and draw attention to situations which give rise to informational advantage. 
 The third chapter investigates the performance consequences of mutual fund 
managers’ deviation tendencies relative to their peers. Previous literature has suggested 
that there exist substantial incentives, like reputational concerns, for mutual fund 
managers to herd with other fund managers in their portfolio strategies. In the presence of 
incentives to herd, mutual fund managers may choose to deviate from their peers’ 
strategies because of private information, overconfidence, conflicts of interest with 
shareholders, among other factors. However, the performance impacts of the different 
motivations to deviate are different. Using the portfolio allocations of actively managed 
funds in the U.S. for ten quarters in the period July 2003-December 2005, this paper 
conducts an empirical investigation into the potential causes and consequences of fund 
managers’ deviating tendencies relative to their peers. The deviating tendency of a fund 
manager in a portfolio quarter is measured as the absolute deviation of the allocated 
portfolio weight in a stock (as percentage of total net assets (TNA)) from the mean 
weight allocated to the stock by other fund managers in the same peer group, averaged 
across all stocks in her portfolio. The determinants of deviating tendencies are examined 
followed by a study of the relationship between deviating tendencies and performance of 
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mutual fund portfolios. This paper broadly contributes to the literature on informed 
trading and herding in capital markets. 
 The fourth chapter studies the factors that impact investment choices made by 
acquiring firm managers during corporate investment in domestic M&A. M&A are an 
important form of corporate investments and have major implications for the industry, 
shareholders as well as policy makers. In particular, the focus of the study is on the role of 
proximity preference in these investment decisions. There has been a recent renaissance 
of literature that relates geographical location to various factors that impact business 
interactions and outcomes, like information asymmetry, familiarity, networks and 
economic spillovers. This paper explores various drivers including those related to 
information asymmetries that may impact the proximity preference in corporate 
investments in M&A, like proximate economic opportunities, antitakeover legal regimes, 
herding behavior, acquiring and target firm characteristics. This paper provides new 
insights into corporate decision-making processes. By focusing attention on the 
geography of investment choices, we have been able to distinguish some factors that 
directly or indirectly play a substantial role in the outcomes of the decision processes. 
 In the three essays, this dissertation attempts to reduce the vast gap between the 
awareness that there may be many informal information flows that critically impact 
decision-making processes of players in financial markets, and a coherent understanding 
of the nature and depth of the influences. The empirical evidence suggests important 
implications for various participants in financial markets, including individual investors, 




INFORMAL INFORMATION NETWORKS: 
THE IMPACT ON PERFORMANCE OF MUTUAL FUND PORTFOLIOS 
 
 
2.1.    Introduction 
The skilled and informed portfolio manager is the holy grail of mutual fund investors. 
Often thought of in conjunction, skill has traditionally referred to the managerial ability to 
process information, while an informed manager may have the ability to acquire 
differential information relative to the other players in the market by capitalizing on 
information frictions. This idea is rooted in the evidence that there are information 
heterogeneities in capital markets, creating potential opportunities for gathering 
differential information. The underlying notion in this paper is that being informed about 
an asset refers to the acquisition of information that may provide a strategic advantage to 
the fund manager.  
Hong, Kubik and Stein (2005) posit that there is word-of-mouth communication 
between fund managers located in the same city, manifested in correlated trading in the 
same stocks. Their study suggests an information process via which a fund manager 
acquires information about assets that is not simultaneously available to the universe of 
investors. Additionally, Coval and Moskowitz (1999, 2001) show that mutual fund 
managers disproportionately weight their portfolios in local companies and earn positive 
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abnormal returns on these holdings.1 This literature indicates that there may be some 
processes by which information diffuses from companies to certain fund managers, 
creating informational advantages. We refer to the channels by which there is information 
dissemination as information networks. The Oxford dictionary defines networking as 
“interacting with others to exchange information and develop contacts”. To the extent 
that information networks exist in financial markets, an investor can use networking 
skills to lower search costs associated with acquiring and processing information.  
Considerable research in sociology and economics points to the propensity of 
information exchanges to occur predominantly within limited geographical and social 
spaces. Limitations in the spatial circumference of information networks arise out of the 
higher likelihood of random interactions between agents located in proximate social and 
business circles (see for example, Sorensen and Stuart (2001), Hong, Kubik and Stein 
(2004), Ivković and Weisbenner (2007)). Since real information networks are not 
observable, we rely on this literature while determining likely information networks. The 
likelihood of an information network existing between an information source and a 
recipient is measured as a function of their geographical proximity (or inverse of 
geographical distance). 
We focus our attention on two forms of information networks: (1) fund-fund 
information networks, which transfer information between fund managers about potential 
investment opportunities; and (2) fund-company information networks, which facilitate a 
manager’s acquisition of differential information about a company via networks with the 
                                                 
1 Ivković and Weisbenner (2005) find similar evidence for individual investors. In 
contrast, Zhu (2002) does not find evidence of information advantage in the local 
investments of individual investors.   
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companies. This paper proposes a simple framework of disentangling the marginal 
impacts of different information networks on stock selection ability, and investigating the 
interplay between them.2  
Risk-adjusted returns on holdings, considered a reflection of stock selection ability, 
are computed based on Daniel et al’s (1997) characteristic-based benchmark portfolios. 
We develop measures of the strength of different networks associated with each fund-
holding pair, along the following two dimensions: fund-fund networks (constructed at the 
fund level), and fund-company networks (constructed at the holding level). First, the 
likelihood of existence of a fund-fund information network between any two managers is 
calculated as the inverse of geographical distance between the managers.3  A measure of 
fund-fund networks for each manager in our sample is computed as the summation of the 
likelihoods of the fund manager having an information network with another manager, 
across all other managers in the sample (excluding those in the same family).4 For 
example, in our metric Boston-based Putnam’s fund managers are likely to have more 
                                                 
2 Note that this framework does not assume that the information transfers are direct, and 
allow for transfers occurring through information intermediaries. For example, the 
implications of our framework of fund-company networks do not change if fund 
managers acquire differential information about local companies by following local 
media (that does not have a widespread audience), instead of acquiring information by 
direct communication with the company’s management or employees. Similarly, in case 
of fund-fund networks, information can transmit from one fund manager to another via 
other intermediaries. 
 
3 Following Hong, Kubik and Stein (2005), Coval and Moskowitz (1999, 2001), the 
location of a manager is identified using the city where the fund is headquartered. The 
underlying assumption is that while a manager may use research conducted in other 
locations etc., the primary information hub and decision-making is at the headquarter 
location. 
 
4 The possibility of intra-family information transfers are considered separately in the 
paper. 
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frequent information transfers with other fund managers compared to a manager for 
Principal Management Corp., which is based in Des Moines, Iowa. The funds comprising 
the highest (lowest) quintile of the fund-fund network metric are identified as having 
strong (weak) fund-fund networks. Second, the likelihood of existence of a fund-
company information network between the fund manager and a company held in the 
manager’s portfolio is calculated as the inverse of geographical distance between the 
fund’s and company’s headquarters. Within each fund portfolio, the companies 
comprising the highest (lowest) deciles of the fund-company network metric are 
identified as having strong (weak) fund-company networks. 
Using domestic equity holdings data for 2,463 U.S. actively managed mutual funds 
for ten quarters during July 2003-December 2005, we show that information networks 
have a substantial impact on holdings’ performance. Evidence indicates that managers 
associated with weak fund-fund networks generate higher risk-adjusted returns from 
portfolio holdings where they have strong fund-company information networks, 
compared to stocks where fund-company networks are absent (with the difference in 
annualized returns being roughly 5.2%). In striking contrast, the managers associated 
with strong fund-fund information transfers generate significantly negative risk-adjusted 
returns when investing in stocks associated with strong fund-company networks, but 
positive returns in holdings where fund-company networks are absent (with the 
difference in annualized returns of roughly -6.6%). Additionally, the managers with 
strong fund-fund networks outperform managers with weak fund-fund networks when 
fund-company networks are absent (by about 2.9%), but underperform in holdings where 
fund-company networks exist (by about -8.9%). Taken together, our main results indicate 
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that (1) fund-fund (fund-company) information networks help in generating positive risk-
adjusted returns in absence of fund-company (fund-fund) networks, (2) fund-company 
networks create information advantage when relatively few funds have comparable 
networks with the holdings company, but hurt when a large number of funds have access 
to similar information networks with the company (diluting potential information 
advantages). The results strongly suggest that the marginal impacts of an informal 
information network are conditional on the nature of other information flows present.  
Overall results hold across fund size, family size, fund age and portfolios of large cap 
stocks having high information availability. To the extent that fund size (Berk and Green 
(2004)) and family size proxies for managerial skills, the empirical results are consistent 
with the marginal impact of information networks being higher for more skilled 
managers.5 External networks complement private information arising out of skill, in-
house research resources and possible intra-family networks. While information networks 
matter both for young and old funds, the marginal impact of fund-company (fund-fund) 
networks is higher (insignificant) for older funds. It is possible that older funds develop 
networks with other fund managers over time, irrespective of geographical location. Less 
reputed funds, like young and small family funds, located in strong fund-fund network 
areas fail to reap benefits from either fund-fund or fund-company networks. Results also 
                                                 
5 Additionally, managers of larger funds may be the originators of the information that is 
being transmitted via fund-fund networks. In this case, these managers are more likely to 
have taken long positions in stocks before the information diffuses to other managers and 
results in increases in stock price. This would reflect as higher returns and consequently 
higher marginal impacts of fund-fund networks for these managers. However, this 
process cannot clearly explain the relationship between marginal impacts of fund-
company networks and fund size, since managers of smaller funds can also develop direct 
networks with companies. 
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indicate that the value of information networks is independent of public information 
availability about a stock. 
In general, the subportfolios that outperform other portfolios are (1) strong fund-
company information portfolios for funds with weak fund-fund networks, and (2) weak 
fund-company information portfolios for funds with strong fund-fund networks. Based on 
these results, this paper conducts a preliminary examination of possible information that 
can be inferred about future asset prices after identifying superior information networks 
of investors and observing their investment choices. Using fund holdings reported at the 
end of a quarter (which is stale information for all subsequent quarters), a hypothetical 
portfolio of stocks associated with the two information networks that generate superior 
risk-adjusted returns in mutual fund investments is constructed, called the Best 
Information Portfolio (or BIP). This portfolio strategy replicates the holdings of the 
information portfolios with superior performance from reports at the end of a quarter, and 
holds it in subsequent quarters starting at the beginning of the month following the 
reported quarter. For a wide range of holding periods, average monthly raw returns for 
the BIP are significantly positive (about 1.7%), with the risk-adjusted monthly returns 
also significantly outperforming their benchmarks by 72 basis points annually. These 
results suggest that the stock selections of superior information networks predict the 
future performance of those stocks, even beyond the quarter in which the investment is 
observed. 
This study contributes to the literature on informed traders by identifying information 
environments that can drive the performance of investments. The existing literature has 
not distinguished between managerial skills in picking stocks and the ability of managers 
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to acquire differential information via networking. While the latter ability to form 
information networks may also be considered a managerial skill, the implications are 
distinct from the traditional notion of skilled portfolio managers. A novel implication of 
this study is that a fund manager can compensate for a lack of skill in processing 
information by having a superior ability to form external information networks. 
Academic papers have separately acknowledged, explicitly or implicitly, the existence of 
each of the information channels considered here. However, to the best of our knowledge, 
this paper is the first to investigate the relative and conditional efficiency of these 
information processes and draw attention to situations which give rise to informational 
advantage. The findings strongly indicate that a portfolio manager should be able to 
improve performance by being aware of the relative efficiencies of different information 
flows, and being proactive in establishing valuable information networks.  
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2. briefly reviews existing literature on 
informal networks. Section 2.3. describes the data. Section 2.4. discusses the empirical 
methodology. Results are presented in section 2.5. Section 2.6. concludes the essay. 
 
 
2.2.    A Note on Informal Information Networks 
 
 
Networks refer to any channel by which communication can occur. Networks can 
exist between people in a society, firms operating in a market, countries engaged in 
diplomatic relationships, and even electronic devices. Formal information networks are 
relatively easy to observe and access. For instance, analyst recommendations being aired 
on national television can be accessed by the wide spectrum of investors in the market. 
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On the other hand, informal networks are much harder to observe and quantify but play a 
substantial role in the functioning of a wide range of economic systems.  
Sociologists have long posited that informal interactions in a society impact 
individual behavior and decision-making. Information exchanges occur in social 
relationships. These relationships may arise out of neighborhood interactions, going to 
the same church, having overlapping social circles etc. Academic research in economics 
has only recently begun to theorize the relationship between informal interactions and 
economic behavior. Different strands of literature in economics have focused on the role 
of networks and informal interactions on a diverse range of economic and social 
outcomes. Some examples of papers interested in individual behavior include studies on 
crime (Glaeser et al. (1996), Bayer et. al. (2004)); peer effects in education (Hoxby 
(2000), Sacerdote (2001), Zimmerman (2003), Zax and Rees (2002)); employment 
choices and wages (Bayer, Ross and Topa (2005)); and welfare program participation 
(Bertrand et al. (2000)). Other studies have focused on firm-level outcomes like 
technological innovation and adaptation (Conley and Udry (2003), Bandiera and Rasul 
(2006), Burke et al. (2004)); knowledge spillovers and economic agglomeration 
(Krugman (1991), Glaeser et al. (1992), Jaffe et al. (1993), Audretsch and Feldman 
(2001)). 
Empirical evidence on the existence and impact of informal information exchanges in 
financial markets is limited.6 In their study on credit markets, Garmaise and Moskowitz 
                                                 
6 Theoretical work on informal communication in financial markets is also limited. Some 
recent theoretical research has begun to draw attention to the impact of social networks 
and communication on asset prices (Ozsoylev (2005), Colla and Mele (2005)). Stein 
(2006), on the other hand, formulates a theory of incentives and conditions under which 
information exchanges occur between managers who are competitors.  
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(2003) document the role of informal networks in connecting the borrowers with service 
intermediaries, who in turn have links with lenders. Shiller (2000) in his well known 
book Irrational Exuberance discusses the role of informal communications among stock 
market investors in causing bubbles and crashes in stock markets. He posits that frequent 
communication of opinions and interests among peers influences the behavior of 
individuals in a peer group, causing the group to have similar thinking. Hong, Kubik and 
Stein (2004) empirically document the relationship between social interaction and stock 
market participation of U.S. investors. After controlling for various factors, they show 
that households that are engaged in more social interactions (presumably having more 
informal information networks) are more likely to participate in stock market investment. 
Ivković and Weisbenner (2007) find word-of-mouth communications among individual 
investors as reflected in trades of neighbors, while Ng and Wu (2006) find similar 
evidence for investors in the same trading room. Duflo and Saez (2002, 2003) uncover 
word-of-mouth effects in retirement planning among employees in the same department. 
In summary, while the existence of informal information networks has been 
acknowledged to some extent, an understanding of the magnitude of their impact on the 
spectrum of economic activities is still elusive. This study focuses on the role of informal 
information networks in the rapidly growing investment management industry.     
 
 
2.3.    Data 
 
 
The primary data source used in this study is the CRSP Survivor-bias Free US Mutual 
Fund Database (MFDB) which provides data on fund characteristics and returns. In 
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January 2005, CRSP added a mutual fund holdings database that includes stocks, bonds, 
mortgage-backed securities, other mutual funds, futures and options, among others. 
CRSP holdings data includes information on the market value of the holdings, number of 
shares held and names of securities, from reports dating September 2003 to December 
2005. Fund holdings in some cases are reported for quarters before September 2003, but 
we exclude these because of largely missing data on a majority of the funds. For our 
analyses, quarterly data for the ten quarters between September 2003 and December 2005 
is obtained. Portfolio holdings are usually reported at the end of each quarter, where the 
portfolio information is effective in the previous three months. 
Given that the CRSP holdings database is relatively new, we verify the accuracy of 
the information by spot matching with the CDA/Spectrum database that has been widely 
used for accessing mutual fund holdings information. The identification and amount 
invested information for holdings are nearly identical between the two databases with 
negligible difference. 
We first construct the sample of funds by choosing US equity funds primarily 
investing in domestic equity (excluding index, sector and bond funds) having aggressive 
growth, growth, growth and income or balanced as stated objective categories from 
CRSP MFDB. Our final sample consists of 2,463 unique funds in the sample period. The 
main fund identifier in CRSP MFDB is the ICDI code. However, CRSP assigns multiple 
ICDI codes to different share classes of the same fund. We prevent erroneous counting of 
funds by merging information of multiple ICDI codes representing the same fund into 
one unique fund. We only include stock holdings of publicly traded companies 
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headquartered in the U.S. and have stock returns data available from CRSP, and exclude 
other assets held in the portfolios. 
The holdings database uses a unique portfolio identifier that is matched to ICDI codes 
in a separate CRSP mapping file. Each portfolio code represents a unique portfolio, and 
multiple ICDI can be mapped to the same portfolio code if the underlying portfolios are 
identical. For example, multiple ICDI codes representing different share classes of the 
same fund have the same underlying portfolio, and are mapped to a common portfolio 
code. After matching the portfolio codes to ICDI codes, we match data on mutual fund 
characteristics like monthly total net assets, management company etc. with the CRSP 
MFDB. Finally, we get stock price and returns data for the holding companies from 
CRSP monthly stock files. 
Fund location information (i.e., city and state) is obtained from Nelson’s Directory of 
Investment Managers. Disclosure database provides information on the headquarter 
location of all publicly traded companies in our sample. The city and state information of 
the funds and companies are matched to latitude and longitude coordinates from US 
Census Bureau’s freely available Gazetteer geographical data source. We use the latitude 
and longitude information to calculate geographical distances between two cities. 
 
 
 2.4. A Framework of Information Networks and Performance 
 
 In this section, we describe the empirical methodology used in this study. We first 
outline a method by which we measure informal information channels and then outline 
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the framework used to observe the performance implications of these information 
channels. 
 
2.4.1. Network Measures 
 
 Ideally, data on real information networks via which each fund manager receives 
information about investment opportunities should be employed to study the impact of 
these networks on investment performance. However, data on fund managers’ real 
informal information sources is not available. While not a perfect measure, we employ a 
methodology using likelihoods of informal interactions as proxies for real information 
networks. 
 
A. Fund-Fund Information Networks 
 
In this study, the first type of informal information transfers considered are those via 
which a fund manager can acquire information from other managers investing in similar 
asset classes (in this case, domestic stocks). In the spirit of Hong, Kubik and Stein 
(2005), proximately located mutual fund managers are considered as more likely to 
engage in informal information transfers. Additionally, the focus is on information 
networks between a fund manager and other funds external to the family which the fund 
belongs to. Intra-family information exchanges are considered separately in this paper.  
Based on this premise, the likelihood of a fund-fund (FF) information network link 









=        (1) 
Here, Distancej,i is the geographical distance between the city where fund j is located and 
the city in which fund i is located. The likelihoods of FF networks between a fund 
manager and all other fund managers not belong to the same fund family are then 
aggregated for each fund in the sample. This provides an estimate of the size of informal 
information networks a fund manager j has with other fund managers and is expressed as 
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Here, i=1,…,N are all funds in the sample that do not belong to the same fund family as 
fund j. 
Finally, each quarter, all funds in the sample are sorted according to the measures of 
FF information networks ( FFj(Network) ) and ranked into quintiles. The funds in the 
lowest quintile in a quarter are considered the funds with weak FF information networks 
( weakFFQ , ). The funds in the highest quintile are considered the funds with strong FF 
information networks ( strongFFQ , ). 
A caveat is in order regarding the measure of fund-fund information networks used in 
this study. This measure includes only the funds in our sample, which is restricted based 
on various criteria like active management, predominantly domestic equity investments 
etc. It does not account for all information flows involving managers of the universe of 
mutual funds. For example, while a sector fund manager is excluded from our sample, 
she may be an information source for a manager in our sample. However, we conjecture 
that our measure of fund networks is highly correlated with a similar measure based on 
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the universe of money managers, since the geographical cluster patterns are unlikely to 
change significantly. In this case, the relative ranking of networks is also unlikely to 
change substantially if we had based our measure on the universe of money managers.      
 
B. Fund-Company Information Networks 
 
 The second type of informal information networks considered in this paper are 
networks between fund managers and companies in which they invest. These fund-
company (FC) information networks are estimated at the stock holding-level for each 
fund, and are measured for each stock in a fund’s portfolio in a given quarter. The 
likelihood of a FC information network existing between fund manager j and the 
company issuing stock n that is held in j’s portfolio is 
)Distance  (1
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=       (3) 
Here, Distancej,n is the geographical distance between the city where fund j is located and 
the city in which company n is headquartered.  
Next, the stocks in each fund portfolio in each quarter are sorted by measures of FC 
information network likelihoods (LFC(Network)j,n) and ranked into deciles. Within each 
portfolio, the lowest decile is considered the sub-portfolio of stocks associated with weak 
FC networks ( weakFCjD
, ). On the other hand, the holdings in the highest decile are 
considered to be the sub-portfolio of stocks with strong FC information networks 
( strongFCjD




− gives the marginal effect of 
FC information networks.  
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Alternatively, for robustness checks, we consider metrics used in Coval and 
Moskowitz (1999, 2001) of local (a portfolio company located within 100 km radius from 
a fund) versus non-local (all portfolio companies further than 100 km) to define the high 





Based on the empirical metrics of information networks discussed previously, a 
framework of studying marginal impacts of informal information networks is developed. 
The goal is to empirically disentangle the impacts of informal information transfers on 
investment performance.  
Fig. 2.1. presents the outline of our information metric that can impact the 
investments decisions associated with a particular investment. Four groups of 
investments are considered and allocated into portfolios P1, P2, P3 and P4. For each 
fund in the subsample having strong (weak) fund-fund networks, i.e. compose groups 
strongFF
Q




, ) in the fund-quarter portfolio, are chosen.   
Developing these categories of investment portfolios lays the foundation for 
disentangling the performance impacts of different informal information networks using 
empirical data. The manner of construction enforces that each fund in the smallest and 
largest network deciles should have at least one stock holding that can be classified into 
the each of the strongest and weakest fund-company information network portfolio. For 
example, in Fig. 2.1. the holdings in portfolio P1 are located geographically close to the 
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adjR (P1)- adjR (P2) 
Difference: 
adjR (P3)- adjR (P4) 
 
 
Figure 2.1. Marginal Impacts of Informal Information Networks 
This figure reports a metric for forming portfolios of stocks held by mutual funds according to 
information flows associated with the stock. The likelihood of a FC information network existing 
between fund manager j and the company issuing stock n that is held in j’s portfolio is 
L
FC
(Network)j,n = 1/(1+Distancej,n) where, Distancej,n is the geographical distance between the 
city where fund j is located and the city in which company n is headquartered. For each fund j, 









) being the highest (lowest) likelihood deciles and form the portfolios Strong Fund-
Company Networks (Weak Fund-Company Networks) in each portfolio quarter. The likelihood of 
an information network existing between fund manager j and fund manager i is LFF(Network)j,i = 
1/(1+Distancej,i) where, Distancej,i is the geographical distance between the city where fund j is 
located and the city in which fund i is located. The size of informal information networks a fund 
manager j has with other fund managers is computed as  










     
Here, i=1,…,N are all funds in the sample that do not belong to the same fund family as fund j. 
Each quarter the funds are sorted by FF








) being the highest (lowest) quintile and form the categories Strong Fund-
Company Networks (Weak Fund-Company Networks). Radj is the risk-adjusted return generated 
from a portfolio of holdings.  
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fund, and presumably have higher likelihood of fund-company information transfers, 
compared to stocks in portfolio P2, which are geographically distant and likely to have 
weaker information transfers. So, the information processes related to portfolio P1 is 
different from P2 by the additional fund-company information flows associated with P1, 
but not with P2. Note that the method of disentangling fund-company information 
networks makes it possible to avoid confounding effects arising out of heterogeneities in 
other fund-, manager-, family- and time-specific factors. Similarly, when other across-
fund differences are ignored, portfolio P1 is different from P3 in that P3 is associated 
with fund-fund networks generating an additional information process, while P1 is not. 
To observe the marginal impact of fund-fund information networks, across-fund 
comparisons are necessary. However, this gives rise to the possibility of significant 
differences in other fund-specific factors that can impact performance, like managerial 
ability. In further empirical analyses, we compare funds which have similar attributes 
along dimensions other than information networks. It is also interesting to note that in 
this framework, portfolio P2 can be viewed as a control group where only the private 
information that arises out of managerial skills is the main driver of investment decisions, 
since other obvious external information processes are negligible.  
Risk-adjusted returns computed following DGTW (1997) for each fund holding is the 
measure of investment performance used in this paper. For each fund in quintile weakFFQ ,  
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Here, wi,t is the portfolio weight of stock i in month t, and S is the number of stocks in the 
sub-portfolio. The weights in each sub-portfolio sum to one. Similarly, risk-adjusted sub-















RRwR       (5) 
Here, 
bench
iR  is the value-weighted monthly return of stock i’s DGTW quintile benchmark 
portfolio (following Daniel et al. (1997)). Along the framework of disentangling marginal 
impacts of informal information portfolios discussed before, the differences in the sub-
portfolio returns form the basis of studying the marginal performance impacts of these 
information networks. For the baseline empirical analyses, the difference in risk-adjusted 
returns adjR (P3)- adjR (P1) between the portfolios P3 and P1 reflects the marginal impact 
of FF information networks, when strong FC networks are present. For holdings 
associated with weak FC networks, difference adjR (P4)- adjR (P2) between the portfolios 
P4 and P2 gives the marginal impact of FF information networks. For the funds with 
weak FF networks, difference adjR (P1)- adjR (P2) measures the marginal performance 
impact of FC information networks. Similarly, adjR (P3)- adjR (P4) measures the marginal 
impact of FC information networks for the strong FF network funds. Note that the 
marginal impact of a type of information network is examined conditional on the extent 
of other type of information networks that may impact the same set of investments. This 
method allows the marginal impact of one type of information network to differ 
depending on what other information exchanges are affecting the investment decisions 
for the same holding. For instance, a fund manager having larger networks with other 
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funds may rely more on information acquired via inter-fund networks when she does not 
have strong networks with the holding company. 
 In summary, the empirical methodology operationalizes an examination of the 
marginal impacts of informal information networks along the framework of the simple 
theoretical model stated in earlier sections. In the following section, we present the 
empirical results on the relationship between information networks and investment 
performance of mutual funds. 
 
 
2.5.    Results 
 
2.5.1. Summary statistics: Mutual fund and portfolio characteristics 
 
 Table 2.1. presents summary statistics on the sample of funds and overall 
characteristics of the stocks held in fund portfolios. The sample consists of 2,463 actively 
managed U.S. funds focused on domestic equity in the period 2003-2005, spanning 
across 569 investment management family complexes. During this period, these funds 
invested in stocks of 4,796 unique public companies headquartered in the U.S. Recall that 
the sample excludes all other holdings like cash, bonds etc. Due to high levels of 
skewness in the data, we usually report median values of most data fields.  
The median fund size (i.e. total net assets) in the sample is $69.5 million, and the 
median fund age (based on first offer date) is six years. Since the metrics of informal 
information networks developed in this paper are based on geography, Table 2.1. also 
reports a summary geographical distribution of the mutual fund holdings and managers. 
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Table 2.1. 
Summary Statistics on U.S. Mutual Funds 
 
Summary statistics are for all U.S. mutual funds that invest primarily in U.S. equity as reported in 
CRSP Mutual Fund Database, excluding index and sector funds during September 2003-
December 2005. Fund age in the holding quarter is computed as the difference between the year 
of the first month in the quarter and the year of the fund’s first offer date. Proximity distribution 
of a fund’s holdings is reported as the percentage of total amount invested in domestic equity in a 
quarter, in stocks of companies that are 0-100 kilometer (km), 100-500 km, 500-1000 km and 
more than 1000km from the location of the fund. Proximity distribution of mutual funds is 
computed for each fund as the percentage of funds located 0-100km, 100-500km, 500-1000km 
and more than 1000km from the fund, and reported as an average across all funds. Median 
number of companies in a fund’s portfolio is the average across all quarters. Daniel et al 
(DGTW) (1997) is followed to compute the size, book-to-market and momentum quintiles for the 
stocks held. Company age is the difference between the year of the first month of the quarter and 
the year in which a company was established, reported in years. 
Total number of  funds in sample 2,463  
Total number of mutual fund families in sample 569  
Total number of different stocks held in sample period 4,796  
Median total net assets ($ million) 69.5  
Median fund age (in years) 6.0  
Proximity distribution of fund investments:   
          Avg. % invested in stocks: 0-100 km 6.88  
          Avg. % invested in stocks: 100-500 km 14.66  
          Avg. % invested in stocks: 500-1000 km 13.22  
          Avg. % invested in stocks: >1000 km 65.24  
Proximity distribution of fund managers:   
          Avg. % of funds located 0-100 km  8.35  
          Avg. % of funds located 100-500 km 19.06  
          Avg. % of funds located 500-1000 km 13.74  
          Avg. % of funds located >1000 km 58.85  
Portfolio characteristics:   
         Median number of companies in portfolio 86  
         Median value-weighted DGTW Size quintile 4.46  
         Median value-weighted DGTW B/M quintile 2.54  
         Median value-weighted DGTW MOM quintile 3.08  




In the median fund portfolio, 6.88% of the total amount invested in domestic equity 
holdings is concentrated in stocks of companies less than 100 km away (or ‘local’) from 
the fund location. More than half (65.2%) of the total amount invested is in stocks of 
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companies more than 1000 km from the fund. The geographical distribution of mutual 
funds across the country is also presented. For the median fund in the sample, 8.35% of 
funds are located within 100 km distance, while 58.85% are located more than 1000 km 
away.7 While the mutual fund industry may be concentrated in a few cities, there is 
substantial dispersion in the data to allow an examination of cross-sectional differences.  
Table 2.1. also reports summary statistics on the stocks held in mutual fund portfolio 
in the sample period. The median fund portfolio is invested in 86 stocks, with median 
company age of 35 years. The characteristics of the stocks reported are the three 
dimensions in DGTW (1997), namely, size, book-to-market ratio and momentum. The 
median stock holding is in a value-weighted DGTW size quintile of about 4.5, indicating 
that mutual funds on average concentrate their investments in stocks of larger companies. 
The median value-weighted DGTW book-to-market (B/M) quintile of stocks held is 
about 2.5, suggesting that mutual funds in the sample have relatively dispersed 
investments across growth (low B/M) and value stocks (high B/M). The median fund 
shows a preference for stocks having higher past year returns, or momentum, by 
investing in stocks slightly above the third DGTW momentum quintile.   
Table 2.2. presents summary statistics for the stock holdings that form the sub-
portfolios associated with different information networks discussed in section 2.4. It is 
possible that the characteristics of investments vary substantially across the different 
network portfolios.  
                                                 
7 Note that the geographical distribution of mutual funds is reported in terms of 
frequency, and not as aggregated dollar amounts managed by the universe of funds. This 
is because in order to operationalize the metrics of information networks among fund 
managers, each fund manager is considered a potential network link and can transfer 




Summary Statistics on Portfolio Characteristics (by Information Networks) 
 
Summary statistics are for all U.S. mutual funds that invest primarily in U.S. equity as reported in CRSP Mutual Fund Database, 
excluding index and sector funds during September 2003-December 2005. The likelihood of a fund-company (FC) information network 
existing between each fund manager j and each company issuing stock n that is held in j’s portfolio is LFC(Network)j,n = 1/(1+ Distancej,n). 
Here, Distancej,n is the geographical distance between the city where fund j is located and the city in which company n is headquartered. 
Every quarter, each fund is split into a Strong Fund-Company Network portion (defined as any holding in the highest LFC(Network)j,n 
decile among all the fund’s holdings in the same quarter) and a Weak Fund-Company Network portion (defined as any holding in the  
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where, i =1,…N are all funds not in the same family as fund j, LFF(Network)j,i = 1/(1+ Distancej,i), and Distancej,i= distance in km. 
between city of fund i and fund j. Network quintiles are computed by sorting all funds in the sample into quintile groups according to the 
network measure computed above. Strong Fund-Fund (F-F) Network funds are the funds in the highest network quintile and Weak Fund-
Fund (F-F) Network funds are funds in the lowest network quintile. Daniel et al (DGTW) (1997) is followed to compute the size, book-to-
market and momentum quintiles for the stocks held. Company age is the difference between the year of the first month of the quarter and 
the year in which a company was established, reported in years. t-tests for differences are done using means comparisons for within- and 











   *, **, *** represent significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively 
 
 




Variables Weak Fund-Fund (F-F) 
Network  funds 
Strong Fund-Fund (F-F) 




Strong Fund-Company (F-C) Network Stocks:      
     Median value-wt. [equally-wt.] DGTW Size quintile 4.36 [4.00] 4.64 [4.00] 0.28*** [0.00] 
     Median value-wt. [equally-wt.] DGTW B/M quintile 2.43 [2.00] 2.64 [3.00] 0.21*** [1.00] 
     Median value-wt. [equally-wt.] DGTW MOM quintile 3.25 [3.00] 3.09 [3.00] -0.16*** [0.00] 
     Median value-wt. [equally-wt.] company age 39.83 [28.00] 57.17 [34.00] 17.34*** [6.00] 
     No. of fund-quarter observations 3,094  3,424   
Weak Fund-Company (F-C)  Network Stocks:      
     Median value-wt. [equally-wt.] DGTW Size quintile 4.44 [4.00] 4.63 [4.00] 0.19** [0.00] 
     Median value-wt. [equally-wt.] DGTW B/M quintile 2.56 [2.00] 2.10 [2.00] -0.46*** [0.00] 
     Median value-wt. [equally-wt.] DGTW MOM quintile 3.19 [3.00] 3.37 [4.00] 0.18*** [1.00] 
     Median value-wt. [equally-wt.] company age 45.40 [26.00] 36.00 [22.00] -9.40*** [-4.00] 
     No. of fund-quarter observations 3,097  3,425   
Difference: Strong-Weak F-C Network      
     Value-weighted [equally-wt.] DGTW Size quintile -0.08*** [0.00] 0.01*** [0.00]  
     Value-weighted [equally-wt.] DGTW B/M quintile -0.13*** [0.00] 0.54*** [1.00]  
     Value-weighted [equally-wt.] DGTW MOM quintile 0.06*** [0.00] -0.28*** [-1.00]  
     Value-weighted [equally-wt.] company age -5.57** [2.00] 21.17*** [12.00]  
      
39 
Funds having weak fund-fund (FF) networks invest in somewhat smaller and younger 
companies with lower B/M ratios when fund-company (FC) networks are strong 
compared to holdings associated with weak FC networks. The difference in value-
weighted DGTW quintiles between the strong and weak FC networks for size and book-
to-market dimensions are -0.08 and -0.13, with both differences being statistically 
significant at 1% level. Perhaps somewhat surprisingly, the funds are relatively bigger 
momentum chasers for the stocks having strong FC networks, compared to when they 
invest in stocks with weak FC networks. It may be the case that the differential 
information fund managers have about the future value of the strong FC network stocks 
reinforces a preference for higher momentum stocks. Interestingly, the statistics for funds 
having strong FF networks are qualitatively dissimilar compared to the funds with weak 
FF networks. These funds invest in significantly larger, older and higher B/M stocks 
associated with strong FC networks, as compared to stocks associated with weak FC 
networks. On the other hand, the strong FC network stocks have lower momentum than 
weak FC network stocks. The DGTW quintile differences for size, book-to-market and 
momentum between strong and weak FC stocks are 0.01, 0.54 and -0.28 respectively, 
with all values being significant at the 1% level. 
Table 2.2. also reports across-fund comparisons between strong and weak FF 
network funds, conditional on FC networks. In the presence of strong FC networks, funds 
with strong FF networks invest in stocks assigned in higher size, higher book-to-market 
and lower momentum quintiles compared to funds having small FF networks. 
Additionally, strong FF network funds invest in companies about 17.3 years older than 
companies held by weak FF network stocks, for the subsample of strong FC network 
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holdings. When the subsample of weak FC network holdings is considered, strong FF 
network funds invest in higher size, lower book-to-market and higher momentum DGTW 
quintiles compared to weak FF network funds. Strong FF network funds also invest in 
younger companies compared to weak FF network funds, when weak FC network 
holdings are considered. It is hard to conclude any unambiguous differences between the 
riskiness of the stocks held by strong and weak FF network funds. 
 
2.5.2.   Information networks and portfolio performance 
 
 Table 2.3. reports the baseline empirical results on the relationship between informal 
information networks and investment performance of stock holdings. Average returns on 
quarterly holdings are presented along with standard deviation of returns as a measure of 
total risk of the portfolios.8 Value-weighted returns and standard deviation of the value-
weighted returns across quarters are computed for each fund sub-portfolio in the sample. 
The average values reported in the table are weighted by fund total net assets (TNA). 
 First, Panel A presents raw returns on the sub-portfolios and standard deviation of 
raw returns. Among the four sub-portfolios, the portfolio of stocks associated with strong 
networks between the fund manager, who has weak networks with other funds, and the 
holdings company has the highest raw returns of 20.74% during the sample period. The 
second highest raw returns (16.26%) are on the portfolio of stocks held by fund manager 
associated with strong fund-fund networks investing in companies with which they are 
                                                 
8 See Sirri and Tufano (1998) who measure funds’ relative riskiness in terms of their total 
risk (measured as standard deviation of returns), rather than by measures like beta, which 




Performance of Mutual Funds and Information Networks (Percentage Annualized Returns) 
 
Every quarter during Sept 2003-Dec 2005, the likelihood of a fund-company (FC) information network existing between each fund 
manager j and each company issuing stock n that is held in j’s portfolio is computed as LFC(Network)j,n = 1/(1+ Distancej,n). Here, 
Distancej,n is the geographical distance between the city where fund j is located and the city in which company n is headquartered. 
Every quarter, each fund is split into a Strong Fund-Company Network portion (defined as any holding in the highest LFC(Network)j,n 
decile among all the fund’s holdings in the same quarter) and a Weak Fund-Company Network portion (defined as any holding in the  
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where, i =1,…N are all funds not in the same family as fund j, LFF(Network)j,i = 1/(1+ Distancej,i), and Distancej,i= distance in km. 
between city of fund i and fund j. Network quintiles are computed by sorting all funds in the sample into quintile groups according to 
the network measure computed above. Strong Fund-Fund (F-F) Network funds are the funds in the highest network quintile and Weak 















where wi,t is the portfolio weight of stock i in month t, and S is the number of stocks in the portfolio. Risk-adjusted portfolio returns 

















iR  is the value-weighted monthly return of stock i’s DGTW quintile benchmark portfolio (following Daniel et al. (1997)). 
Reported returns (expressed in annual percentage rates) are value-weighted by fund total net assets (TNA) and averaged across 
quarters. Standard deviation of portfolio returns (in percentage) is calculated for each fund and is reported as a value-weighted 








Panel A: Raw Returns 
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Panel B: Risk-adjusted Returns 
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not likely to have frequent informal interactions. However, higher raw returns may 
simply be a compensation for higher levels of risk borne by the manager in these 
portfolios. 
 In Panel B, risk-adjusted returns are reported for the four sub-portfolios and are the 
more appropriate measures of performance. A comparison of Panel A and Panel B shows 
that risk-adjusted returns are qualitatively similar to the pattern of raw returns across the 
four sub-portfolios. Marginal impacts of fund-company (FC) networks are reported 
conditional on fund-fund (FF) networks. FC networks have a significantly positive 
impact when funds having weak fund-fund (FF) networks are considered. The results are 
consistent with Coval and Moskowitz (2001) who find that fund managers in remote 
locations (who are likely to form the subsample of weak FF network managers in this 
paper) can earn higher abnormal returns on proximate holdings. The findings are also 
consistent with the implications of the theoretical model, based on which it is expected 
that the marginal impact of FC networks is higher when fewer fund managers have 
access to similar FC networks with the companies. Further, empirical results show that 
funds in areas where there are strong FF networks are unable to translate fund-company 
information channels into better performance on the corresponding holdings, earning a 
negative risk-adjusted annualized return of -3.38% on these holdings. This may be a 
reflection of the fact that for companies located in areas where there are larger 
concentrations of mutual funds, the potential to generate information advantages about 
the company is low. Too many fund managers may form information networks with the 
same companies leading to a dilution of information advantage for any one manager. 
Weak FF network funds generate positive risk-adjusted returns on holdings with strong 
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FC networks that exceed returns on holdings with weak FC networks by 5.22% annually, 
with significance at the 1% level. Contrastingly, the strong FF network funds 
underperform on their holdings associated with strong FC networks relative to holdings 
with weak FC networks. For these strong FF network funds, the marginal impact of FC 
networks on risk-adjusted returns is negative, having a value of -6.57%, and significant at 
1% level. In summary, consistent with theoretical predictions, the marginal impacts of 
fund-company networks are bigger for funds in weak FF network areas compared to 
funds in strong FF network areas. 
 Table 2.3. also presents the marginal impact of FF networks, conditional on the level 
of FC networks. Recall that, unlike the analyses of marginal impacts of FC networks 
where within-fund portfolio decompositions are used; studying marginal impact of FF 
networks necessitates across-fund comparisons. This gives to the possibility that other 
heterogeneities between the funds drive performance differences, and are considered in 
later robustness checks. In the baseline empirical results, a means comparison between 
sub-portfolio returns for each quarter is used to determine marginal impact of FF 
networks, conditional on FC networks. Funds with strong FF networks underperform the 
funds with weak FF networks by 8.90% (significant at 1% level), for holdings linked 
with strong FC networks. On the other hand, for holdings associated with weak FC 
networks, the strong FF network funds outperform the weak FF network funds by 2.89% 
annually (at 5% level significance). In summary, FF networks help in the absence of 
strong FC networks, but not when the funds can form strong information channels with 
the holding companies. 
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2.5.3.    Do intra-family networks substitute for external networks? 
 
 The baseline results presented thus far support the implications of the theory in this 
paper. However, there remains a concern that other factors, which may impact 
performance in general, are the underlying differences between the funds and not the 
information networks. For example, funds with stronger FF networks may be part of 
bigger family complexes, while the weaker FF network funds belong to small families. In 
this case, the unaccounted differences in family characteristics can be driving the 
differences in performance, instead of variations in the extent of FF networks that the 
fund can avail. Moreover, family size is also likely to be a proxy for the level of intra-
family information channels that is available to a fund manager.9 It may be the case that 
external networks with other fund managers are only important for managers who do not 
have substantial information sources within the complex. 
 In Table 2.4., the issue of family size is addressed. To make sure that comparisons are 
made between funds in similar families, each quarter the sample of funds is sorted by the 
number of funds in the family. The funds are then sorted into terciles comprising small, 
medium and large family funds. The fund managers from small families (with average 
funds in family being approximately 10) are least likely to gain from the intra-family 
informal interactions that facilitate information transfers. The fund managers from large 
fund families (average number of funds in family being approximately 188) are likely to 
have more intra-family information channels, in addition to the availability of resources  
                                                 
9 To the extent that family size reflects organizational differences, Stein (2002) also 
posits that hierarchical versus decentralized structures that may characterize big versus 
small complexes respectively, hinder or encourage the collection and use of “soft 
information” (like the information gathered via informal communications) by managers. 
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 Table 2.4.  
Performance of Mutual Funds and Information Networks (by family size) 
 
Every quarter during Sept 2003-Dec 2005, the likelihood of a fund-company (FC) information network existing between each fund 
manager j and each company issuing stock n that is held in j’s portfolio is computed as LFC(Network)j,n = 1/(1+ Distancej,n). Here, 
Distancej,n is the geographical distance between the city where fund j is located and the city in which company n is headquartered. 
Every quarter, each fund is split into a Strong Fund-Company Network portion (defined as any holding in the highest LFC(Network)j,n 
decile among all the fund’s holdings in the same quarter) and a Weak Fund-Company Network portion (defined as any holding in the  
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where, i =1,…N are all funds not in the same family as fund j, LFF(Network)j,i = 1/(1+ Distancej,i), and Distancej,i= distance in km. 
between city of fund i and fund j. Network quintiles are computed by sorting all funds in the sample into quintile groups according to 
the network measure computed above. Strong Fund-Fund (F-F) Network funds are the funds in the highest network quintile and Weak 


















iR  is the value-weighted monthly return of stock i’s DGTW quintle benchmark portfolio (following Daniel et al. (1997)). 
Returns (expressed in annual percentage rates) are value-weighted by fund total net assets (TNA) and averaged across quarters. 
Standard deviation of portfolio returns (in percentage) is calculated for each fund and is reported as a value-weighted average by fund 







Panel A: Small Intra-family Network funds (Mean #funds/family=10.6) 
 Weak Fund-Fund (FF) Network 
(1)  
Strong Fund-Fund (FF)  Network 
(2) 
 
Risk-adjusted Returns  
(Std. Dev. (in %)) 
 Risk-adjusted Returns 
(Std. Dev. (in %)) 
Marginal Impact: 
Strong-Weak FF Net. 
[t-statistic] 
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[t-statistic] 
7.06***   
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No. of Fund-Quarter Obs.: 1,464  1,291  
Panel B: Large Intra-family Network funds (Mean #funds/family= 188.3) 
 Weak Fund-Fund (FF) Network 
(1)  
Strong Fund-Fund (FF)  Network 
(2) 
 
Risk-adjusted Returns  
(Std. Dev. (in %)) 
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(Std. Dev. (in %)) 
Marginal Impact: 
Strong-Weak FF Net. 
[t-statistic] 
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(like research units etc.) that a large family can provide to gather information. On the 
other hand, fund managers from larger families may also be more reputed among peers, 
facilitating the formation of networks with other managers. So, while fund managers 
from larger families may have the least need for information from informal external 
channels, they are the most likely to have informal information networks available to 
them. 
 Panel A reports results for the subsample of funds forming the smallest family size 
tercile and were also ranked in either the weakest or strongest FF network quintiles. 
Consistent with the baseline results, the marginal impact of FC networks continues to be 
positive and significant for funds with weak FF networks. The risk-adjusted returns on 
holdings in companies where strong FC networks exist exceed holdings associated with 
weak FC information channels by 7.06% annually, with significant at the 1% level. 
Again, the funds in strong FF network areas underperform in their strong FC network 
holdings compared to weak FC network holdings by 0.86% (at 1% level significance). 
The substantial difference in results compared to baseline results is for the marginal 
impact of FF information networks for these funds from small families. The empirical 
evidence suggests that, unlike for the universe of funds in the sample, fund managers 
from these small families are unable to take advantage of being in strong FF network 
areas. The marginal impact of FF networks is statistically insignificant, and the 
magnitude is negative. 
In Panel B, the results for the funds belonging to the largest family complexes and 
also ranked in either the weakest or strongest FF network quintiles are presented. For 
weak FF network funds from large families, the marginal impact of strong FC networks 
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on risk-adjusted portfolio returns is positive and significant (at 1%) with magnitude 
12.83% annually. In contrast, the strong FF network funds from large families 
underperform on their strong FC network holdings compared to weak FC network 
holdings by 6.35%. These results are qualitatively similar to the baseline results, with the 
marginal impact of FC networks for large family funds with weak FF networks being 
more pronounced than for the baseline analyses. Additionally, the marginal impact of FF 
networks remains significant even for funds from large FF network families. Therefore, 
the evidence does not indicate that intra-family information networks replace external 
information networks. For holdings associated with strong FC networks, large family 
funds with weak FF networks outperform large family funds with strong FF networks by 
11.77%, compared to the 8.90% for the baseline results. For these large family funds, the 
marginal impact of FF networks on returns from holdings where there are weak FC 
networks is 7.41%, compared to the marginal impact of 2.89% for the full sample.  
Overall, the results suggest that marginal impacts of informal information networks is 
bigger for funds belonging to large families, and intra-family networks do not 
compensate for external networks. It may be concluded that funds from larger complexes 
leverage their reputation and visibility among their peers to form informal networks that 
produce more magnified informational advantages than fund managers from small 
families. Also, it is likely that larger fund families systematically hire managers with 
more ability than small fund families. The magnified marginal impacts of FC and FF 
information networks are consistent with the theoretical model, with managers likely to 
have more ability being able to generate bigger marginal impact of differential 
information on investment performance. 
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2.5.4.    Are bigger funds better at using information networks? 
 
 Fund size has been shown to proxy for various unobservable fund- and manager-
specific factors. Stein (2002) posits that the difference between decentralized and 
hierarchical organizational forms determines performance in capital allocation in 
information-intensive projects. For this reason, it is important to look at the impact of 
informal information processes (largely “soft information” that cannot be immediately 
verified) separately for both organizational forms in the mutual fund industry. Also, Berk 
and Green (2004) argue that larger funds have managers with more managerial skills. By 
comparing the marginal impacts of information networks separately for large and small 
funds, it may be possible to see whether there is a role played by managerial ability in 
determining the marginal impact of informal information networks. The theoretical 
model posits that the marginal impact of differential information on investment 
performance will be higher for managers with more skills, since they have more ability to 
process information into accurate strategies. Comparisons within fund size categories 
also act as robustness checks to uncover whether the baseline results hold across the 
spectrum of funds. 
 Table 2.5. presents the analyses of risk-adjusted performance on holdings across fund 
size terciles. Funds each quarter are ranked into size terciles based on total net assets 
(TNA). Due to space considerations, results for medium sized funds are excluded since 
they are qualitatively similar to those for small and large funds. Panel A reports the 
analyses for the subsample of funds forming the smallest fund size tercile (with mean 
TNA $16 million) that were also ranked in either the weakest or strongest FF network 




Performance of Mutual Funds and Information Networks (by fund size) 
 
Every quarter during Sept 2003-Dec 2005, the likelihood of a fund-company (FC) information network existing between 
each fund manager j and each company issuing stock n that is held in j’s portfolio is computed as LFC(Network)j,n = 1/(1+ 
Distancej,n). Here, Distancej,n is the geographical distance between the city where fund j is located and the city in which 
company n is headquartered. Every quarter, each fund is split into a Strong Fund-Company Network portion (defined as 
any holding in the highest LFC(Network)j,n decile among all the fund’s holdings in the same quarter) and a Weak Fund-
Company Network portion (defined as any holding in the  lowest LFC(Network)j,n decile among all the fund’s holdings in 
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where, i =1,…N are all funds not in the same family as fund j, LFF(Network)j,i = 1/(1+ Distancej,i), and Distancej,i= 
distance in km. between city of fund i and fund j. Network quintiles are computed by sorting all funds in the sample into 
quintile groups according to the network measure computed above. Strong Fund-Fund (F-F) Network funds are the funds 
in the highest network quintile and Weak Fund-Fund (F-F) Network funds are funds in the lowest network quintile. Risk-

















iR  is the value-weighted monthly return of stock i’s DGTW quintle benchmark portfolio (following Daniel et 
al. (1997)). Returns (expressed in annual percentage rates) are value-weighted by fund total net assets (TNA) and averaged 
across quarters. Standard deviation of portfolio returns (in percentage) is calculated for each fund and is reported as a 






















Panel A: Small Funds (Mean TNA= $16 mill) 
 Weak Fund-Fund (FF) Network 
(1)  
Strong Fund-Fund (FF)  Network 
(2) 
 
Risk-adjusted Returns  
(Std. Dev. (in %)) 
 Risk-adjusted Returns 
(Std. Dev. (in %)) 
Marginal Impact: 
Strong-Weak FF Net. 
[t-statistic] 
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1,221  1,155  
Panel B: Large Funds (Mean TNA= $1,563 mill) 
 Weak Fund-Fund (FF) Network 
(1)  
Strong Fund-Fund (FF)  Network 
(2) 
 
Risk-adjusted Returns  
(Std. Dev. (in %)) 
 Risk-adjusted Returns 
(Std. Dev. (in %)) 
Marginal Impact: 
Strong-Weak FF Net. 
[t-statistic] 
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No. of Fund-Quarter Obs.: 662  1,012  
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weak FF network funds compared to strong FF network funds, supporting the prediction 
that information advantages are higher for more exclusive FC networks. The marginal 
impact is positive (3.50%) for the weak FF network funds and negative (-2.69%) for the 
strong FF network funds. Also, the marginal impact of FF networks remains significantly 
negative (-4.27%) for holdings with strong FC information channels, and significantly 
positive (1.92%) in the absence of FC networks. In Panel B, the subsample of funds 
forming the largest fund size tercile (with mean TNA $1,563 million) that were also 
independently ranked in either the weakest or strongest FF network quintiles are 
included. Again, consistent with evidence presented so far, the marginal impact of 
differential information acquired via strong FC networks is higher for weak FF network 
funds compared to funds with strong FF information networks. Weak FF network funds 
are able to generate an additional 5.40% risk-adjusted return on investments in companies 
with which they have strong FC networks, compared to the marginal impact of 3.50% for 
small funds in Panel A. For investments in companies associated with strong FC 
networks, strong FF network funds underperform weak FF network funds by 9.65% 
annually. On the other hand, the strong FF network funds outperform the weak FF 
network funds by 2.56% annually in investments lacking substantial FC networks, 
compared to a corresponding value of 1.92% for small funds (See Panel A). 
 To summarize, the evidence on the marginal impact of information networks holds 
across fund sizes. Moreover, to the extent that fund sizes reflect managerial ability, the 
empirical findings support the notion that managers with more skills are able to generate 
higher performance from differential information acquired via informal interactions.      
 
54 
2.5.5.    Fund age, information networks and performance 
 
 One important aspect of informal information networks that has not been considered 
so far is the role of fund experience on the development of these information channels. 
While the primary measures of information networks employed in this paper depend on 
cross-sectional variations in the likelihood of a fund manager’s informal interactions, 
fund experience may be an important determinant of the extent of networks developed 
over time. Consider the fundamental findings in sociology and economics on which the 
network measures are developed. The likelihood of existence of an information network 
is considered to be a function of the likelihood of a random interaction via social or 
business connections. Though most of this paper models the likelihood of a random 
interaction as a function of geographical distance (known to translate into social 
distance), the likelihood of a random interaction is also likely to be a function of the 
length of time the fund has been a participant in the market. In effect, funds that have 
been a part of the mutual fund industry for a long time may have the opportunity to 
develop informal information channels, irrespective of geographical factors.  
 In Table 2.6., the role of information networks in generating risk-adjusted returns is 
examined across experienced and inexperienced funds. Fund age is measured as the 
number of years between the first offer date and the portfolio quarter. The funds are 
ranked into terciles by fund age, with the lowest tercile being the young funds (median 
age 3 years) and highest tercile being the old funds (median age 14 years). The young and 
old funds that were also ranked in the weakest and strongest FF network quintiles are 
included in the two groups. 




Performance of Mutual Funds and Information Networks (by fund age) 
 
Every quarter during Sept 2003-Dec 2005, the likelihood of a fund-company (FC) information network existing between each 
fund manager j and each company issuing stock n that is held in j’s portfolio is computed as LFC(Network)j,n = 1/(1+ 
Distancej,n). Here, Distancej,n is the geographical distance between the city where fund j is located and the city in which 
company n is headquartered. Every quarter, each fund is split into a Strong Fund-Company Network portion (defined as any 
holding in the highest LFC(Network)j,n decile among all the fund’s holdings in the same quarter) and a Weak Fund-Company 
Network portion (defined as any holding in the  lowest LFC(Network)j,n decile among all the fund’s holdings in the same 
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where, i =1,…N are all funds not in the same family as fund j, LFF(Network)j,i = 1/(1+ Distancej,i), and Distancej,i= distance in 
km. between city of fund i and fund j. Network quintiles are computed by sorting all funds in the sample into quintile groups 
according to the network measure computed above. Strong Fund-Fund (F-F) Network funds are the funds in the highest 
network quintile and Weak Fund-Fund (F-F) Network funds are funds in the lowest network quintile. Risk-adjusted portfolio 

















iR  is the value-weighted monthly return of stock i’s DGTW quintle benchmark portfolio (following Daniel et al. 
(1997)). Returns (expressed in annual percentage rates) are value-weighted by fund total net assets (TNA) and averaged across 
quarters. Standard deviation of portfolio returns (in percentage) is calculated for each fund and is reported as a value-weighted 








Panel A: Young Funds (Median Fund Age= 3 years) 
 Weak Fund-Fund (FF) Network 
(1)  
Strong Fund-Fund (FF)  Network 
(2) 
 
Risk-adjusted Returns  
(Std. Dev. (in %)) 
 Risk-adjusted Returns 
(Std. Dev. (in %)) 
Marginal Impact: 
Strong-Weak FF Net. 
[t-statistic] 
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No. of Fund-Quarter Obs.: 1,337  1,158  
Panel B: Old Funds (Median Fund Age= 14 years) 
 Weak Fund-Fund (FF) Network 
(1)  
Strong Fund-Fund (FF)  Network 
(2) 
 
Risk-adjusted Returns  
(Std. Dev. (in %)) 
 Risk-adjusted Returns 
(Std. Dev. (in %)) 
Marginal Impact: 
Strong-Weak FF Net. 
[t-statistic] 
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No. of Fund-Quarter Obs.: 944  1,199  
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 As shown in Panel A, young funds are able to leverage strong FC information 
channels and outperform in their holdings with weak FC networks by 2.53%. Also, the 
marginal impact of FC networks remains bigger for weak FF network funds compared to 
strong FF network funds. Weak FF network funds outperform strong FF network funds 
in holdings associated with strong FC networks by 7.19% annually. However, the results 
for marginal impact of FF networks on performance of investments in weak FC network 
companies for these young funds differs from the evidence so far. Young funds in strong 
FF network areas fail to capitalize on FF networks, and underperform weak FF network 
young funds in both strong and weak FC network investments. The results suggest that 
young funds are neither able to gain information advantages via informal interactions 
with companies in areas where there are many funds present, nor are they able to generate 
superior performance using information acquired via networks with other fund managers.  
Panel B reports the evidence for the subsample of old funds. Interestingly, while most 
results do not change, the marginal impact of FF networks in generating superior 
performance on holdings with weak FC networks loses significance. This is consistent 
with the notion that experienced funds, while located in weak FF network areas, can 
build informal information channels over time that are similar to funds in strong FF 
network areas. In other words, it is possible that spatial limitations to informal 
interactions are overcome by the opportunity to form informal information links over 
time. Moreover, while the marginal impacts of FF networks on investment performance 
decreases for older funds, the marginal impact of FC networks is more pronounced 
compared to younger funds. These results suggest that while informal networks among 
funds can be independent of spatial boundaries, information channels with companies can 
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become stronger over time and increase the degree of differential information that a fund 
manager can acquire via fund-company networks. 
 
 
2.5.6.    Do information networks matter when information availability is high? 
 
 The potential to create differential information about an asset may be insubstantial 
when information availability about the future value of an asset is high. The information 
availability of a company depends on the size, since larger firms are more visible and get 
more attention from media, analysts etc. In general, the information in the public domain 
about large firms is much higher than for small firms. It may be possible that the role of 
informal information networks is insignificant for investments in the stocks of large 
companies, where most pertinent information is publicly available. 
In Table 2.7., the baseline analyses are repeated for the subset of stock holdings in 
companies that were ranked in the fourth and fifth highest DGTW size quintiles. Results 
are qualitatively similar to the findings so far and suggest that informal information 
networks have significant marginal impact on performance even when information 
availability about the assets is high. The marginal impact of FC networks is higher when 
fewer funds have FC networks with the same companies. Conditional on the existence of 
weak FF networks, FC networks have a positive and significant marginal impact of 
4.74% annually on risk-adjusted returns. Strong FF network funds underperform weak 
FF network funds in their strong FC network holdings by 9.58%. For weak FC network 
holdings, FF networks have a positive marginal impact of 2.32%, significant at the 5% 




Performance in Large Cap Stocks and Information Networks 
 
Every quarter during Sept 2003-Dec 2005, the likelihood of a fund-company (FC) information network existing between each fund manager j and each 
company issuing stock n that is held in j’s portfolio is computed as LFC(Network)j,n = 1/(1+ Distancej,n). Here, Distancej,n is the geographical distance 
between the city where fund j is located and the city in which company n is headquartered. Every quarter, each fund is split into a Strong Fund-
Company Network portion (defined as any holding in the highest LFC(Network)j,n decile among all the fund’s holdings in the same quarter) and a Weak 
Fund-Company Network portion (defined as any holding in the  lowest LFC(Network)j,n decile among all the fund’s holdings in the same quarter). Fund-
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where, i =1,…N are all funds not in the same family as fund j, LFF(Network)j,i = 1/(1+ Distancej,i), and Distancej,i= distance in km. between city of fund 
i and fund j. Network quintiles are computed by sorting all funds in the sample into quintile groups according to the network measure computed above.  
Strong Fund-Fund (F-F) Network funds are the funds in the highest network quintile and  Weak Fund-Fund (F-F) Network funds are funds in the 

















iR  is the value-weighted monthly return of stock i’s DGTW quintle benchmark portfolio (following Daniel et al. (1997)). Returns 
(expressed in annual percentage rates) are value-weighted by fund total net assets (TNA) and averaged across quarters. Standard deviation of portfolio 
returns (in percentage) is calculated for each fund and is reported as a value-weighted average by fund TNA. *, **, *** represent significance at 10%, 5% 
and 1% level respectively. 
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No. of Fund-Quarter Obs.: 2,430 2,763  
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highest DGTW size quintile only, and results hold. To summarize, results on the marginal 
impact of informal information networks hold for mutual fund investments in stocks that 
have high information availability associated with them. 
 
 
2.5.7.    Copycat portfolios and future asset prices 
 
 Based on the empirical analyses in this paper, the portfolios that show superior 
performance are (1) strong fund-company network portfolios for funds with weak fund-
fund networks, and (2) weak fund-company network portfolios for funds with strong 
fund-fund networks. The results suggest that the information used to drive investments in 
these holdings is superior to other information channels. It is possible that fund 
investments made based on the information acquired via these ‘superior’ networks are 
indicative of longer term future values of the stocks, beyond the horizon of three-month 
quarterly portfolios. If so, since fund holdings become publicly available information at 
the end of each portfolio quarter, then there are ways to infer future values of these assets 
based on observing these portfolio strategies. 
In Table 2.8., a preliminary examination of identifying superior information networks 
of mutual fund managers and their relationship with future value of the stocks chosen is 
presented. Using fund holdings reported in the previous quarter (which is stale 
information for all subsequent quarters), a hypothetical or ‘copycat’ portfolio is 
constructed including the stocks of holdings which were chosen by the two information 
networks that generate superior risk-adjusted returns in mutual fund investments, called 




Hypothetical Portfolio Strategies based on Information Networks 
 
Every quarter during Sept 2003-Dec 2005, the likelihood of a fund-company (FC) information network existing between each 
fund manager j and each company issuing stock n that is held in j’s portfolio is computed as LFC(Network)j,n = 1/(1+ Distancej,n). 
Here, Distancej,n is the geographical distance between the city where fund j is located and the city in which company n is 
headquartered. Every quarter, each fund is split into a Strong Fund-Company Network portion (defined as any holding in the 
highest LFC(Network)j,n decile among all the fund’s holdings in the same quarter) and a Weak Fund-Company Network portion 
(defined as any holding in the  lowest LFC(Network)j,n decile among all the fund’s holdings in the same quarter). Fund-fund (FF) 
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where, i =1,…N are all funds not in the same family as fund j, LFF(Network)j,i = 1/(1+ Distancej,i), and Distancej,i= distance in 
km. between city of fund i and fund j. Network quintiles are computed by sorting all funds in the sample into quintile groups 
according to the network measure computed above.  Strong Fund-Fund (F-F) Network funds are the funds in the highest network 
quintile and  Weak Fund-Fund (F-F) Network funds are funds in the lowest network quintile. We generate a hypothetical 
portfolio called the “Best Information Portfolio” (BIP) comprising of stocks which are classified as (1) Strong Fund-Company 
Network stocks for Weak Fund-Fund Network funds and (2) Weak Fund-Company Network stocks for Strong Fund-Fund 
Network funds. BIP is formed at the beginning of month t, based on the publicly released information on mutual fund holdings 
for a quarter comprising months t-3, t-2, t-1. Panel A reports the average monthly returns of an equally-weighted portfolio of BIP 
stocks for 3-, 6-, …, 24-month holding periods. Panel B reports risk-adjusted returns for value-weighted portfolios based on the 
dollar value of the holding in a fund’s quarterly report. Risk-adjustment is done using benchmark portfolio returns computed 

































BIP (All Qtr) 8,488 0.017 0.014 0.012 0.012 0.013 0.011 0.012 0.014 
  (23.92) (3.11) (2.60) (2.36) (2.38) (2.22) (1.88) (1.65) 
          
BIP (Qtr 1) 987 0.049 0.033 0.022 0.014 0.021 0.015 0.015 0.016 
  (22.05) (22.35) (18.37) (13.55) (23.70) (17.26) (18.85) (20.98) 
BIP (Qtr 2) 995 0.017 0.010 0.003 0.014 0.008 0.009 0.011 0.011 
  (8.43) (7.03) (2.18) (15.10) (8.45) (10.70) (13.24) (14.38) 
BIP (Qtr 3) 877 0.004 -0.004 0.013 0.005 0.008 0.010 0.010  
  (1.83) (-2.64) (12.51) (5.18) (8.38) (11.52) (11.96)  
BIP (Qtr 4) 1,050 0.002 0.021 0.008 0.011 0.013 0.010   
  (0.87) (17.47) (7.39) (11.54) (14.84) (12.41)   
BIP (Qtr 5) 889 0.047 0.015 0.015 0.017 0.016    
  (25.02) (11.43) (14.45) (17.16) (18.24)    
BIP (Qtr 6) 896 -0.018 -0.001 0.006 0.007     
  (-9.09) (-0.44) (5.45) (7.06)     
BIP (Qtr 7) 970 0.026 0.019 0.016      
  (13.17) (14.10) (12.43)      
BIP (Qtr 8) 1,019 0.015 0.017       
  (7.29) (11.70)       
BIP (Qtr 9) 943 0.010        
  (5.69)        
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BIP-Bench. 8,488 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.005 0.006 0.006 0.004 0.005 
  (2.61) (3.11) (2.61) (2.36) (2.38) (2.23) (1.88) (1.65) 
          
HP (Qtr 1) 987 0.006 0.005 0.007 0.005 0.007 0.007 0.005 0.005 
  (1.28) (2.14) (2.40) (1.60) (1.51) (1.34) (1.19) (1.20) 
HP (Qtr 2) 995 0.005 0.008 0.004 0.007 0.006 0.004 0.006 0.007 
  (0.82) (1.51) (0.80) (1.08) (0.98) (0.88) (1.03) (1.16) 
HP (Qtr 3) 877 0.009 0.010 0.010 0.006 0.005 0.007 0.003  
  (1.71) (1.28) (1.16) (0.93) (0.93) (1.20) (1.60)  
HP (Qtr 4) 1,050 0.001 0.007 0.005 0.003 0.005 0.007   
  (-0.23) (0.97) (0.81) (0.57) (0.93) (1.07)   
HP (Qtr 5) 889 0.013 0.009 0.003 0.006 0.007    
  (1.30) (1.00) (0.55) (1.08) (1.16)    
HP (Qtr 6) 896 0.006 0.000 0.006 0.006     
  (0.71) (0.08) (1.01) (1.08)     
HP (Qtr 7) 970 0.002 0.005 0.007      
  (0.50) (1.62) (1.68)      
HP (Qtr 8) 1,019 0.008 0.007       
  (1.35) (2.10)       
HP (Qtr 9) 943 0.004        
    (0.89)        
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the two information portfolios with superior performance from reports at the end of a 
quarter, and holds it starting the first month of the next quarter for up to two years (the 
maximum time horizon allowed based on our data).  
Panel A presents returns for three to twenty-four month holding strategies, with three 
month increments. Average monthly raw returns for the BIP are positive and significant 
for all eight holding periods, with somewhat decreasing statistical significance as the 
portfolio horizon increases. The returns on these portfolio strategies range between the 
maximum of 1.70% (with t-statistic of 23.92) for the first three months following the 
quarter for which the holdings are reported by mutual funds, and the minimum of 1.1% 
(with t-statistic of 2.22) for the 18-month holding strategy. The returns on the eight 
holdings strategies are also presented separately for the nine sets of quarterly reports that 
form the dataset used in this paper. This is done as a robustness check to detect if outliers 
in portfolio strategy returns drive the significance of the aggregated findings. Using the 
reported holdings of each of the nine quarters separately, the copycat portfolios are 
constructed for the eight holdings periods. The first three-month holding strategy 
generates significantly positive returns for seven of the nine quarters, with the maximum 
average monthly return of 4.90% for the first quarter. Similarly, the results for the seven 
other holding periods also hold and are not driven by outliers. However, these returns 
may be a compensation for the risk borne by these portfolios. 
In Panel B, risk-adjusted returns are used instead of raw returns. Average risk-
adjusted monthly returns of the BIP are also significantly positive for the eight holding 
periods, although they are of considerably smaller magnitude than raw returns. Overall, 
the average monthly risk-adjusted return on the eight holding strategies range between 
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0.6% and 0.4%. Results suggest that there may be potential asset pricing implications of 
identifying more efficient investor information networks, where certain information 
networks are more likely to predict superior future stock performance. A more 
comprehensive investigation of these asset pricing implications is beyond the scope of 





This study provides new insights on the role of informal information channels on the 
ability of money managers to generate superior performance from holdings. The focus is 
on two forms of informal information networks that exist in the mutual fund industry: (1) 
fund-fund information networks, which transfer information between fund managers 
about potential investment opportunities; and (2) fund-company information networks, 
which facilitate a manager’s acquisition of differential information about a company via 
networks with the companies. By studying marginal impacts of these information 
channels, empirical challenges associated with distinguishing the relationship between 
informal information networks and net fund performance are largely avoided.  
It is shown that information networks have substantial marginal impacts on 
performance of holdings. In general, superior stock selection ability is shown by strong 
fund-fund (fund-company) networks in the absence of strong fund-company (fund-fund) 
networks. Results uncover poor performance in holdings when strong fund-company 
networks overlap for many fund managers, i.e. are less exclusive, possibly via dilution of 
informational advantages. Overall findings hold across fund size, family size, fund age 
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and investments in large cap stocks having high information availability. Results are also 
consistent with the notion that higher managerial ability allows managers to better 
translate information acquired via informal interactions into positive performance. 
Copying the stock selections of superior information networks, in months subsequent to 
when the quarterly reports become public, generate significantly positive monthly risk-
adjusted returns. The results allude to the possibility that certain superior information 
networks can identify misvaluations in asset prices that persist beyond the portfolio 
quarter. While this may be in violation of the semistrong form of market efficiency, if a 
sizeable group of investors begin to implement these copycat strategies, the gains may be 
short-lived or disappear. 
While informal information networks have often been recognized in sociology and to 
some extent in economics, formal studies on their role in financial markets is a recent 
phenomenon. The findings in this paper suggest that managerial skills in networking with 
relevant, efficient and exclusive informal information sources can improve performance 
in professional investment management. Evidence on the superiority of certain 
information networks and the predictive value of their investments allude to asset pricing 
implications of investor networks, an intriguing avenue for future research. Another facet 
of the existence of informal communication and information sharing in financial markets 
that demands exploration, both empirically and theoretically, are the incentives and 
externalities that drive market participants to pool information. 
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CHAPTER 3 
WHEN MUTUAL FUND MANAGERS DEVIATE FROM THEIR PEERS: 





“Worldly wisdom teaches that it is better for reputation to fail conventionally than to 
succeed unconventionally.”  
- John Maynard Keynes 
 
 Previous literature has suggested that there exist substantial incentives, like 
reputational concerns, for mutual fund managers to herd with other fund managers in 
their portfolio strategies. Scharfstein and Stein (1990) were among the first to depict the 
tendency and incentives to herd among investment managers. Some other studies which 
study herding behavior are Banerjee (1992), Bikhchandani et al. (1992), Froot et al. 
(1992), Grinblatt and Keloharju (2000), among others. On the other hand, Grinblatt et al. 
(1995) find relatively weak empirical evidence of herding among mutual fund managers. 
Researchers have also been concerned about the potential increase in volatility of asset 
prices caused by herding. The recent stock market bubble in the late 1990s, driven by 
overpricing of U.S. technology stocks, is often cited as anecdotal evidence of the dark 
side of herding among investors in capital markets. A recent article in the New York 
Times says that “mutual funds are a destabilizing force in the stock market”, further 
stating that there are profit opportunities for investors who follow contrarian strategies 
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relative to the herd.10 There is some evidence in the academic literature that implicitly 
indicates potential gains from strategies that deviate away from benchmarks. For 
example, Kacperczyk, Sialm and Zheng (2005) show that funds which have higher 
industry concentration in their portfolios outperform well-diversified industry portfolios. 
Baks, Busse and Green (2007) find that fund manages who take bigger bets in a few 
stocks outperform those who do not.  
 In general, herding may be reflected in the tendency of mutual fund managers to 
follow similar buying and selling decisions and portfolio allocations. However, given the 
incentives to follow their peers, the instances where fund managers deviate away from 
the strategies of others may contain information pertinent to mutual fund investors.  
 Mutual fund managers may deviate from the portfolio allocation strategies of their peers 
due to various reasons. They may deviate by overweighting or underweighting stocks, 
relative to their peers’ allocations, based on private information. A fund manager’s deviating 
tendency may also be because of a conflict of interest between the manager and the investors. 
Due to the well documented asymmetric relationship between flow and performance (see, 
Sirri and Tufano (1998)), investors substantially reward superior performance but do not 
proportionately penalize poor performance. In this case, a fund manager may deviate from 
peers and follow riskier strategies to increase chances of outperforming other managers.11 In 
summary, there may be several different reasons including irrationality, information or 
agency problems which may lead fund managers to deviate from the choices made by their 
                                                 
10 New York Times (April 8th, 2007), Mark Hubert, “How to Find Profit Away From the 
Herd” 
 
11 See Brown, Harlow and Starks (1995). 
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peers. However, the different drivers of deviation strategies should have different 
implications for performance. If informed trading generates deviating tendencies among fund 
managers, then we should observe higher future performance as a consequence of deviations. 
On the other hand, if the deviations arise out of agency problems or irrational biases like 
managerial overconfidence, the performance impact is likely to be negative. Finally, if 
deviations are random and are not a systematic indication of information, then it is unlikely 
that there is a detectable relationship between performance and managers’ deviating 
tendencies. 
 Using the portfolio allocations of actively managed funds in the U.S. for ten quarters 
in the period July 2003-December 2005, we conduct an empirical investigation into the 
potential causes and consequences of fund managers’ deviating tendencies relative to 
their peers. We measure the deviating tendency of a fund manager in a portfolio quarter 
as the absolute deviation of the allocated portfolio weight in a stock (as percentage of 
total net assets (TNA)) from the mean weight allocated to the stock by other fund 
managers in the same peer group, averaged across all stocks held by the peer group. For 
instance, if a fund manager on average overweights or underweights stocks by 2% of the 
TNA relative to the mean portfolio weights allocated by other managers in her peer group 
to the same stocks, her deviating tendency would be computed as 2%. We consider three 
alternative definitions of ‘peer group’ for fund managers: all other funds in the sample, 
all other funds in the same objective, and all other funds in the same objective and of 
similar size. We also conduct various robustness checks for alternative definitions of peer 
groups and fund objective classifications. 
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 Firstly, we examine the determinants of fund managers’ deviating tendencies. The 
deviating tendency of a fund manager decreases with the fund size, family size, fund 
turnover, and strength of networks with other mutual fund managers. We measure 
networks between fund managers as function of geographical proximity, in which case 
our results suggest that managers located in areas with a higher concentration of fund 
managers are less likely to deviate from their peers. We also find a non-linear 
relationship between a manager’s deviating tendency and past fund performance, 
indicating a U-shaped relationship between deviating tendency and past performance. 
Therefore, the best and worst performers deviate more than the intermediate performers 
in subsequent periods. Additionally, single manager funds and funds investing in larger 
(higher momentum) stocks have a higher (lower) deviating tendency. Moreover, we find 
striking persistence in deviating tendencies over time. 
 Secondly, we investigate the relationship between fund performance and deviating 
tendency using clustered multivariate OLS regressions. The empirical findings suggest a 
significantly negative relationship between deviating tendency and contemporaneous 
fund performance relative to their objectives, after controlling for various factors. 
Deviating tendencies also seem to partially predict future underperformance of the fund. 
The results are robust to the definition of peer group and hold across different fund size 
and past performance categories. 
 Lastly, we dig deeper into the consequences of a fund manager’s decision to deviate 
from the portfolio allocation strategies of their peers by employing a portfolio 
decomposition approach. Each fund manager’s portfolio holdings are ranked into deciles 
by the magnitude of deviation, with the highest (lowest) decile comprising the most 
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overweighted (underweighted) stocks, relative to the weights allocated by other managers 
in the peer group. If the manager deviates based on information, the portfolio of 
overweighted stocks should in general outperform the portfolio of underweighted stocks 
in the future. However, the findings contradict this ‘information hypothesis’. In fact, the 
average fund manager overweights stocks that subsequently underperform compared to 
the stocks that the manager underweights. The underperformance is significant and the 
magnitude is an annualized benchmark-adjusted return of about -4.6%.12 These findings 
hold across peer group definitions, fund size categories and fund past performance 
categories.  
 This paper broadly contributes to the literature on informed trading and herding in 
capital markets. Most existing literature has focused attention on the incentives and 
consequences of herding by investors in stock markets. In spirit, our study focuses on the 
reverse dimension of herding, i.e the situations where fund managers deviate from their 
peers’ strategies. There are several important implications of the findings that fund 
managers display persistent deviating tendencies and higher deviations are associated 
with underperformance both at the fund and the holdings’ level. The results suggest that 
mutual fund investors who are unable to identify skilled portfolio managers may do better 
by avoiding funds which have higher disparity in portfolio allocations relative to 
comparable funds. Also, if managers’ deviating tendencies have a detrimental impact on 
performance, the persistence in deviating tendencies seem to suggest agency problems in 
the investment management industry. 
                                                 
12 Benchmark-adjusted returns are computed following the methodology of Daniel et al. 
(1997) 
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 The remaining paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2. discusses the data used for 
the empirical study. Section 3.3. discusses the empirical methodology employed in the 





The primary data source used in this study is the CRSP Survivor-bias Free US Mutual 
Fund Database (MFDB) which provides data on fund characteristics and returns. In 
January 2005, CRSP added a mutual fund holdings database that includes stocks, bonds, 
mortgage-backed securities, other mutual funds, futures and options, among others. 
CRSP holdings data includes information on the market value of the holdings, number of 
shares held and names of securities, from reports dating September 2003 to December 
2005. Fund holdings in some cases are reported for quarters before September 2003, but 
we exclude these because of largely missing data on a majority of the funds. For our 
analyses, quarterly data for the ten quarters between September 2003 and December 2005 
is obtained. Portfolio holdings are usually reported at the end of each quarter, where the 
portfolio information is effective in the previous three months. 
Given that the CRSP holdings database is relatively new, we verify the accuracy of 
the information by spot matching with the CDA/Spectrum database that has been widely 
used for accessing mutual fund holdings information. The identification and amount 
invested information for holdings are nearly identical between the two databases with 
negligible difference.  
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We first construct the sample of funds by choosing US equity funds primarily 
investing in domestic equity (excluding index, sector and bond funds) having aggressive 
growth, growth, growth and income or balanced as stated objective categories from 
CRSP MFDB. We finally follow Kacperzcyk et al. (2005) and select funds with ICDI 
objective codes: AG, GI, LG, IN. We also impose a minimum fund size criterion of $5 
million in total net assets for the fund to be included in the sample. 
Our final sample consists of 1,631 unique funds in the sample period. The main fund 
identifier in CRSP MFDB is the ICDI code. However, CRSP assigns multiple ICDI codes 
to different share classes of the same fund. We prevent erroneous counting of funds by 
merging information of multiple ICDI codes representing the same fund into one unique 
fund. We only include stock holdings of publicly traded companies headquartered in the 
U.S. and have stock returns data available from CRSP, and exclude other assets held in 
the portfolios. 
The holdings database uses a unique portfolio identifier that is matched to ICDI codes 
in a separate CRSP mapping file. Each portfolio code represents a unique portfolio, and 
multiple ICDI can be mapped to the same portfolio code if the underlying portfolios are 
identical. For example, multiple ICDI codes representing different share classes of the 
same fund have the same underlying portfolio, and are mapped to a common portfolio 
code. After matching the portfolio codes to ICDI codes, we match data on mutual fund 
characteristics like monthly total net assets, management company etc. with the CRSP 
MFDB. Finally, we get stock price and returns data for the holding companies from 
CRSP monthly stock files. 
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Fund location information (i.e., city and state) is obtained from Nelson’s Directory of 
Investment Managers. Disclosure database provides information on the headquarter 
location of all publicly traded companies in our sample. The city and state information of 
the funds and companies are matched to latitude and longitude coordinates from US 
Census Bureau’s freely available Gazetteer geographical data source. We use the latitude 
and longitude information to calculate geographical distances between two cities. 
Table 3.1. reports summary statistics on the sample of equity mutual funds used in 
this paper and some portfolio characteristics. The final sample of 1,631 unique mutual 
funds is managed by 381 unique investment companies for the ten quarters during July 
2003 to December 2005. There were 4,897 publicly traded stocks of U.S. companies that 
were held by these mutual fund managers in this period. The median fund in the sample 
has eight years of experience and has total net assets (TNA) of about $109 million. The 
median fund turnover is 66% per year, and the median fund portfolio size is 89 stocks. 
On a value-weighted basis, funds invest in relatively larger market cap stock in the size 




3.3. Empirical Methodology 
 
3.3.1. Performance measures  
 
We construct two measures of excess performance in using returns data from the CRSP 




Summary Statistics on U.S. Mutual Funds 
 
This table reports summary statistics for the funds in our sample. It includes U.S. mutual funds that 
invest primarily in U.S. equity as reported in CRSP Mutual Fund Database, excluding index and 
sector funds during July 2003-December 2005. Fund age is the number of years since the 
organization of the fund, in the portfolio quarter. Single manager funds (in % of funds per quarter) 
are reported as the % of funds in a portfolio quarter that are managed by a single manager, 
averaged across all quarters in the sample. Expenses are stated as the total annual management fees 
and expenses as a percentage of the year-end TNA. Turnover ratio is the fund turnover expressed 
as the minimum of purchases and sales over average TNA for the calendar year. The portfolio 
weight allocated to a stock is the amount invested in the stock as a percentage of the fund TNA. A 
fund’s objective-adjusted return is reported at the quarter level, and is winsorized below at the 1% 
level and above the 99% level. The number of companies in a fund’s portfolio is reported as the 
average across all quarters. Daniel et al (DGTW) (1997) is followed to compute the size, book-to-
market and momentum quintiles for the stocks held. 
 Mean Median Std. Dev. 
Total number of  funds in sample 1,631   
Total number of mutual fund families in sample 381   
Total number of different stocks held in sample period 4,897   
Total net assets (TNA) (in $ million) 756.75 109.35 2856.10 
Fund age (in years) 11.37 8.00 11.71 
Single manager funds (in % of funds per quarter) 34.32   
Expenses (in %) 1.29 1.26 0.43 
Turnover ratio 0.99 0.66 0.16 
Portfolio Weight of a stock (as % of TNA) 1.52 1.20 0.86 
Fund Objective-adjusted Returns in % (OAR) (quarterly) 0.05 0.02 2.17 
Portfolio characteristics:    
         Number of companies in portfolio 141 89 200 
         Value-weighted DGTW Size quintile 4.02 4.51 1.06 
         Value-weighted DGTW B/M quintile 2.57 2.54 0.47 




by subtracting the performance of the median fund in the matched investment objective 




tj RRRRRROAR 321321 111111 +++−+++=                    (1). 
Here, jR1 , 
jR2 , 
jR3 are the fund’s total returns reported in CRSP in the three months in the 
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quarter, and objR1 , 
objR2 , 
objR3 are the median returns of other funds in the same objective 
as fund j in the corresponding months. 
The advantage of employing the simplistic objective-adjusted returns (OAR) is that 
the methodology does not require a long time-series of returns data to compute the fund’s 
abnormal performance. The disadvantage of using OAR as a performance measure is that 
it ignores potentially large dispersions in risk exposures within the same objective. 
Therefore, the excess returns may just be capturing rewards for holding higher levels of 
risk rather than differences in performance. Hence, as a second measure, we also compute 
holdings’ based benchmark-adjusted abnormal returns using the methodology of Daniel 
et al. (DGTW) (1997).  
Raw returns for portfolios are computed in each portfolio quarter following DGTW 











raw RwR ,,*)/(        (2) 
  
Here, wi,t is the portfolio weight of stock i in month t, and S is the number of stocks in the 
sub-portfolio. The weights in each sub-portfolio sum to one. As the second measure of 
abnormal returns, we similarly construct risk-adjusted sub-portfolio returns for each fund 
















iR  is the value-weighted monthly return of stock i’s DGTW quintile benchmark 
portfolio (following Daniel et al. (1997)). 
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3.3.2. Measures of deviation from peer groups  
 
 Our measures of the degree to which a fund manager deviates from their peer group 
are based on the portfolio weight allocations to the stocks held in their portfolios and fall 
into two broad categories.  
 First, we examine the overall tendency of a fund manager to deviate in their portfolio 
allocations from others in their peer groups. Throughout the paper, we use three 
alternative definitions of peer groups: (i) all funds in the sample, (ii) all same objective 
funds, and (iii) all same objective and same size quartile funds. For each stock holding in 
a fund’s portfolio in a given quarter, the deviation from peer group is computed as 
 
tititi wwDeviation ,,, −=         (4) 
 
Here, tiw ,  is the portfolio weight of stock i in portfolio quarter t expressed as percent of 
TNA of the fund, and tiw ,  is the mean portfolio weight of stock i held by all other funds 
in the peer group in the same portfolio quarter. All stocks in which a fund manager’s peer 
group invested in the portfolio quarter comprises the universe of stocks considered for 
each manager. In effect, if tiDeviation ,  is positive (negative), the fund manager is 
overweighting (underweighting) stock i relative to the portfolio weight assigned to the 
stock by the fund managers peers. Table 3.2. reports summary statistics on the measures 
of deviations used in this paper. There is substantial variation in the portfolio weights (as 
% of TNA) allocated in holdings and deviation measures. 













Summary Statistics on Deviations from Peer Groups 
 
Summary statistics are for all U.S. mutual funds that invest primarily in U.S. equity as reported in 
CRSP Mutual Fund Database, excluding index and sector funds during July 2003-December 2005. 
For each stock holding in a fund’s portfolio in a given quarter, the deviation from peer group is 
computed as:  dev_perctna = (percent_tna – mean percent_tna of all other funds in the peer group 
holding the same stock). Three alternative definitions of peer groups are used: (i) all funds in the 
sample, (ii) all same objective funds, and (iii) all same objective and same size quartile funds. Daniel 
et al (DGTW) (1997) is followed to compute the size, book-to-market and momentum quintiles for 
the stocks held.  
 Peer Groups 






Mean portfolio weight (as % TNA) 0.844 0.844 0.844 
Min (Max) portfolio weight 0.00 (40.41) 0.00 (40.41) 0.000 (40.41) 
Mean deviation 0.584 0.577 0.563 
Min (Max) deviation -44.23 (47.63) -44.15 (47.24) -44.56 (49.49) 
Mean deviation:    
    DGTW Size Quintiles:  1 0.369 0.350 0.315 
                                           2 0.459 0.444 0.431 
                                           3 0.517 0.505 0.497 
                                           4 0.572 0.563 0.555 
                                           5 0.726 0.722 0.715 
    DGTW B/M Quintiles:  1 0.600 0.588 0.577 
                                           2 0.580 0.571 0.558 
                                           3 0.588 0.580 0.569 
                                           4 0.564 0.556 0.544 
                                           5 0.572 0.565 0.552 
    DGTW Mom Quintiles: 1 0.594 0.586 0.573 
                                           2 0.597 0.589 0.578 
                                           3 0.595 0.586 0.573 
                                           4 0.576 0.567 0.556 
                                           5 0.566 0.554 0.544 
 
 
Here, | tiDeviation , | is the absolute value of the deviation in portfolio weight in stock i, as 
expressed in equation (4), and S is the set of stocks held by the peer group in quarter t. 
 Second, we use a measure of within-portfolio relative holdings’ deviations for fund 
portfolios. We employ a portfolio decomposition methodology to identify the holdings in 
which a fund manager deviates the most, in terms of overweighting or underweighting, in 
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a stock relative to their peers in the concurrent quarter. For this, we rank the holdings in a 
fund’s portfolio into decile ranks based on tiDeviation , , with Decile 1 (Decile 10) 
representing the sub-portfolio of stocks where the fund manager has chosen to most 
underweight (overweight) the stock relative to the portfolio weight allocated to that stock 
by all other fund managers in the same peer group. If the tendency to deviate reflects 
private information of the manager, the holdings in which a manager overweights relative 
to the peer group should have superior future performance relative to holdings where they 
underweight relative to the peer group. 
 We use both overall fund managers’ deviation tendency measures and within-
portfolio deviation measures because (i) each produces a different measure of a fund’s 
proclivity towards deviation in a particular holding, (ii) fund-level deviations are more 
likely to capture overall managerial behavior and may be correlated with other 
heterogeneities, while within-portfolio deviation comparisons control for heterogeneities 
like managerial skills etc., and (iii) both types of measures may reflect different 
motivations for deviation. 
 
 
3.3.3. Other variables 
 
 Most of the other variables that we use in this study have been used in previous 
studies. For fund level characteristics, we consider variables that have been shown to 
matter in previous studies on fund performance. Log (TNA) is the natural logarithm of a 
fund’s total net assets reported in millions of dollars. Log (Age) is the natural logarithm of 
the fund age in years, computed from the fund’s first offer date. Turnover is the fund’s 
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turnover ratio. Single Manager dummy is a dummy variable assuming a value of 1 if the 
fund managed by one manager and 0 otherwise. Past performance (6 mths) is a measure 
of recent fund performance, and is calculated as the objective-adjusted average monthly 
return of the fund in the six months prior to the beginning of a portfolio quarter. Fund-










,)()(       (6) 
Here, i =1,…N are all funds in the same objective category but not in the same family as 
fund j, LFF(Network)j,i is the likelihood of a network existing between fund managers j 
and i, and is computed as: LFF(Network)j,i = 1/(1+ log(Distancej,i)), where Distancej,i= 
distance in km between the cities of fund i’s headquarters and fund j’s headquarters.13  
 Previous literature has indicated that there may be substantial variation in the risk 
characteristics of the portfolios held by funds in the same objective or style categories. In 
order to control for portfolio risk characteristics that are not explained by fund level 
measures, we use variables based on the three DGTW (1997) dimensions. The Value-
weighted Size, B/M and MOM Quintile variables are the value-weighted average DGTW 
size, book-to-market and momentum quintiles of the stocks held in a portfolio 
respectively. Industry_Herfindahl is a measure of the industry concentration of the fund 
portfolio, measured as the Herfindahl (summation of squared-portfolio weights allocated 
to each industry) across NCIS industry categories held by the fund. The size of a fund 
family, Log (# funds in family), is reported as the natural logarithm of the total number of 
funds under the investment management company. A pairwise correlation matrix of the 
explanatory variables used in this study is presented in Table 3.3.   
                                                 





The table reports all the pairwise correlation coefficients between variables used in regression analyses. Log (TNA) is the 
natural logarithm of a fund’s total net assets reported in $ million. Log (Age) is the natural logarithm of the fund age (in years) 
computed from the fund’s first offer date. Turnover is the fund’s turnover ratio. Single Manager dummy is a dummy variable 
assuming a value of 1 if the fund managed by one manager and 0 otherwise. Past perf. is the objective-adjusted average 
monthly return of the fund in the six months prior to the beginning of a portfolio quarter. Fund-Fund Networks for each fund j is 








j NetworkL     (Network) ,)(  
where, i =1,…N are all funds in the same objective category but not in the same family as fund j, LFF(Network)j,i = 1/(1+ 
log(Distancej,i)), and Distancej,i= distance in km. between city of fund i and fund j. The Value-weighted Size, B/M and MOM 
Quintile variables are the value-weighted average DGTW size, book-to-market and momentum quintiles of the stocks held in a 
portfolio respectively. Log (# funds in family) is the natural logarithm of the total number of funds under the investment 
































   
 




























   


















































































































Figure 3.1. Persistence in Funds’ Deviating Tendencies 
 
The figure documents the persistence of fund deviating tendencies over time. For each stock 
holding in a fund’s portfolio in a given quarter, the deviation from peer group is computed as: 
dev_perctna = (percent_tna – mean percent_tna of all other funds in the peer group holding the 
same stock). The case where all funds in the sample are used as a peer group is reported. A fund’s 
deviation is measured as the average |dev_perctna| across all stocks in a fund portfolio in the 
quarter. In the first quarter, the funds are ranked into quintiles using fund’s deviation. The plot 
reports the average fund deviation of the quintile groups formed in the first quarter over ten 
quarters. 
Persistence of Funds' Deviating Tendencies
























3.4.1. Graphical analysis: Deviations from peer groups 
 
 Figure 3.1. reports the persistence in the deviating tendency measures of mutual fund 
managers, presented as an average across all the funds in our sample. Funds are assigned 
into quintile portfolios formed based on deviation measures in the first quarter. The 
average deviations of the funds in the quintile groups are reported for subsequent 
quarters, and we note a striking persistence in the relative rankings of deviations. In 







Figure 3.2.1. Fund Performance vs. Deviations from Peer Groups 
 
The figure documents the relationship between overall fund performance and fund deviating 
tendencies over time. For each stock holding in a fund’s portfolio in a given quarter, the deviation 
from peer group is computed as: dev_perctna = (percent_tna – mean percent_tna of all other 
funds in the peer group holding the same stock). A fund’s deviation is measured as the average 
|dev_perctna| across all stocks in a fund portfolio in the quarter. Funds are ranked into quintiles in 
every quarter t. Three alternative definitions of peer groups are used: (i) all funds in the sample, 
(ii) all same objective funds, and (iii) all same objective and same size quartile funds. The 
quarterly objective-adjusted return (OAR) in quarter t is computed as:  
OAR = (1+Ret_mth1)*(1+Ret_mth2)*(1+Ret_mth3) - (1+ObjR_mth1)*(1+ObjR_mth2)*(1+ObjR_mth3) 
The median OAR in period t is reported for the deviation quintiles formed in period t-1. 





















most likely to show highest relative deviations from their peers’ portfolio strategies in 
subsequent quarters. We present the case where all the funds in the sample are considered 
the peer group. In unreported robustness checks, we confirm that other definitions of peer 
groups lead to similar implications. 
 Figure 3.2.1 presents the plot between funds’ average objective-adjusted returns 
(OARs) for the quintile groups of funds, ranked by deviating tendency in the previous 
quarter to which OAR is measured. The deviating tendency is measured as expressed in  
Peer Group (Objective, Size) 
Peer Group (Objective) 
Peer Group (All Funds) 
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Figure 3.2.2. Fund Performance weighted by TNA vs. Deviations from Peer Groups 
 
The figure documents the persistence of fund deviating tendencies over time. For each stock 
holding in a fund’s portfolio in a given quarter, the deviation from peer group is computed as: 
dev_perctna = (percent_tna – mean percent_tna of all other funds in the peer group holding the 
same stock). A fund’s deviation is measured as the average |dev_perctna| across all stocks in a 
fund portfolio in the quarter. Funds are ranked into quintiles in every quarter t. Three alternative 
definitions of peer groups are used: (i) all funds in the sample, (ii) all same objective funds, and 
(iii) all same objective and same size quartile funds. The quarterly objective-adjusted return 
(OAR) in quarter t is computed as:  
OAR = (1+Ret_mth1)*(1+Ret_mth2)*(1+Ret_mth3) - (1+ObjR_mth1)*(1+ObjR_mth2)*(1+ObjR_mth3) 
The median OAR in period t is reported as a TNA-weighted value for the deviation quintiles 
formed in period t-1. 




















equations (4) and (5). For all definitions of peer groups considered, there is a distinct 
negative trend in OAR as deviating tendency increases. This alludes to a potential 
negative relationship between fund performance and the funds’ deviations in portfolio 
strategies relative to peers. In Figure 3.2.2, the reported OAR is weighted by fund TNA, 
to check whether the relationships are driven only by smaller funds, in which case an 
observable trend should not exist. However, the previous result that fund performance 
decreases with deviating tendencies holds.   
Peer Group (All Funds) 
Peer Group (Objective, Size) 
Peer Group (Objective) 
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Figure 3.3. Holdings’ Deviation from Peer Groups vs. Risk-adjusted Returns 
 
The figure reports value-weighted risk-adjusted returns of sub-portfolios formed by decomposing 
a fund’s portfolio into deciles based on deviation of portfolio weights from the mean portfolio 
weight allocated by the fund manager’s peer group in the same stock.  For each stock holding in a 
fund’s portfolio in a given quarter, the deviation from peer group is computed as:  dev_perctna = 
(percent_tna – mean percent_tna of all other funds in the peer group holding the same stock). For 
each fund portfolio, dev_perctna is ranked into deciles, with Decile 1 (10) being holdings’ which 
are most underweighted (overweighted) relative to peer funds. Three alternative definitions of 
peer groups are used: (i) all funds in the sample, (ii) all same objective funds, and (iii) all same 
objective and same size quartile funds. Risk-adjusted portfolio returns are computed in each 

















iR  is the value-weighted monthly return of stock i’s DGTW quintle benchmark 
portfolio (following Daniel et al. (1997)). Returns are expressed in annual percentage rates and 
averaged across quarters. 
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 In Figure 3.3., we employ a portfolio decomposition methodology to identify the 
holdings in which a fund manager deviates the most, in terms of overweighting or 
underweighting, relative to their peers in the concurrent quarter. The graphical 
relationship between the deviations from peers’ portfolio allocations, in terms of 
underweighting and overweighting, and subsequent performance of the holdings is 
Peer Group (Objective, Size) Peer Group (All Funds) 
Peer Group (Objective) 
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reported. The holdings in a fund’s portfolio are ranked into deciles based on tiDeviation ,  
as computed in equation (4), with Decile 1 (Decile 10) representing the sub-portfolio of 
stocks where the fund manager has chosen to most underweight (overweight) the stock 
relative to the portfolio weight allocated to that stock by all other fund managers in the 
peer group. There is an almost monotonic decrease in benchmark-adjusted returns as the 
relative deviation weights increase, indicating that the average fund managers seems to 
overweight stocks that underperform in the subsequent quarter, and underweight stocks 
that show superior performance. 
 While the graphical results strongly suggest a negative relationship between deviation 
tendencies of fund managers and performance in an univariate setting, we have not 
controlled for various other factors that may diminish this relationship. In the next few 
sections, we conduct a more rigorous empirical investigation using multivariate settings 
and regression analysis. 
  
 
3.4.2. Multivariate regressions: Determinants of Deviation from peer groups 
 
 Table 3.4. reports results of estimating regression models that explain the overall 
deviation tendencies exhibited by mutual fund managers. Various fund/family 
characteristics and portfolio characteristics are included as explanatory variables. Robust 
standard errors are used to account for the possibility that the standard errors are 
correlated across observations. Throughout the paper, three alternative methods are 
considered in the measure of deviating tendency used. The methods differ in the 
definition of peer groups for a fund manager, with the first being the most general since it  
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Table 3.4. 
Multivariate Regressions (Funds’ Deviations from Peer Groups) 
 
The dependent variable in the clustered OLS regressions is the absolute value of average deviation in 
portfolio weight allocations by a fund manager from their peer groups in a portfolio quarter. The 
sample includes actively managed equity mutual funds and spans ten quarters during 2003 to 2005. 
For each stock holding in a fund’s portfolio in a given quarter, the deviation from peer group is 
computed as: dev_perctna = (percent_tna – mean percent_tna of all other funds in the peer group 
holding the same stock). Three alternative definitions of peer groups are used: (i) all funds in the 
sample, (ii) all same objective funds, and (iii) all same objective and same size quartile funds. A 
fund’s deviation is measured as the average dev_perctna across all stocks in a fund portfolio in the 
quarter. Turnover is the turnover ratio, Log( Age) is the natural logarithm of fund age, and Log( TNA) 
is the natural logarithm of total net assets. Single Manager dummy is a dummy variable assuming a 
value of 1 if the fund managed by one manager and 0 otherwise. Past fund performance is the 
cumulative objective-adjusted return for the six months prior to the beginning of a portfolio quarter. 
Fund-Fund Networks is a measure of the strength of information networks that a fund manager has 
with other fund managers, and the details of the variable constructions are given in Appendix A. 
Value-weighted Size (B/M, Momentum) Quintile are the value-weighted average DGTW size (book-
to-market, momentum) quintiles in a portfolio, respectively. Log (# funds in family) is the natural 
logarithm of the total number of fund’s under the investment management company of the fund. p-
values are based on robust standard errors. ***, **, * report significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% 
levels. Past fund performance2 
  
  Peer Groups 
All Funds  Objective  Objective, Size  
(1)  (2)  (3) 
  Coeff.   p-val   Coeff.   p-val   Coeff.   p-val 
Intercept 2.360 *** 0.00  2.294 *** 0.00  2.236 *** 0.00 
Fund characteristics:            
   Log (TNA) -0.033 *** 0.00  -0.034 *** 0.00  -0.038 *** 0.00 
   Log (Age) -0.004  0.69  0.006  0.53  0.007  0.47 
   Turnover -0.019 *** 0.00  -0.017 *** 0.00  -0.013 *** 0.00 
   Single manager dummy 0.090 *** 0.00  0.103 *** 0.00  0.095 *** 0.00 
   Past fund performance -0.841 ** 0.05  -0.790 ** 0.05  -0.752 ** 0.05 
   (Past fund performance)
2
 11.592 *** 0.00  11.557 *** 0.00  11.463 *** 0.00 
   Fund-Fund Networks -0.110 *** 0.00  -0.121 *** 0.00  -0.128 *** 0.00 
Portfolio characteristics:            
   Value-weighted Size Quintile 0.122 *** 0.00  0.129 *** 0.00  0.139 *** 0.00 
   Value-weighted B/M Quintile 0.014  0.57  0.028  0.26  0.034  0.17 
   Value-weighted Mom Quintile -0.091 *** 0.00  -0.086 *** 0.00  -0.079 *** 0.01 
   Avg. Fund-Company Networks 0.334 *** 0.00  0.326 *** 0.00  0.310 *** 0.00 
Family characteristics:            
   Log (# funds in family) -0.126 *** 0.00  -0.123 *** 0.00  -0.117 *** 0.00 
Time fixed-effects   YES    YES    YES 
Objective fixed-effects   YES    YES    YES 
N    12260      12260      12260 
Adjusted R-sq.     0.14       0.14       0.14 
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considers the whole sample of actively managed U.S. funds investing in domestic equity. 
The second peer group considered is all funds in a particular objective, and seems a 
natural definition since funds are for most purposes compared to other funds in their 
objective. Lastly, we consider forming a peer group by categorizing funds into objectives 
and similar size quartiles. All the regression models presented control for time and 
objective fixed effects. 
 In model (1), we report the regression estimates when all sample funds are considered 
as the peer group for a fund manager. Several fund characteristics are significant in 
explaining the deviating tendency of a fund manager. The deviating tendency of a fund 
manager decreases with the fund size, family size, fund turnover, and strength of 
networks with other mutual fund managers.14 Since our measure of networks is 
associated with geographical location, our results suggest that managers located in areas 
with a higher concentration of fund managers are less likely to deviate. In our 
regressions, we include a measure of past performance and the square of past 
performance as independent variables. This accounts for a possible non-linear 
relationship between a manager’s deviating tendency and past fund performance. Based 
on the regression results in Table 3.4., we find a U-shaped relationship between deviating 
tendency and past performance, supporting the idea that the best and worst performers 
deviate more than the intermediate performers. These findings are consistent with 
Zweibel (1995) who suggests that very good and very bad managers have incentives to 
deviate from the benchmark, while others have incentives to herd. The likelihood of 
                                                 
14 Since there are some simultaneity problems with using a dependant variable based on 
fund size (TNA) and fund TNA as an independent variable, we also run regressions 
where fund TNA is excluded from the models. However, the results remain similar and 
we do not report these specifications. 
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deviating from peers also increases if the fund is managed by a single manager as 
compared to when the fund is team-managed. The deviating tendency is higher for fund 
managers investing in larger stocks. While the portfolio characteristic in the book-to-
market ratio dimension is not significant, the deviating tendency is lower when the 
manager invests in a portfolio with higher momentum stocks.  
 Models (2) and (3) in Table 3.4. report regression results for alternative definitions of 
peer groups using objective, and objective combined with size, respectively. The results 
are consistent with model (1). All variables that are significant in model (1) retain their 
significance in models (2) and (3) with similar magnitudes of coefficients. The results 
suggest that in this case the choice of definition of peer groups for a fund manager does 
not have a critical impact on the measured relationship between the deviating tendency 
and the explanatory variables considered. 
 
 
3.4.3.    Relationship between performance and deviation 
 
 In this section, we study the relationship between the deviating tendencies, extent of 
deviation and future performance of the fund and portfolio holdings. The empirical 
methodology conducts comparisons of fund-level performance in an univariate setting 
between funds displaying highest and lowest deviating tendencies, and also uncovers the 
performance-deviation relationship using multivariate regressions. The second part of the 
empirical investigation analyses within-portfolio differences in performance from 
holdings where a manager is more bullish than their peers, versus in holdings where they 
are more bearish than their peers. 
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A.  Fund returns 
 
 In Table 3.5., we report multivariate regression results explaining fund performance. 
The regression coefficients are for various model specifications, include time and 
objective fixed effects, and the p-values reported are based on robust standard errors. 
 In Panel (1) of Table 3.5., the peer group considered is the universe of equity funds in 
our sample. Model (i) studies the relationship between a fund’s deviating tendency in 
period t, Fund Deviation (t), and performance in the same period t. The deviating 
tendency has a significantly negative impact on performance as reflected in an estimated 
coefficient of -0.002 on Fund Deviation (t) with significance at the 1% level. Other 
control variables that explain some of the variation in performance are fund size, 
measured as the natural logarithm of total net assets (Log (TNA)), fund’s recent 
performance in the previous six months, Past fund performance, and overall portfolio 
characteristics of the fund. In model (ii), we include the deviating tendency measured in 
the previous period, Fund Deviation (t-1), to predict performance in the current period t. 
The deviation in the previous period also has a significantly negative impact on fund 
performance, but the magnitude of the effect is smaller than for contemporaneous 
deviation-performance relationships. We do not include Fund Deviation (t) and Fund 
Deviation (t-1) together because of high degrees of correlation between deviation 
measures across time. In unreported tests, we find significant correlations between the 
time series of deviating tendency measures, suggesting substantial persistence in 
deviating tendencies. 
 In Panel (2) and (3) of Table 3.5., the regressions are repeated using the alternative 




Relationship between Fund Performance and Funds’ Deviation from Peer Groups 
 
The dependent variable in the regressions is the quarterly objective-adjusted return (OAR), the measure of fund performance. The 
quarterly OAR is computed as:  
OAR = (1+Ret_mth1)*(1+Ret_mth2)*(1+Ret_mth3) – (1+ObjR_mth1)*(1+ObjR_mth2)*(1+ObjR_mth3). The sample includes 
actively managed equity mutual funds and spans ten quarters during 2003 to 2005. For each stock holding in a fund’s portfolio in a 
given quarter, the deviation from peer group is computed as:  dev_perctna = (percent_tna – mean percent_tna of all other funds in the 
peer group holding the same stock). Three alternative definitions of peer groups are used: (i) all funds in the sample, (ii) all same 
objective funds, and (iii) all same objective and same size quartile funds. A fund’s deviation at time t (t-1), Fund Deviation (t) (Fund 
Deviation (t-1)),  is measured as the average |dev_perctna| across all stocks in a fund portfolio in the quarter t (t-1). Turnover is the 
turnover ratio, Log( Age) is the natural logarithm of fund age, and Log( TNA) is the natural logarithm of total net assets. Single 
Manager dummy is a dummy variable assuming a value of 1 if the fund managed by one manager and 0 otherwise. Past fund 
performance is the cumulative objective-adjusted return for the six months prior to the beginning of a portfolio quarter. Fund-Fund 
Networks is a measure of the strength of information networks that a fund manager has with other fund managers, and the details of the 
variable constructions are given in Appendix A. Value-weighted Size (B/M, Momentum) Quintile are the value-weighted average 
DGTW size (book-to-market, momentum) quintiles in a portfolio, respectively. Log (# funds in family) is the natural logarithm of the 
total number of fund’s under the investment management company of the fund. p-values are based on robust standard errors. ***, **, * 









Coeff. p-val Coeff. p-val Coeff. p-val Coeff. p-val Coeff. p-val Coeff. p-val
Intercept -0.009 0.27 -0.040 *** 0.00 -0.010 0.26 -0.040 *** 0.00 -0.010 0.26 -0.040 *** 0.00
Fund Deviation (t) -0.002 *** 0.00 -0.002 *** 0.00 -0.002 *** 0.00
Fund Deviation (t-1) -0.001 * 0.06 -0.001 * 0.07 -0.001 * 0.06
Fund characteristics:
   Log (TNA) 0.001 ** 0.05 0.001 * 0.07 0.001 ** 0.05 0.001 * 0.08 0.001 * 0.05 0.001 * 0.08
   Log (Age) -0.001 * 0.10 -0.001 0.28 -0.001 0.11 -0.001 0.29 -0.001 0.11 -0.001 0.29
   Turnover 0.000 0.71 0.000 0.49 0.000 0.72 0.000 0.49 0.000 0.74 0.000 0.50
   Single manager dummy -0.002 0.21 -0.002 0.23 -0.002 0.21 -0.002 0.23 -0.002 0.20 -0.002 0.22
   Past fund performance 0.136 *** 0.00 0.111 *** 0.00 0.136 *** 0.00 0.111 *** 0.00 0.136 *** 0.00 0.111 *** 0.00
   Fund-Fund Networks -0.001 0.21 -0.001 0.56 -0.001 0.20 -0.001 0.55 -0.001 0.20 -0.001 0.55
Portfolio characteristics:
   Value-weighted Size Quintile -0.003 *** 0.00 -0.001 0.27 -0.003 *** 0.00 -0.001 0.28 -0.003 *** 0.00 -0.001 0.29
   Value-weighted B/M Quintile 0.007 *** 0.00 0.010 *** 0.00 0.007 *** 0.00 0.010 *** 0.00 0.007 *** 0.00 0.010 *** 0.00
   Value-weighted Mom Quintile 0.004 *** 0.00 0.005 *** 0.00 0.004 *** 0.00 0.005 *** 0.00 0.004 *** 0.00 0.005 *** 0.00
   Avg. Fund-Company Networks 0.001 0.82 -0.001 0.79 0.001 0.82 -0.001 0.79 0.001 0.83 -0.001 0.78
   Industry_Herfindahl 0.012 ** 0.03 0.011 ** 0.02 0.010 * 0.07 0.012 * 0.09 0.011 ** 0.05 0.012 * 0.10
Family characteristics:
   Log (# funds in family) 0.000 0.81 0.000 0.71 0.000 0.81 0.000 0.69 0.000 0.84 0.000 0.69
Time fixed-effects YES YES YES YES YES
Objective fixed-effects YES YES YES YES YES
N 9921 12225 9921 12225 9921
Adjusted R-sq. (%) 2.39 3.25 2.39 3.26 2.39
12255
2.68
Model (i) Model (ii)
YES
YES













are consistent with the earlier analyses using all funds in the sample as a peer group. Both 
the magnitudes and significance of explanatory variables are similar across the peer 
group classifications. There is a significant relationship between the extent of deviating 
tendency displayed by a fund manager in a portfolio quarter and fund performance. The 
deviating tendency in a portfolio quarter is also significant in explaining the fund’s 
performance in the next quarter. Various fund/family characteristics and portfolio 
characteristics are used as control variables in all the model specifications.      
 Table 3.6. examines the relationship between fund performance and deviating 
tendencies across different fund size and past performance categories. While Table 3.5. 
shows that there is a significant relationship between performance and deviations, after 
controlling for factors like fund size and past performance, the strength of the relationship 
may be differ depending on the category of funds. In Table 3.6. we compose portfolios of 
high versus low deviation funds, within fund size and past performance categories, and 
study the return differences between these hypothetical portfolios.  
 In Panel A of Table 3.6., we sort the funds into size quartiles based on TNA. It is 
possible that the information contained in the deviating tendencies of portfolio managers 
is different across fund size categories. Depending on the fund’s size characteristics, 
which are closely related with the resources a fund manager has at her disposal, the 
causes of deviations from peers may be strikingly different. A fund manager of a large 
fund may have better research resources related to small funds, wherein they deviate 
when they have private information about investment opportunities. Additionally, these 
fund managers are also likely to be the ones with larger reputation stakes resulting in 




Fund Performance and Deviations from Peer Groups 
 
Panel A reports the annualized objective-adjusted return (OAR) for fund that have high versus low 
deviation tendency from their peers across different fund size categories. The quarterly OAR is 
computed as:  
OAR = (1+Ret_mth1)*(1+Ret_mth2)*(1+Ret_mth3) – (1+ObjR_mth1)*(1+ObjR_mth2)*(1+ObjR_mth3). The 
sample includes actively managed equity mutual funds and spans ten quarters during 2003 to 2005. 
For each stock holding in a fund’s portfolio in a given quarter, the deviation from peer group is 
computed as:  dev_perctna = (percent_tna – mean percent_tna of all other funds in the peer group 
holding the same stock). Three alternative definitions of peer groups are used: (i) all funds in the 
sample, (ii) all same objective funds, and (iii) all same objective and same size quartile funds. A 
fund’s deviation at time t, Fund Deviation (t), is measured as the average |dev_perctna| across all 
stocks in a fund portfolio in the quarter t. High (Low) Deviation Funds are the funds in the highest 
(lowest) quintile ranked by Fund Deviation (t). Panel B reports the annualized objective-adjusted 
return (OAR) for funds that have high versus low deviation tendency from their peers across different 
fund past performance categories. Returns are expressed in annual percentage rates and averaged 
across quarters. p-values are based on two-sample t test of the hypothesis that the returns have equal 
means across the high and low deviation fund samples. 
  
Fund Size Quartiles OAR p-val OAR p-val OAR p-val
Quartile 1 (Small): Median TNA = 9.73
        High Deviation Fund -0.038 -0.042 -0.039
        Low Deviation Fund 0.008 0.009 0.034
        High – Low -0.046 0.20 -0.050 0.20 -0.073 0.17
Quartile 2: Median TNA = 34.20
        High Deviation Fund -0.010 -0.010 -0.015
        Low Deviation Fund 0.012 -0.023 0.017
        High – Low -0.021 0.01 0.013 0.68 -0.032 0.00
Quartile 3: Median TNA = 111.40
        High Deviation Fund -0.008 -0.008 -0.007
        Low Deviation Fund 0.014 0.012 0.013
        High – Low -0.023 0.00 -0.019 0.00 -0.020 0.00
Quartile 4 (Large): Median TNA = 739.80
        High Deviation Fund -0.002 -0.001 0.000
        Low Deviation Fund 0.016 0.016 0.011
        High – Low -0.018 0.00 -0.017 0.00 -0.011 0.01
(3)
All Funds Objective Objective, Size







Table 3.6. (contd.) 
Fund Previous Performance Quartiles OAR p-val OAR p-val OAR p-val
Quartile 1 (Worst): Median OAR = -4.00%
        High Deviation Fund -0.046 -0.044 -0.044
        Low Deviation Fund -0.030 -0.028 -0.029
        High – Low -0.016 0.06 -0.016 0.05 -0.016 0.06
Quartile 2: Median OAR = -0.95%
        High Deviation Fund -0.017 -0.016 -0.014
        Low Deviation Fund 0.001 0.001 -0.001
        High – Low -0.017 0.00 -0.017 0.00 -0.013 0.02
Quartile 3: Median OAR = 1.11%
        High Deviation Fund 0.009 0.010 0.008
        Low Deviation Fund 0.019 0.020 0.017
        High – Low -0.010 0.08 -0.011 0.14 -0.010 0.07
Quartile 4 (Best): Median OAR = 4.41%
        High Deviation Fund 0.031 0.031 0.030
        Low Deviation Fund 0.044 0.045 0.044
        High – Low -0.013 0.04 -0.014 0.68 -0.013 0.04
(1) (2) (3)
Panel B: Objective-adjusted Return (by Peer Group)




on accurate private information. On the other hand, it is possible that a fund manager of a 
small fund has relatively poorer resources, and deviates for reasons that do not have 
positive implications for future performance. Under these circumstances, the relative 
performance of fund managers who deviate versus those who have portfolio allocations 
similar to their peers may depend on the fund’s resources and reputation.     
 From the results presented in Panel A of Table 3.6., we conclude that the relationship 
between fund performance and deviating tendency is similar across all fund size 
categories and definitions of peer groups. For the peer group definition including all 
funds, the funds in the highest quintile of deviating tendency underperform the funds in 
the lowest quintile in all size categories. However, for the sub-sample of small funds, the 
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underperformance of high deviation funds relative to low deviation funds is not 
significant. For all other fund size categories, the difference in performance is significant 
at the 1% level. For the sub-sample of large funds, high deviation funds’ 
underperformance relative to their objectives is 1.8% more than low deviation funds. For 
funds in the second and third size quartile, the underperformance is 2.1% and 2.3% 
expressed as annualized OAR. For alternative peer group definitions based on objective 
and objective-size matches, the results are consistent with the findings using all funds as 
the peer group. When all same-objective funds are considered the peer group, the 
underperformance of high deviation funds relative to low deviation funds are significant 
for the two largest size quartiles, but not significant for the smaller size quartiles. For 
peer group definition using an objective-size matching, the underperformance is 
significant for the majority of size quartiles, except for the smallest funds in the sample. 
 In Panel B of Table 3.6., we compare performance of funds across different 
categories based on recent performance of the funds. A fund’s past performance may 
have an important impact on the motivation to deviate away from peers’ portfolio 
strategies. Brown et al. (1996) posit that fund managers with recent poor performance are 
more likely to pursue riskier strategies in order to compensate for previous low returns. If 
the deviating tendency is a way of pursuing riskier strategies, recent poor performers may 
have more incentives to deviate from their peers.   
 From Panel B of Table 3.6., the findings suggest that funds with high deviating 
tendencies underperform funds with low deviating tendencies across all categories of past 
fund performance. For the first peer group definition, when the sub-sample of worst 
performers in the previous six months are considered, the high deviation funds 
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underperform by an annualized return of 1.6% relative to low deviation funds, and the 
difference is significant at the 10% level. For the best performers, comprising the fourth 
quartile, the high deviation funds underperform the low deviation funds by 1.3%. 
Interesting, while for the sub-sample of poor performers, both high and low deviation 
funds underperform their objectives, for the best performers, both outperform their 
objectives. In the latter case, the high deviation funds outperform their objectives to a 
lesser extent than the low deviation funds. These results are robust when alternative 
definitions of peer groups, based on objective and size, are used.     
 
 
B. Holdings’ returns 
 
 In the previous sections, we have focused on fund performance in order to study the 
potential information contained in the deviating tendencies of mutual fund managers. 
Using a portfolio decomposition approach, we conduct further analyses aiming to 
understand the implications of a fund manager’s decision to deviate away from their 
peers in portfolio allocation strategies. In this approach, we distinguish between holdings 
where a fund manager has chosen to deviate from their peers by allocating a higher 
portfolio weight than their peers, i.e. overweight the asset, and holdings where they 
underweight relative to their peers. A manager with valuable private information should 
deviate in the positive direction (i.e., overweight) in assets that are more likely to 
generate positive risk-adjusted returns in the future, and in the negative direction (i.e., 
underweight) for assets that are less likely to have good future performance. So, there 
may be information inferred by comparing the performance of holdings that are 
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overweighted versus holdings that are underweighted by a fund manager. Among the 
advantages of using this approach is that by examining within-portfolio differences in 
performance, we can avoid manager-, fund-, family- and time-specific heterogeneities 
which are the main challenge when comparing performance across funds. 
 Table 3.7. presents the value-weighted risk-adjusted returns for ten subportfolios 
formed based on the magnitude of deviation of the holdings’ allocated weight and mean 
weight allocated by peers in the same security. Each fund portfolio is decomposed in 
deciles based on portfolio weights’ deviation and ranked into ten decile portfolios. The 
reported values in Table 3.7. are sample averages over ten quarters. In addition to 
equally-weighted averages across funds in the sample, we also compute the portfolios 
returns for each decile portfolio using value-weighting by fund TNA. TNA-weighted 
averages are reported in order to eliminate the possibility that the results are primarily 
driven by small funds and do not hold for larger funds in the sample. It also indicates 
whether the relationship between returns and deviation in portfolio allocations are 
important when we look at aggregate dollar returns from the investment management 
industry. For phenomena that only holds for small funds, the implications in terms of 
dollar returns may not be substantial.  
 In Table 3.7., the first definition of peer group used is all funds in the sample. From 
the results presented in panel (1), the value-weighted returns decrease almost 
monotonically for the decile portfolios as the magnitude of deviation in portfolio weight 
increases. Fund managers seem to overweight stocks that underperform and underweight 





Holding-based Returns and Deviations from Peer Groups (Portfolio Decomposition) 
 
The table reports value-weighted risk-adjusted returns of sub-portfolios formed by decomposing a fund’s portfolio into deciles based 
on deviation of portfolio weights from the mean portfolio weight allocated by the fund manager’s peer group in the same stock.  For 
each stock holding in a fund’s portfolio in a given quarter, the deviation from peer group is computed as:  dev_perctna = 
(percent_tna – mean percent_tna of all other funds in the peer group holding the same stock). For each fund portfolio, dev_perctna is 
ranked into deciles, with Decile 1 (10) being holdings’ which are most underweighted (overweighted) relative to peer funds. Three 
alternative definitions of peer groups are used: (i) all funds in the sample, (ii) all same objective funds, and (iii) all same objective 

















iR  is the value-weighted monthly return of stock i’s DGTW quintle benchmark portfolio (following Daniel et al. (1997)). 
Returns are expressed in annual percentage rates are reported both as equally-weighted as well as value-weighted by fund total net 
assets (TNA) and averaged across quarters. p-values are based on one-sample t test of the hypothesis that the portfolio risk-adjusted 









  Abnormal Returns: Peer Group 
 All Funds   Objective   Objective, Size 
 Not TNA-weighted TNA-weighted  Not TNA-weighted TNA-weighted  Not TNA-weighted TNA-weighted 















(Lowest weight relative to peers)                             
                  Decile 1 0.018 0.00 0.011 0.31  0.019 0.00 0.011 0.03  0.016 0.00 0.011 0.04 
Decile 2 0.017 0.00 0.028 0.02  0.017 0.00 0.020 0.00  0.011 0.00 0.016 0.01 
Decile 3 0.007 0.00 0.008 0.59  0.008 0.00 0.016 0.00  0.007 0.00 0.019 0.00 
 Decile 4 0.007 0.00 0.020 0.08  0.006 0.00 0.013 0.02  0.007 0.00 0.009 0.15 
Decile 5 0.001 0.54 0.010 0.43  0.002 0.30 0.008 0.18  -0.001 0.79 0.005 0.40 
Decile 6 -0.005 0.01 0.005 0.84  -0.005 0.01 0.004 0.43  -0.007 0.00 0.000 0.98 
Decile 7 -0.007 0.00 0.003 0.77  -0.007 0.00 -0.004 0.55  -0.005 0.02 0.000 0.99 
Decile 8 -0.010 0.00 0.010 0.50  -0.011 0.00 0.000 0.98  -0.011 0.00 -0.003 0.69 
Decile 9 -0.015 0.00 -0.018 0.10  -0.015 0.00 -0.022 0.00  -0.015 0.00 -0.008 0.19 
Decile 10 -0.028 0.00 -0.033 0.02  -0.029 0.00 -0.035 0.00  -0.028 0.00 -0.037 0.00 
(Highest weight relative to peers)     
  
        
  
        
  
  
2nd Half – 1st Half -0.023 0.00 -0.022 0.00  -0.024 0.00 -0.025 0.00  -0.021 0.00 -0.022 0.00 
5th Quintile – 1st Quintile -0.039 0.00 -0.045 0.00  -0.040 0.00 -0.044 0.00  -0.035 0.00 -0.036 0.00 
10th Decile – 1st Decile -0.046 0.00 -0.043 0.00   -0.049 0.00 -0.047 0.00   -0.044 0.00 -0.049 0.00 
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overweight the most relative to peers, i.e. Decile 10, has an annualized return of -2.8% 
compared to the most underweighted stocks which have a return of 1.8%. The difference 
in performance between highest and lowest weighted stocks is -4.6%, and statistically 
significant at the 1% level. The underperformance of overweighted stocks holds for 
comparisons between the highest and lowest quintiles of deviation in portfolio weights 
allocated, with a return difference of -3.9%. The results also hold when the higher half 
according to portfolio weight deviations are compared to the lower half, in which case the 
difference in returns is -2.3%, and significant at the 1% level. In panel (2), the portfolio 
returns are reported as TNA-weighted measures. As with the equally-weighted returns, 
the portfolio of stocks with the highest relative weight underperforms the portfolio of 
stock with lowest relative weights by -4.3%. Overall, the results are similar whether we 
weight by fund size or not, indicating that the results are not driven by small funds.  
 The results are also robust to the three definitions of peer groups considered. In 
panels (4) and (5) of Table 3.7., we report annualized returns when deviations are 
calculated based on all funds in the same objective as a peer group. The portfolio 
annualized return of Decile 10 underperforms the returns of Decile 1 by -4.9% when 
values are not TNA-weighted, and by -4.7% when values are weighted by fund TNA. In 
panels (5) and (6), we use all funds in the same objective and same fund size quartile, 
ranked in each quarter, as the peer group. The portfolio annualized return of Decile 10 
underperforms the returns of Decile 1 by -4.4% when values are not TNA-weighted, and 
by -4.9% when values are weighted by fund TNA. The differences are significant at the 
1% level. 
 In summary, fund managers on average seem to allocate higher weights to stocks that 
underperform and lower weights to stocks that outperform in the portfolio quarter. So, the 
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evidence does not support the notion that fund managers deviate from their peers in their 
portfolio weight allocations based on private information. These findings based on 
holdings’ returns are consistent with the conclusions from analyses of fund returns in 
previous sections. Whether we consider aggregate fund performance or holdings’ returns, 
the decision to deviate from peers does not reflect private information. The fund 
manager’s deviation relative to her peers is related to future underperformance both at the 
fund and holdings’ level. 
 As further robustness checks, we examine holdings’ return and their relationship with 
deviation in portfolio allocations across different categories of funds, based on fund size 
and recent performance. In Panel A of Table 3.8., the returns are reported for the 
portfolios of highest and lowest weights relative to peer groups, across fund size 
quartiles. The underperformance of the portfolio with highest relative weights compared 
to the portfolio with lowest relative weights is significant and similar across fund size 
quartiles. For the smallest (largest) funds, the stocks that were overweighted 
underperform stocks that were underweighted by -4.3% (-4.2%) annualized return. The 
findings hold when other definitions of peer groups are considered. So, the relationship 
between deviation and holdings’ returns hold across different fund sizes. 
 In Panel B of Table 3.8., we present results across different fund performance 
quartiles, based on fund returns in the six months prior to the portfolio quarter. The 
results are consistent with overall findings that the portfolio of stocks with highest weight 
allocations relative to peers significantly underperform stocks assigned the lowest 
portfolio weight allocations. The portfolio returns of the highest relative weights, i.e. 




Holdings’ Performance and Deviations from Peer Groups 
 
Fund Previous Performance Quartiles are formed based on the cumulative objective-adjusted fund 
return for the six months prior to the beginning of a portfolio quarter. Panel A reports the 
annualized objective-adjusted return (OAR) for fund that have high versus low deviation tendency 
from their peers. The quarterly OAR is computed as:  
OAR = (1+Ret_mth1)*(1+Ret_mth2)*(1+Ret_mth3) – (1+ObjR_mth1)*(1+ObjR_mth2)*(1+ObjR_mth3). 
The sample includes actively managed equity mutual funds and spans ten quarters during 2003 to 
2005. For each stock holding in a fund’s portfolio in a given quarter, the deviation from peer group 
is computed as:  dev_perctna = (percent_tna – mean percent_tna of all other funds in the peer 
group holding the same stock). Three alternative definitions of peer groups are used: (i) all funds in 
the sample, (ii) all same objective funds, and (iii) all same objective and same size quartile funds. 
A fund’s deviation at time t, Fund Deviation (t), is measured as the average |dev_perctna| across all 
stocks in a fund portfolio in the quarter t. High (Low) Deviation Funds are the funds in the highest 
(lowest) quintile ranked by Fund Deviation (t). In Panel B, for each fund portfolio, dev_perctna is 
ranked into deciles, with Decile 1 (10) being holdings’ which are most underweighted 
(overweighted) relative to peer funds. Three alternative definitions of peer groups are used: (i) all 
funds in the sample, (ii) all same objective funds, and (iii) all same objective and same size quartile 

















iR  is the value-weighted monthly return of stock i’s DGTW quintle benchmark 
portfolio (following Daniel et al. (1997)). Returns are expressed in annual percentage rates are 
reported both as equally-weighted as well as value-weighted by fund total net assets (TNA) and 
averaged across quarters. p-values are based on one-sample t test of the hypothesis that the 
portfolio risk-adjusted return has a mean of zero. 
  
Fund Size Quartiles Risk-ad. Ret p-val
Risk-ad. 
Ret p-val Risk-ad. Ret p-val
Quartile 1 (Small): Median TNA = 9.73
        Highest relative weight -0.028 -0.030 -0.029
        Lowest relative weight 0.015 0.013 0.012
        High – Low -0.043 0.00 -0.043 0.00 -0.041 0.00
Quartile 2: Median TNA = 34.20
        Highest relative weight -0.027 -0.026 -0.027
        Lowest relative weight 0.017 0.017 0.014
        High – Low -0.044 0.00 -0.044 0.00 -0.042 0.00
Quartile 3: Median TNA = 111.40
        Highest relative weight -0.031 -0.031 -0.028
        Lowest relative weight 0.023 0.030 0.021
        High – Low -0.053 0.00 -0.061 0.00 -0.049 0.00
Quartile 4 (Large): Median TNA = 739.80
        Highest relative weight -0.026 -0.030 -0.027
        Lowest relative weight 0.016 0.018 0.018
        High – Low -0.042 0.00 -0.048 0.00 -0.046 0.00
All Funds Objective Objective, Size




Table 3.8. (contd.) 
Fund Previous Performance Quartiles Risk-ad. Ret p-val Risk-ad. p-val Risk-ad. Ret p-val
Quartile 1 (Worst): Median OAR = -4.00%
        Highest relative weight -0.032 -0.030 -0.040
        Lowest relative weight 0.014 0.010 0.012
        High – Low -0.046 0.00 -0.040 0.00 -0.052 0.00
Quartile 2: Median OAR = -0.95%
        Highest relative weight -0.027 -0.031 -0.027
        Lowest relative weight 0.018 0.017 0.017
        High – Low -0.044 0.00 -0.048 0.00 -0.044 0.00
Quartile 3: Median OAR = 1.11%
        Highest relative weight -0.037 -0.032 -0.036
        Lowest relative weight 0.019 0.010 0.021
        High – Low -0.056 0.00 -0.042 0.00 -0.057 0.00
Quartile 4 (Best): Median OAR = 4.41%
        Highest relative weight -0.021 -0.038 -0.027
        Lowest relative weight 0.021 0.018 0.016
        High – Low -0.041 0.00 -0.056 0.00 -0.043 0.00
Panel B: Holdings' Return (by Peer Group)





fund performance quartiles. The underperformance is -4.6% and -4.1% for the worst and 
best performing funds, respectively. Results are also robust for alternative definition of 
peer groups categorized based on fund objective and size, and are presented in panels (2) 
and (3). The evidence suggests that the results are not driven by poorly performing funds. 
Even funds that have performed well in the past seem unable to pick the right stocks to 
overweight and underweight. 
 
C. Robustness Checks 
 
 The previous sections have documented the relationship between the deviating 
tendencies of mutual fund managers away from the portfolio allocation strategies of their 
peers, and the ability to generate superior performance. However, there is no conclusive 
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definition of what constitutes a peer group for fund managers. In this section, we examine 
the robustness of the findings to alternative definitions of peer groups based on portfolio 
characteristics and fund objective definitions other than ICDI objective categories. We 
have used ICDI objective definitions in all previous analyses. 
 Table 3.9. presents clustered multivariate OLS regressions explaining the funds’ 
deviating tendency when the deviations are measured relative to peer groups based on the 
portfolio characteristics of the funds. In order to develop peer group categories based on a 
fund’s portfolio characteristics, we employ the DGTW stock characteristics based on 
size, book-to-market (B/M) ratios and momentum (MOM). For each fund portfolio in 
each quarter, we compute a value-weighted quintile measure for each of the DGTW 

























)_()__(     (9) 
Here, tsizeQDGTW )_( , tbmQDGTW )_( , tmomQDGTW )_(  are the DGTW size, 
B/M, momentum quintile assignments, respectively, for stock i in the fund portfolio in 
quarter t; iw  is the portfolio weight invested in stock i in quarter t.  
 Next, each fund is assigned into style categories based on the three dimensions. In 
each quarter, each fund is assigned a quintile based on sorting the measures of 
tsizeQDGTWFund )__( , where each quintile comprises funds in one peer group.  
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Table 3.9. 
Multivariate Regressions (Funds’ Deviations from Style-based Peer Groups) 
 
The dependent variable in the clustered OLS regressions is the absolute value of average deviation in 
portfolio weight allocations by a fund manager from their peer groups in a portfolio quarter. The 
sample includes actively managed equity mutual funds and spans ten quarters during 2003 to 2005. 
For each stock holding in a fund’s portfolio in a given quarter, the deviation from peer group is 
computed as: dev_perctna = (percent_tna – mean percent_tna of all other funds in the peer group 
holding the same stock). Three alternative definitions of peer groups are used: (i) funds in the same 
quintile based on value-weighted DGTW Size quintiles held, (ii) funds in the same quintile based on 
value-weighted DGTW B/M quintiles held, and (iii) funds in the same quintile based on value-
weighted DGTW Momentum quintiles held. A fund’s deviation is measured as the average 
|dev_perctna| across all stocks in a fund portfolio in the quarter. Turnover is the turnover ratio, Log( 
Age) is the natural logarithm of fund age, and Log( TNA) is the natural logarithm of total net assets. 
Single Manager dummy is a dummy variable assuming a value of 1 if the fund managed by one 
manager and 0 otherwise. Past fund performance is the cumulative objective-adjusted return for the 
six months prior to the beginning of a portfolio quarter. Fund-Fund Networks is a measure of the 
strength of information networks that a fund manager has with other fund managers, and the details 
of the variable constructions are given in Appendix A. Value-weighted Size (B/M, Momentum) 
Quintile are the value-weighted average DGTW size (book-to-market, momentum) quintiles in a 
portfolio, respectively. Log (# funds in family) is the natural logarithm of the total number of fund’s 
under the investment management company of the fund. p-values are based on robust standard errors. 
***, **, * report significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels.  
  
Coeff. p-val Coeff. p-val Coeff. p-val
Intercept 2.070 *** 0.00 2.144 *** 0.00 2.209 *** 0.00
Fund characteristics:
      Log (TNA) -0.032 *** 0.00 -0.029 *** 0.00 -0.028 *** 0.01
      Log (Age) 0.002 0.95 0.000 0.99 -0.003 0.89
      Turnover -0.022 *** 0.00 -0.020 *** 0.01 -0.023 *** 0.00
      Single manager dummy 0.086 *** 0.01 0.082 *** 0.01 0.074 ** 0.02
      Past fund performance -0.771 ** 0.05 -0.875 ** 0.03 -0.889 ** 0.02
      (Past fund performance)
2
10.950 *** 0.01 9.956 *** 0.01 10.397 *** 0.00
      Fund-Fund Networks -0.100 *** 0.00 -0.103 *** 0.00 -0.106 *** 0.00
Portfolio characteristics:
     Value-weighted Size Quintile 0.128 *** 0.00 0.115 *** 0.00 0.110 *** 0.00
     Value-weighted B/M Quintile 0.029 0.51 0.045 0.29 0.031 0.47
     Value-weighted Mom Quintile -0.062 0.15 -0.070 * 0.10 -0.086 ** 0.03
     Avg. Fund-Company Networks 0.361 0.15 0.382 0.12 0.362 0.13
Family characteristics:
     Log (# funds in family) -0.119 *** 0.00 -0.118 *** 0.00 -0.113 *** 0.00
Time fixed-effects YES YES YES
Objective fixed-effects YES YES YES
N 12258 12258 12258
Adjusted R-sq. 0.15 0.14 0.14
Peer Groups





Similarly, peer groups are also formed by sorting the other two style dimensions: 
tbmQDGTWFund )__(  and tmomQDGTWFund )__( . In summary, the goal is to 
define a fund’s peer group based on the characteristics of the stocks held in their 
portfolio. For instance, all funds in the highest quintile of tsizeQDGTWFund )__(  
( tbmQDGTWFund )__( ) in a portfolio quarter are the funds that invest in large-cap 
(value) stocks, and belong to the same peer group.  
 The results reported in Table 3.9. are similar to the findings in previous empirical 
analyses. Large, high turnover funds and funds belonging to larger fund families have a 
lower tendency to deviate from their peers. Also, funds located in areas where there are 
likely to be more interactions with other fund managers (i.e., stronger networks) have 
lesser tendency to deviate. The evidence on the existence of a U-shaped relationship 
between previous fund performance and deviating tendency also holds. So, the poorest 
and best performers show higher deviations from peers. The results are also similar 
across the three style dimensions of size, B/M and momentum characteristics of the 
portfolio of stocks. 
 Table 3.10. reports the multivariate regressions exploring the relationship between 
performance of the fund, using fund objective-adjuster returns, and the fund’s deviations 
relative to peers. The results from the regression analyses are consistent with previous 
findings. Ceteris paribus, funds which show a higher deviation tendency have poorer 
performance. The relationship between contemporaneous deviations and performance is 
stronger than the predictive relationship, which is not significant in all model 





Relationship between Fund Performance and Funds’ Deviation from Style-based Peer Groups 
 
The dependent variable in the regressions is the quarterly objective-adjusted return (OAR), the measure of fund performance. The 
quarterly OAR is computed as:  
OAR = (1+Ret_mth1)*(1+Ret_mth2)*(1+Ret_mth3) – (1+ObjR_mth1)*(1+ObjR_mth2)*(1+ObjR_mth3).  
The sample includes actively managed equity mutual funds and spans ten quarters during 2003 to 2005. For each stock holding in a 
fund’s portfolio in a given quarter, the deviation from peer group is computed as:  dev_perctna = (percent_tna – mean percent_tna 
of all other funds in the peer group holding the same stock).  Three alternative definitions of peer groups are used: (i) funds in the 
same quintile based on value-weighted DGTW Size quintiles held, (ii) funds in the same quintile based on value-weighted DGTW 
B/M quintiles held, and (iii) funds in the same quintile based on value-weighted DGTW Momentum quintiles held. A fund’s 
deviation at time t (t-1), Fund Deviation (t) (Fund Deviation (t-1)),  is measured as the average |dev_perctna| across all stocks in a 
fund portfolio in the quarter t (t-1). Turnover is the turnover ratio, Log( Age) is the natural logarithm of fund age, and Log( TNA) is 
the natural logarithm of total net assets. Single Manager dummy is a dummy variable assuming a value of 1 if the fund managed by 
one manager and 0 otherwise. Past fund performance is the cumulative objective-adjusted return for the six months prior to the 
beginning of a portfolio quarter. Fund-Fund Networks is a measure of the strength of information networks that a fund manager has 
with other fund managers, and the details of the variable constructions are given in Appendix A. Value-weighted Size (B/M, 
Momentum) Quintile are the value-weighted average DGTW size (book-to-market, momentum) quintiles in a portfolio, 
respectively. Log (# funds in family) is the natural logarithm of the total number of fund’s under the investment management 
company of the fund. p-values are based on robust standard errors. ***, **, * report significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. 
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Coeff. p-val Coeff. p-val Coeff. p-val Coeff. p-val Coeff. p-val Coeff. p-val
Intercept -0.006 0.48 -0.045 *** 0.00 -0.012 0.26 -0.045 *** 0.00 -0.006 0.26 -0.040 *** 0.00
Fund Deviation (t) -0.001 *** 0.01 -0.002 *** 0.01 -0.002 *** 0.01
Fund Deviation (t-1) -0.001 0.21 -0.001 * 0.10 -0.001 0.20
Fund characteristics:
       Log (TNA) 0.001 ** 0.06 0.001 * 0.08 0.001 * 0.06 0.001 * 0.08 0.001 * 0.06 0.001 * 0.07
       Log (Age) -0.001 0.11 -0.001 0.28 -0.001 0.11 -0.001 0.28 -0.001 * 0.10 -0.001 0.27
       Turnover 0.000 0.91 0.000 0.73 0.000 0.91 0.000 0.73 0.000 0.90 0.000 0.73
       Single manager dummy -0.001 0.25 -0.002 0.27 -0.001 0.25 -0.002 0.27 -0.001 0.25 -0.002 0.26
       Past performance 0.141 *** 0.00 0.117 *** 0.00 0.141 *** 0.00 0.116 *** 0.00 0.141 *** 0.00 0.116 *** 0.00
       Past fund performance)
2
-0.158 0.12 -0.213 * 0.06 -0.157 0.12 -0.211 * 0.06 -0.157 0.12 -0.213 0.06
       Fund-Fund Networks -0.001 0.14 -0.001 0.44 -0.001 0.13 -0.001 0.43 -0.001 0.13 -0.001 0.43
Portfolio characteristics:
       Value-weighted Size Quintile -0.003 *** 0.00 -0.001 0.19 -0.003 *** 0.00 -0.001 0.19 -0.003 *** 0.00 -0.001 0.18
       Value-weighted B/M Quintile 0.007 *** 0.00 0.010 *** 0.00 0.007 *** 0.00 0.010 *** 0.00 0.007 *** 0.00 0.010 *** 0.00
       Value-weighted Mom Quintile 0.003 *** 0.00 0.005 *** 0.00 0.003 *** 0.00 0.005 *** 0.00 0.003 *** 0.00 0.005 *** 0.00
       Avg. Fund-Company Networks 0.001 0.76 -0.001 0.80 0.001 0.73 -0.001 0.82 0.001 0.74 -0.001 0.80
       Industry_Herfindahl 0.009 ** 0.04 0.010 ** 0.05 0.008 * 0.10 0.009 * 0.09 0.010 ** 0.04 0.007 * 0.09
Family characteristics:
      Log (# funds in family) 0.000 0.72 0.000 0.77 0.000 0.67 0.000 0.82 0.000 0.69 0.000 0.77
Time fixed-effects YES YES YES YES YES
Objective fixed-effects YES YES YES YES YES
N 9919 12253 9919 12253 9919
Adjusted R-sq. (%) 2.25 3.12 2.25 3.12 2.39
Peer Groups




Model (v) Model (vi)
YES
YES
Model (i) Model (ii) Model (iii) Model (iv)
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 In Table 3.11., we report within-portfolio deviations from peers and risk-adjusted 
returns. In general, the value-weighted returns decrease across the decile portfolios 
(based on holdings’ portfolio weight relative to peers) as the magnitude of deviation in 
portfolio weight increases. This is consistent with our previous finding that fund 
managers seem to overweight stocks that underperform and underweight stocks that 
outperform in the portfolio quarter. Overall, the results are similar whether we weight by 
fund TNA or not, indicating that the results are not driven by small funds.  
 Table 3.12. presents regressions explaining fund deviations using a different objective 
classification. In all previous analyses, we have followed other studies in using ICDI 
objective classifications. We conduct robustness checks where we use Standard & Poor’s 
objective classifications (reported in CRSP MFDB) when we are defining peer groups 
involving objectives, and accounting for objective fixed-effects in regression analyses. 
Using alternative objective classifications does not change the overall findings using 
ICDI objective definitions. Again, large, high turnover funds, and funds belonging to 
larger fund families and stronger networks have a lower deviations from their peers. The 
singer manager funds and the extreme performers deviate more, confirming the 
previously documented U-shaped relationship. 
    In Table 3.13., we present multivariate regressions examining the relationship 
between performance and fund deviations, using S&P objective classifications. The 
negative relationship between fund deviations and performance persists, and the 
magnitudes of co-efficients are higher than when ICDI objectives are used as fund 






Holding-based Returns and Deviations from Style-based Peer Groups (Portfolio Decomposition) 
 
The table reports value-weighted risk-adjusted returns of sub-portfolios formed by decomposing a fund’s portfolio into deciles based on 
deviation of portfolio weights from the mean portfolio weight allocated by the fund manager’s peer group in the same stock.  For each 
stock holding in a fund’s portfolio in a given quarter, the deviation from peer group is computed as:  dev_perctna = (percent_tna – 
mean percent_tna of all other funds in the peer group holding the same stock). For each fund portfolio, dev_perctna is ranked into 
deciles, with Decile 1 (10) being holdings’ which are most underweighted (overweighted) relative to peer funds. Three  Three 
alternative definitions of peer groups are used: (i) funds in the same quintile based on value-weighted DGTW Size quintiles held, (ii) 
funds in the same quintile based on value-weighted DGTW B/M quintiles held, and (iii) funds in the same quintile based on value-

















iR  is the value-weighted monthly return of stock i’s DGTW quintle benchmark portfolio (following Daniel et al. (1997)). 
Returns are expressed in annual percentage rates are reported both as equally-weighted as well as value-weighted by fund total net 
assets (TNA) and averaged across quarters. p-values are based on one-sample t test of the hypothesis that the portfolio risk-adjusted 




Risk-ad Ret. p-val Risk-ad Ret. p-val Risk-ad Ret. p-val Risk-ad Ret. p-val Risk-ad Ret. p-val Risk-ad Ret. p-val
(Lowest weight relative to peers)
                  Decile 1 0.021 0.00 0.018 0.00 0.018 0.00 0.021 0.00 0.017 0.00 0.018 0.00
Decile 2 0.017 0.00 0.015 0.00 0.010 0.00 0.018 0.00 0.015 0.00 0.010 0.03
Decile 3 0.009 0.00 0.014 0.01 0.011 0.00 0.011 0.08 0.009 0.00 0.017 0.00
 Decile 4 0.003 0.11 0.003 0.60 0.002 0.26 0.003 0.64 0.004 0.08 0.000 0.99
Decile 5 -0.006 0.01 0.008 0.16 -0.001 0.51 0.003 0.51 -0.001 0.65 0.002 0.69
Decile 6 -0.006 0.01 -0.002 0.77 -0.002 0.40 0.007 0.16 -0.003 0.20 0.005 0.37
Decile 7 -0.006 0.00 0.004 0.53 -0.007 0.00 -0.006 0.34 -0.009 0.00 0.003 0.62
Decile 8 -0.011 0.00 -0.009 0.19 -0.012 0.00 -0.003 0.62 -0.013 0.00 -0.004 0.49
Decile 9 -0.013 0.00 -0.013 0.04 -0.012 0.00 -0.012 0.03 -0.014 0.00 -0.018 0.00
Decile 10 -0.030 0.00 -0.037 0.00 -0.029 0.00 -0.032 0.00 -0.028 0.00 -0.032 0.00
(Highest weight relative to peers)
2
nd
 Half – 1
st
 Half -0.022 0.00 -0.023 0.02 -0.019 0.03 -0.026 0.00 -0.022 0.00 -0.024 0.04
5
th
 Quintile – 1
st
 Quintile -0.041 0.00 -0.042 0.01 -0.038 0.00 -0.044 0.00 -0.036 0.01 -0.045 0.00
10
th
 Decile – 1
st
 Decile -0.052 0.00 -0.050 0.00 -0.048 0.00 -0.057 0.00 -0.049 0.00 -0.053 0.00
Not TNA-weighted TNA-weighted
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Not TNA-weighted TNA-weighted Not TNA-weighted TNA-weighted
Abnormal Returns: Peer Group







Multivariate Regressions (Funds’ Deviations from Peer Groups using S&P Objectives) 
 
The dependent variable in the clustered OLS regressions is the absolute value of average deviation 
in portfolio weight allocations by a fund manager from their peer groups in a portfolio quarter. 
The sample includes actively managed equity mutual funds and spans ten quarters during 2003 to 
2005. For each stock holding in a fund’s portfolio in a given quarter, the deviation from peer 
group is computed as: dev_perctna = (percent_tna – mean percent_tna of all other funds in the 
peer group holding the same stock). Three alternative definitions of peer groups are used: (i) all 
funds in the sample, (ii) all same objective funds, and (iii) all same objective and same size 
quartile funds. A fund’s deviation is measured as the average dev_perctna across all stocks in a 
fund portfolio in the quarter. Turnover is the turnover ratio, Log( Age) is the natural logarithm of 
fund age, and Log( TNA) is the natural logarithm of total net assets. Single Manager dummy is a 
dummy variable assuming a value of 1 if the fund managed by one manager and 0 otherwise. Past 
fund performance is the cumulative objective-adjusted return for the six months prior to the 
beginning of a portfolio quarter. Fund-Fund Networks is a measure of the strength of information 
networks that a fund manager has with other fund managers, and the details of the variable 
constructions are given in Appendix A. Value-weighted Size (B/M, Momentum) Quintile are the 
value-weighted average DGTW size (book-to-market, momentum) quintiles in a portfolio, 
respectively. Log (# funds in family) is the natural logarithm of the total number of fund’s under 
the investment management company of the fund. p-values are based on robust standard errors. 
***, **, * report significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. S&P objective codes in sample are: 
AGG, FLX, GMC, GRI, GRO, ING, and SCG.  
Coeff. p-val Coeff. p-val Coeff. p-val
Intercept 2.377 *** 0.00 2.278 *** 0.00 2.209 *** 0.00
Fund characteristics:
          Log (TNA) -0.012 * 0.06 -0.013 *** 0.00 -0.017 *** 0.01
          Log (Age) -0.005 0.84 0.005 0.85 0.007 0.78
         Turnover -0.027 ** 0.05 -0.025 *** 0.00 -0.022 *** 0.01
        Single manager dummy 0.082 *** 0.02 0.083 *** 0.01 0.076 ** 0.02
         Past fund performance -0.579 0.13 -0.534 0.15 -0.507 0.15
         (Past fund performance)
2
8.867 ** 0.02 8.632 ** 0.02 8.538 *** 0.01
         Fund-Fund Networks -0.121 ** 0.03 -0.120 ** 0.03 -0.134 *** 0.01
Portfolio characteristics:
        Value-weighted Size Quintile 0.047 0.38 0.044 0.40 0.061 0.23
        Value-weighted B/M Quintile 0.031 0.48 0.043 0.32 0.049 0.26
        Value-weighted Mom Quintile -0.080 * 0.08 -0.077 * 0.08 -0.071 * 0.10
         Avg. Fund-Company Networks 0.278 0.30 0.246 0.34 0.237 0.35
Family characteristics:
        Log (# funds in family) -0.114 *** 0.00 -0.111 *** 0.00 -0.105 *** 0.00
Time fixed-effects YES YES YES
Objective fixed-effects YES YES YES
N 12258 12258 12258
Adjusted R-sq. 0.16 0.17 0.16
Peer Groups







Relationship between Fund Performance and Funds’ Deviation from Peer Groups (using S&P Objectives) 
 
The dependent variable in the regressions is the quarterly objective-adjusted return (OAR), the measure of fund performance. The 
quarterly OAR is computed as: OAR = (1+Ret_mth1)*(1+Ret_mth2)*(1+Ret_mth3) – (1+ObjR_mth1)*(1+ObjR_mth2)*(1+ObjR_mth3).  
The sample includes actively managed equity mutual funds and spans ten quarters during 2003 to 2005. For each stock holding 
in a fund’s portfolio in a given quarter, the deviation from peer group is computed as:  dev_perctna = (percent_tna – mean 
percent_tna of all other funds in the peer group holding the same stock). Three alternative definitions of peer groups are used: (i) 
all funds in the sample, (ii) all same objective funds, and (iii) all same objective and same size quartile funds. A fund’s deviation 
at time t (t-1), Fund Deviation (t) (Fund Deviation (t-1)),  is measured as the average |dev_perctna| across all stocks in a fund 
portfolio in the quarter t (t-1). Turnover is the turnover ratio, Log( Age) is the natural logarithm of fund age, and Log( TNA) is the 
natural logarithm of total net assets. Single Manager dummy is a dummy variable assuming a value of 1 if the fund managed by 
one manager and 0 otherwise. Past fund performance is the cumulative objective-adjusted return for the six months prior to the 
beginning of a portfolio quarter. Fund-Fund Networks is a measure of the strength of information networks that a fund manager 
has with other fund managers, and the details of the variable constructions are given in Appendix A. Value-weighted Size (B/M, 
Momentum) Quintile are the value-weighted average DGTW size (book-to-market, momentum) quintiles in a portfolio, 
respectively. Log (# funds in family) is the natural logarithm of the total number of fund’s under the investment management 
company of the fund. p-values are based on robust standard errors. ***, **, * report significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels.  




Coeff. p-val Coeff. p-val Coeff. p-val Coeff. p-val Coeff. p-val Coeff. p-val
Intercept -0.043 0.27 -0.040 *** 0.00 -0.020 0.26 -0.040 *** 0.00 -0.010 0.45 -0.053 *** 0.00
Fund Deviation (t) -0.023 *** 0.01 -0.025 ** 0.03 -0.019 ** 0.04
Fund Deviation (t-1) -0.018 * 0.06 -0.019 0.20 -0.020 * 0.06
Fund characteristics:
          Log (TNA) 0.005 * 0.07 0.004 * 0.09 0.003 *** 0.01 0.001 * 0.08 0.002 * 0.07 0.004 * 0.09
          Log (Age) -0.001 0.11 -0.001 0.29 -0.001 0.12 -0.001 0.54 -0.001 0.13 -0.001 0.50
         Turnover 0.000 0.86 0.000 0.90 0.000 0.85 0.000 0.87 0.000 0.93 0.000 0.85
        Single manager dummy -0.001 0.33 -0.001 0.35 -0.002 0.33 -0.002 0.40 -0.002 0.31 -0.002 0.43
         Past performance 0.142 *** 0.00 0.115 *** 0.00 0.142 *** 0.00 0.111 ** 0.03 0.121 ** 0.02 0.111 * 0.10
         (Past fund performance)
2
-0.135 0.19 -0.179 0.11 -0.136 0.18 -0.111 0.20 0.112 * 0.09 0.114 0.12
         Fund-Fund Networks -0.010 0.45 -0.015 0.93 -0.001 0.45 -0.001 0.88 -0.001 0.20 -0.001 0.93
Portfolio characteristics:
        Value-weighted Size Quintile -0.002 0.15 0.001 0.46 -0.002 0.15 -0.001 0.43 -0.003 0.42 -0.001 0.36
        Value-weighted B/M Quintile 0.007 *** 0.00 0.010 *** 0.00 0.007 *** 0.00 0.010 *** 0.00 0.011 *** 0.00 0.010 *** 0.00
        Value-weighted Mom Quintile 0.003 *** 0.00 0.005 *** 0.00 0.003 *** 0.00 0.005 *** 0.00 0.004 *** 0.00 0.005 *** 0.00
         Avg. Fund-Company Networks 0.002 0.60 -0.001 0.88 0.002 0.61 -0.001 0.79 0.001 0.83 -0.001 0.65
        Industry_Herfindahl 0.009 ** 0.03 0.011 ** 0.02 0.010 * 0.08 0.012 * 0.09 0.011 ** 0.05 0.012 * 0.10
Family characteristics:
        Log (# funds in family) 0.000 0.47 0.000 0.72 0.000 0.46 0.000 0.69 0.000 0.84 0.000 0.73
Time fixed-effects YES YES YES YES YES
Objective fixed-effects YES YES YES YES YES
N 9919 12225 9919 12225 9921








Model (iii) Model (iv) Model (v) Model (vi)
12253
3.09






 The main findings in the paper are summarized as follows. Our study uncovers a 
significantly negative relationship between fund managers’ deviating tendencies in their 
portfolio allocation strategies relative to their peers, and fund performance relative to 
their objectives. This finding has an important bearing on the frequent discussion about 
the tendency of money managers to follow similar strategies. The negative relationship 
documented in this study suggests that the average fund manager does not deviate based 
on valuable private information. 
 There also exists a striking persistence in deviating tendencies over time. We find a 
U-shaped relationship between deviating tendency and past performance, suggesting that 
the best and worst performers deviate more than the intermediate performers in 
subsequent periods. In further empirical analyses using portfolio decompositions, it is 
documented that the average fund manager overweights stocks that subsequently 
underperform compared to the stocks that the manager underweights. The 
underperformance is significant and the magnitude is an annualized benchmark-adjusted 
return of about -4.6%. The results are robust across peer group definitions, fund size 
categories, objective definitions and fund past performance categories.  
 The findings in this study have several important implications and raise some 
interesting questions. Results seem to indicate that mutual fund investors may do better 
by avoiding funds which have higher disparity in portfolio allocations relative to 
comparable funds, since it is a challenge to identify the managers with superior ability. 
Also, the persistence in deviating tendencies, which have a negative impact on 
performance, suggests potential conflicts of interest between fund managers and mutual 
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fund investors. Further, this study has not attempted to disentangle what causes the 
detrimental impact of deviating tendencies and performance. The relationship may be 
driven by agency problems where the manager is willing to take rational risks that are not 
beneficial for the fund’s investors, or by irrational biases like managerial overconfidence, 
where the manager overestimates her skill and private information. We leave this is an 
interesting avenue for future research. 
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CHAPTER 4 
WHAT DRIVES HOME BIAS IN CORPORATE INVESTMENTS? 




“Everything is related to everything else, but near things are more related than 
distant things.” 
-Waldo Tobler’s “First Law of Geography” (1970) 
 
The overarching goal of this paper is to shed light on the factors that impact 
choices made by acquiring firm managers during corporate investment in domestic 
M&A. We do so by focusing our attention on one intriguing facet of investment 
choice: the tendency of economic agents to show proximity preference. Our 
motivation to study this aspect of investment is rooted in the recent renaissance of 
literature that relates geographical location to various factors that impact business 
interactions and outcomes, like information asymmetry, familiarity, networks and 
economic spillovers. We first document a substantial proximity preference (or ‘home 
bias’) in corporate investment choices in M&A that is not satisfactorily explained by 
industrial agglomeration, and then identify some factors that impact the geography of 
these corporate investments. Our findings suggest that home bias in M&A is 
impacted by proximate economic opportunities, antitakeover legal regimes, herding 
behavior and acquiring firm characteristics. Unexpectedly, the target’s characteristics 
(i.e., asset attributes) are not among the prominent drivers of home bias. 
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Our study is most closely related to two main streams of literature. The first is the 
growing body of research that documents and explores home bias in portfolio 
investments, a phenomenon that continues to intrigue financial economists. While 
initial studies focused on home bias in international portfolio investments15, a 
significant extension of the literature were studies like Coval and Moskowitz (1999, 
2001) and Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001) which documented investors’ home bias 
even in domestic investments. Specifically, Coval and Moskowitz show that U.S. 
investment managers exhibit a strong preference for locally headquartered firms, 
particularly small and highly levered firms producing nontraded goods. The authors 
interpret their findings as suggesting that information advantage of local over non-
local investors drives the preference for investing in geographically proximate assets. 
Similarly, Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001) show that Finnish investors are more likely 
to hold and trade the stocks of Finnish firms that are located close to the investor, 
communicate in the investor’s native language, and have chief executives of the same 
cultural background. Although a definite accounting is still elusive, the home bias in 
domestic portfolio holdings is likely to be related to information asymmetry and/or a 
cognitive bias towards the familiar as argued by Huberman (2000). In the context of 
international portfolio investments, Chan, Covrig, and Ng (2005) find that the home 
bias is not confined to U.S. investors, but is universally exhibited by portfolio 
                                                 
15 See for example, French and Poterba (1991) who show the lack of diversified 
international portfolios held by U.S. investors. Most early studies attributed this home 
bias to the existence of barriers to international investment such as legal restrictions, 
withholding taxes, etc. However, in recent years formal barriers to international 
investment have largely been dismantled. 
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investors around the world and has persisted after the elimination of most formal 
barriers to international investments.  
The second body of research related to our study is that on corporate investments, 
and more specifically on mergers and acquisitions. A vast number of studies have 
explored various aspects of M&A, both cross-border and domestic, since M&A form 
a significant part of corporate economic activity. Additionally, M&A have retained 
attention because the overall results point to the fact that acquirers do not create 
wealth for their shareholders on an average16, but it remains among the primary 
channels of corporate investment. Most gains go to the target firm’s shareholders. 
Considerable research has been geared towards finding determinants of successful 
acquirer performance in M&A17.  
During 1990-2003, domestic M&A activity of publicly traded U.S. firms 
accounted for more than $6 trillion in corporate investments. Clearly, M&A are an 
important form of corporate investments and have major implications for the industry, 
shareholders as well as policy makers. In this paper, we take a step back from stock-
price based studies on M&A performance. In peeling another layer off the evidence 
found in performance studies, we try to shed light on one issue that may influence 
deals in the decision-making stage and determine the choice set of prospective target 
                                                 
16 Bruner (2002) surveys the literature on M&A and reviews the findings of 130 studies 
during the period 1971-2001. In summary, Bruner states that acquirers fail to benefit 
from synergies in the deal when short-term stock price reactions are considered, albeit 
with considerable cross-sectional variations. 
 
17 See for example, Rau and Vermaelen (1998) who find that long-term post-merger 
performance is better for tender offers than mergers, and poor for ‘glamour’ bidders 
with low book-to-market ratios. Loughran and Vijh (1997) find that long-term 
performance is higher for bidders using cash as method of payment compared to 
bidders paying with stock.   
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firms: the issue of target firm location relative to acquirer. If acquiring firms limit the 
scope of search for potential targets, what are the reasons that drive this behavior? 
Acquirers involved in acquisitive activities identify attractive target firms based on 
their information about the potential targets. This situation gives rise to the possibility 
that acquirers may have differential information and awareness about potential 
targets, depending on geographical proximity to the acquirer. By exploring the 
geographical distribution of domestic M&A deals we also draw attention to an 
important aspect of the market for corporate control, namely, the national versus 
segmented scope of the M&A market. We aim to disentangle the effect of industrial 
agglomeration from home bias, an aspect which has clear implications for corporate 
investments unlike for portfolio investments.  
 To the extent that firms have greater resources and capacity for collecting and 
processing information than the majority of portfolio investors, firms may not exhibit 
a significant home bias in their investments if at all. Further, unlike portfolio 
investors who often need to collect information in a timely fashion to counter 
efficient markets, firms often face imperfect competition for the investment projects 
and thus may devote more time to information gathering and analysis. So, the 
influence of information asymmetry can be much less pronounced in corporate 
investments than in portfolio investments. Also, being an impersonal organization 
with pecuniary mandates and collective decision-making processes, firms may be less 
prone to psychological biases than portfolio investors. In other words, geography may 
not be as important a factor in corporate investments as in portfolio investments. 
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 However, the literature on economic geography, a study of spatial location of 
economic activity, suggests otherwise. Studies such as von Thünen (1826), Marshall 
(1920), and Krugman (1991), suggest that economic activities may cluster naturally 
as a result of interactions of transportation costs, market potentials, and technical 
externalities. Marshall and Krugman similarly argue that there can be spatial 
boundaries to knowledge spillovers among the firms, as the cost of transmitting 
knowledge increases with distance. In the same vein, Audretsch and Feldman (2001) 
document that R&D activities and innovation tend to cluster geographically due to the 
existence of knowledge externalities. In summary, the literature on economic 
geography broadly suggests that geographical proximity may play an important role 
in corporate investments. Additionally, unlike for portfolio investors, acquisitions are 
investments in real assets. So, corporate acquirers may prefer proximate targets due to 
the ease of post-deal monitoring. Since there can be opposite forces influencing the 
spatial distribution of corporate investments, the question then can only be answered 
empirically. We use a large sample of successfully completed domestic M&A deals 
in the U.S. in order to bear on the questions relating geography to target choices in 
corporate M&A investments.  
 We examine a sample of about 10,300 successfully completed U.S. domestic 
M&A deals, of at last $10 million in value, announced by publicly traded firms 
during the period 1990-2003. We are mainly concerned with (i) documenting 
acquirers’ limited scope of target search arising out of proximity preference in 
domestic corporate M&A investments, and (ii) the factors driving the observed 
proximity preference. We study the distribution pattern of M&A based on two 
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alternative observation units: the states where acquirers and targets are headquartered 
and the geographical distance between targets and acquirers. There are several 
reasons supporting the use of states as primary geographical units in the domestic 
context. Some of the main reasons are (i) many policy decisions about businesses and 
law are made at the state level, (ii) M&A activities are regulated mostly by the state, 
and (iii) states are intuitive geographical categories for economic agents during 
decision-making. The key findings and hypotheses presented in our paper are 
summarized below. 
 Firstly, our results show that firms exhibit a strong proximity preference in M&A 
deals, with the frequency of the deals declining sharply as the geographical distance 
between targets and acquirers increases. Specifically, about 34% of acquired targets 
are ‘local’, i.e, located within a 100 kilometer (km) radius from the headquarters of 
acquiring firms. After adjusting for industry agglomeration, acquirers invest in targets 
that are approximately 34% (or 580 km) nearer than the average potential target in the 
sample, almost four times the 9% (or 160 km) local bias shown by U.S. mutual fund 
managers in Coval and Moskowitz (1999). We adjust for industrial clustering by 
constructing the benchmark (or ‘unbiased’) target distance from each acquirer as the 
mean distance from a portfolio of potential targets firms operating in the same 
industry as the actual target. This pattern of local bias holds across deal size quintiles, 
but is somewhat less for largest (≈ 462 km or 28%; mean deal size = $1,999 mill) as 
compared to smallest size quintile (≈ 655 km or 37.5%; mean deal size = $13 mill). 
Overall, firms are found to exhibit proximity preference that is strikingly similar to 
the well documented behavior of portfolio investors, and is considerably more 
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compelling in magnitude. Our results allude to a much more magnified home bias in 
case of investment in real assets versus in financial securities.  
 Second, when the state is used as an observation unit instead of geographical 
distance, we again observe a strong home bias in corporate M&A activities. On an 
average, while acquirers choose 23.2% targets in their home state, the benchmark or 
unbiased sample weight of target firms in a state is 2%. For example, while 
Wisconsin-domiciled targets account for 1.2% of the total number of sample targets 
during the period 1990-2003, they account for 30.5% of the total acquisitions made 
by Wisconsin firms. Targets based in Wisconsin, Illinois, and Minnesota, together 
account for more than half (55.5%) of acquisitions made by Wisconsin-based firms. 
Another example of home bias is exhibited by Washington-based firms that primarily 
acquire targets on the West coast (27.9% in-state, 26.7% in California and 5.2% in 
Oregon). The examples of Wisconsin and Washington are representative of a wide-
spread tendency of acquiring firms to show preference for home state targets, and are 
not explained solely by economic concentration. 
 Thirdly, our goal is to explain the considerable variation in the degree of home 
bias displayed by acquiring firms. Our hypotheses outline six categories of factors 
that may relate to home bias: (i) economic opportunities, (ii) legal environment, (iii) 
herd behavior, (iv) acquiring firm characteristics, (v) target firm characteristics, and, 
(vi) deal characteristics. While the first three categories of factors are external to the 
firms, the remaining factors capture internal firm-specific situations. We expect that 
greater economic opportunities in the acquirer’s vicinity will induce localization of 
target choices in M&A. The aspect of corporate law most pertinent to takeovers, 
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namely state antitakeover laws, should discourage M&A in states authorizing higher 
protection of target firm managers via adoption of antitakeover statutes. Firms’ 
acquisition strategies may be influenced by the strategies of a peer group of managers 
they are likely to be compared with by the media and shareholders, interact more with 
or are more likely to compete with. This may manifest itself in correlated or ‘herd’ 
behavior18. In our context, if the managers in the peer group are showing a tendency 
for localized M&A, the acquirer may have a higher likelihood of displaying localized 
target choices. We form two peer groups for each acquirer in each year: first, all the 
acquiring firm managers based in the same city and in the same industry; second, all 
the acquirers not located in the same city but operating in the same industry. This 
method allows us to separate industry-wide effects from location-dependent herding 
effects. Additionally, acquiring firm characteristics like size, book-to-market, debt in 
capital structure, R&D intensity and undistributed free cash flows may be vital in 
determining target choices. These acquirer characteristics reflect the firm’s business 
resources, network, risk attitudes, strategic considerations and financial health, all of 
which may impact M&A decisions. Target firm characteristics like size, book-to-
market and leverage reflect the degree to which information asymmetries play a role 
in takeovers. In case of deal characteristics, while we cannot overreach in interpreting 
causality, we hypothesize that deal features like cash versus stock payment, hostile 
                                                 
18 For example, Scharfstein and Stein (1990) develop a model of herd behavior 
among managers, where managers tend to mimic each others decisions because a 
manager is less likely to be answerable for a wrong strategy when other managers in 
the industry also followed the wrong strategy (i.e., a “sharing-the-blame” effect 
protects managers from being held responsible). Hong, Kubik and Stein (2005) find 
that mutual fund managers located in the same city herd in and out of the same 
stocks.  
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versus friendly attitude, same-industry versus inter-industry and tender offer to 
shareholders are related to information asymmetry and prior familiarity between 
acquirer and target, the same factors which are expected to be related to distance 
between the firms.  
Our first set of regression analyses, based on state-level choices, show that the 
propensity to acquire in-state targets is positively related to the size of the state where 
the acquiring firm is headquartered, reflecting the opportunities at home. It is noted 
that during our sample period, California- (North Dakota) based firms acquired 
50.7% (0%) of their targets in-state, reflecting ample (scarce) acquisition 
opportunities at home. On the other hand, the propensity to acquire in-state is 
negatively related to the severity of anti-takeover statutes in the home state of the 
acquirer. Especially, the statutes regarding control shares, number of freeze-out years 
and fair price significantly discourage in-state acquisitions. Thus, state-level laws 
matter in determining where M&A takes place. Considering that home bias, 
regardless of its causes, tends to reflect segmented markets, anti-takeover statutes can 
be seen as having an unexpected effect of integrating the market for corporate control 
by countering the home bias in M&A. Acquirers display substantial herding behavior 
with managers located in their city and operating in the same industry in their 
tendency to display home bias while choosing targets. Interestingly, acquirer behavior 
is not impacted by same-industry managers in other cities, or other-industry managers 
in the same city. Some firm-level factors help in explaining the degree of proximity 
preference shown by acquirer. The propensity to acquire in-state is negatively related 
to the acquirer firm size and book-to-market ratio, showing that large, value firms 
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have a lower propensity for home bias than small, growth firms. Perhaps 
unexpectedly, publicly-traded targets are more likely to be acquired by home-state 
firms than private targets, possibly due to the political resistance to out-of-state 
takeover of public firms that tend to be more visible and vital to the state economy 
than private firms. Target firm characteristics are insignificant in explaining home 
bias in M&A when the acquirer characteristics are accounted for. We also conduct 
parallel analyses involving proximity preference measures based on distance instead 
of state-level geographical choices and the empirical evidence holds. 
While our study is by no means comprehensive in terms of finding the 
determinants of corporate investment choices, our paper provides new insights into 
corporate decision-making processes. By focusing our attention on the geography of 
investment choices, we have been able to distinguish some factors that directly or 
indirectly play a substantial role in the outcomes of the decision processes. Our 
findings, along with other studies similarly indicating that ‘home’ lies within a 100 
km radius, are perhaps suggestive of the limited human capacity for managing 
complex social interactions, information sharing and processing, factors that may be 
at the root of the so-called home bias puzzle. The evidence that state laws can have a 
considerable impact on the location and nature of corporate strategies deserves further 
attention, since it uncovers the role of legal structures in the development of 
businesses and regional economies. Finally, the notion that acquirer managers care 
more about or are influenced more by the strategies of managers they are likely to be 
compared with by the local media and shareholder base, have more word-of-mouth 
communication with, or compete locally with deserves further consideration in order 
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to examine the drivers of corporate behavior and their subsequent implications for 
success.   
 The paper is organized as follows. Section 4.2. discusses the data and sample 
construction used in the study. Section 4.3. documents the geographical distribution 
of M&A deals in the United States and provides evidence on the existence of a strong 
home bias in acquiring firms. Section 4.4. discusses the variables and hypotheses 
related to the factors that may affect home bias in acquiring firms. Empirical results 
are reported in section 4.5. Section 4.6. concludes. 
 
 
4.2. Data and Sample Selection 
 
The primary source of our data is Securities Data Corporation (SDC) Platinum’s 
Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A) database. We construct a sample of successfully 
completed domestic M&A deals in the U.S. that were announced during 1990-2003 
and use various criteria to select our final dataset. There were 91,274 domestic 
acquisition announcements by U.S. acquirers during this period. From this sample, 
we choose M&A deals that have deal value of at least $10 million, were completed 
and where the acquirer owned 100% of the target’s shares post-acquisition. This 
reduces the sample to 25,010 deals. Further, we choose acquiring firms that are 
publicly traded and targets which have either public or private status, and have 11,885 
deals that satisfy these criteria. Finally, we exclude U.S. territories and islands from 
our sample in order to prevent outliers from driving the results. Although we include 
Alaska and Hawaii in our analysis, the results are not affected by their exclusion. Our 
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final sample consists of 10,379 M&A deals in the U.S. during 1990-2003. The SDC 
M&A database is our main source of data for deal and firm characteristics. 
 We supplement the firm-level data provided by SDC with data obtained from 
Center for Research on Security Prices (CRSP) and COMPUSTAT databases for U.S. 
publicly traded firms. Monthly stock price and shares outstanding data are obtained 
from CRSP to compute market value of acquirers in the month prior to the acquisition 
announcement where available. COMPUSTAT annually updated financial data were 
used to compute firm book-to-market equity values, leverage, research and 
development (R&D) expenses and undistributed free cash flows. Similar data for 
target firms were obtained for the subsample of targets that were publicly traded at 
the time of the acquisition announcement. 
 Our study uses publicly available economic and geographical data on states 
provided by the U.S. government. A widely accepted measure of a state’s economy is 
the gross state product (GSP) in current dollars which is obtained from the Bureau of 
Economic Analysis (BEA), U.S. Department of Commerce 
(http://www.bea.doc.gov/). GSP is defined as the value added in production by the 
labor and property located in a state. GSP for a state is computed as the aggregated 
gross state product originating in all industries in a state. BEA prepares GSP 
estimates for 63 industries and aggregates these industries’ GSP to compute the 
aggregated state-level Gross State Product. We also collect information on the 
standard antitakeover statutes adopted by each state to define antitakeover legal 
regimes. Appendix A summarizes some of the variables used in our study.  
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 Geographical location of firms is obtained by matching firms’ city of 
headquarters with the latitude-longitude co-ordinates provided by the U.S. Geological 
Survey (USGS). We then compute the great circle distance between each target ‘i’ 









where lat  and long  are the latitudinal and longitudinal coordinates of the target and 
acquirer headquarters’ cities in degrees, and r is the radius of the earth 
( kilometers 6378 ≈ ).  
 We use returns on the S&P 500 composite index and interest rate as 
macroeconomic variables that capture the overall business conditions under which the 
firms were operating at the time of the deal. CRSP is our source of stock index 
returns. The Federal Reserve Board of Governors provides the data on annual average 
prime interest rate levels. We do not consider monthly prime rate fluctuations since 
the deviations of monthly rates from the annual average in a given year are negligible. 
 
 
4.3. Geographical Distribution of M&A 
 
In this section we document geographical patterns in domestic M&A activity and 
provide evidence on the propensity of M&A to occur in spatial clusters within the 
United States. However, in order to understand and interpret the spatial distribution of 
                                                 
19 The great-circle distance is the shortest distance between any two points on the 
surface of a sphere measured along a path on the surface of the sphere (as opposed to 
going through the sphere's interior). 
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M&A, it is imperative to take into account industrial agglomeration and urban 
clustering. These phenomena by definition put more potential targets clustered around 
an acquirer, since industries and populations tend to develop in agglomerated 
geographic spaces. For example, Ellison and Glaeser (1999) in their study of U.S. 
manufacturing industries confirm the conventional wisdom that most industries are 
somewhat localized (extreme examples being Silicon Valley and Detroit’s auto 
industry). However, their empirical results show that the degree of localization is 
slight for many of the industries in their sample.  
 Figure 4.1. shows plots of the actual and benchmark frequency distributions of 
M&A deals versus the geographical distance ranges between the target and acquiring 
firms. Urban and industrial clustering lead to a skewed geographical distribution of 
firm locations, because they cause more potential targets to be located in proximity to 
an acquirer. So, in order to estimate what an ex-ante or “unbiased” target spatial 
frequency distribution should be, we have to take into account urban and industrial 
agglomeration. We use a simplistic frequency distribution of the universe of sample 
target firms based on distance from each acquirer, which accounts for spatial 
clustering of firms. For ease of presentation, we aggregate the ex-ante distribution of 
targets across all acquirers. While this measure of ex-ante expected target distribution 
may not be ideal, it is impossible to determine a perfect ex-ante target distribution 
since we would then have to know the universe of firms that each acquirer considers 
as potential targets. Our benchmark measure should at least partially reflect the effect 
of agglomeration. Using this method, the ex-ante probability that an acquired target is 
located within 100 km of the acquirer (or ‘local’) is 4%. However, using the actual or  
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Figure 4.1. Frequency of M&A and Distance between Acquirers and Targets 
 
The figure shows the geographical frequency distribution of targets acquired and the 
benchmark target distribution. Actual target distribution plots the % of targets acquired 
lying in the corresponding x-axis distance range from the acquirer. Benchmark target 
distribution is computed as the % of target firms in the sample which lie in the 
corresponding distance range to an acquiring firm. The values plotted are averaged 
across all acquirers in the sample. The distance ranges are in 100km units between 
acquirer and target firms. The x-axis is the distance range at which the frequency of 
deals is computed: 0-100 km, 101-200 km, 201-300 km etc. The plot after 4500 km is 











































































































ex-post target distribution, the probability that a target is within 100 km from the 
acquirer is 34%. So, the actual probability of deals involving a local target is more 
than eight times the expected probability.  
Figure 4.1. also illustrates that the frequency of M&A deals with proximate 
targets is much higher than those involving distant targets. The frequency of M&A 
deals falls precipitously with distance between acquirers and targets. Till around 650 
km distance from acquirer, the actual target frequency exceeds the benchmark 
134 
frequency. However, for distances greater than 650 km, the benchmark target 
frequency is higher than the actual frequency through all distance ranges. The effect 
of distance on the propensity of M&A deals to occur becomes negligible after 
approximately 1800 km. Large states like California, New York, Massachusetts and 
Texas are likely to have a high degree of business exchange, which would be 
reflected in greater geographical distances between acquirers and targets in these 
states. This fact gets reflected in the distance ranges 3800-4400 km, where there is a 
slight increase in frequency of M&A. We also run additional checks with a sub-
sample where we exclude acquirers and targets from these four states, but the 
frequency plot looks very similar to the results for the full sample and we do not 
report it.  
 To introduce our state-level analyses of target choices, we consider acquirers from 
two states, namely, Wisconsin and Washington. Figure 4.2. illustrates the 
phenomenon of proximity preference in M&A, by presenting surface maps of the 
distribution of target firms acquired by companies from Wisconsin (Panel A) and 
Washington (Panel B). As we will demonstrate in the later part of this section, the 
behavior of Washington and Wisconsin acquirers is typical of firms from most states. 
Panel A presents a contour map of the geographical frequency distribution of 
takeovers by Wisconsin acquirers. It clearly shows that there is a strong proximity 
preference shown by Wisconsin acquirers in the choice of where to make investments 
in M&A. The contour peaks are highest in the home state and contiguous states like 
Illinois and Minnesota, and fall away with distance. Also representative of several 
other states in the sample, Wisconsin acquirers venture to acquire in industrially  
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Figure 4.2. Geographical Distribution of Target firms 
 
Panel A shows a contour map of the distribution of M&A activity conducted by Wisconsin 
acquirers, based on frequency of targets in a state. Panel B shows a contour map of the 
distribution of M&A activity conducted by Washington acquirers, based on frequency of 







Panel A: Target Frequency Distribution of Wisconsin Acquirers 
Panel B: Target Frequency Distribution of Washington Acquirers 
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concentrated regions like California, Florida and the Northeast in spite of distance.  
Panel B presents an equivalent contour map for takeovers by Washington acquirers. 
We clearly see that Washington acquirers primarily acquire in their home state and 
nearby states on the West coast, like California and Oregon. The other regions where 
Washington acquirers show some activity are Texas, Florida and the Northeast.  
 Overall, the spatial patterns in target firms’ locations provide strong evidence that 
the home state and contiguous states are preferred by acquirers during acquisitive 
activity, thereby showing a home as well as near-home bias. In order to understand 
whether the phenomenon of proximity preference universally holds across the 
spectrum of acquiring firms in the U.S., we study the distribution of M&A activity 
involving acquirers and targets from all U.S. states. 
 Table 4.1. provides descriptive statistics on the geographical distribution of M&A 
activity using states as units of observations. Business activity, as reflected by the 
proportion of targets and acquirers in a state, is clearly not distributed uniformly 
between states and large inequalities are evident. California is by far the biggest state, 
accounting for approximately 18% of acquirers and 19% of target firms. Some other 
states that account for a considerable portion of the acquirers and targets in the 
sample are Texas (8.5% of acquirers, 7.7% of targets), New York (7.8% of acquirers, 
6.3% of targets) and Massachusetts (5% of acquirers, 5.1% of targets), together 
accounting for around 21% of the acquirers and 19% of target firms.  
 One of the most important things evident from Table 4.1. is that the geographical 
distribution of M&A deals is not explained solely by the concentration of business  
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Table 4.1. 
Summary Statistics of Domestic M&A Activity by State 
 
The table reports summary statistics for the 50 U.S. states and the District of Columbia. The % of Targets (Acquirers) in a state is the number of deals 
involving targets (acquirers) located in the state as a percentage of the total number of deals in the sample. Home Acquirers (%) is the percentage of 
targets in the state acquired by in-state acquirers. The Top three Out-of-State Acquirers for a target state are the three states which acquired the highest 
number of targets in the state. When more than one acquirer state has the same number of acquisitions, we rank according to the mean value of the deal.  
Home Targets (%) is the percentage of acquisitions conducted by acquirers in the state involving in-state targets.  Top three Out-of-State Targets for an 
acquiring state are the three states which had the maximum number of targets involved in deals conducted by acquirers in the state. 














Top three Out-of-State Acquirers  




Top three Out-of-State Targets  
(As % of Acquisitions By Acquirer State) 
Alabama AL 1.87 0.86 24.72 GA: 12.36 TN: 10.11 CA: 8.99 11.40 FL: 25.39 GA: 14.51 TX: 11.40 
Alaska AK 0.02 0.09 0.00 CA: 44.44 AR: 11.11 MI: 11.11 0.00 WA:50.00 CA: 50.00 - 
Arizona AZ 1.06 1.50 10.32 CA: 18.06 TX: 8.39 FL: 6.45 14.55 CA: 13.64 NY: 9.09 TX: 7.27 
Arkansas AR 0.58 0.49 31.37 TX: 15.69 MO: 11.76 TN: 9.80 26.67 TX: 15.00 IL: 8.33 CA: 8.33 
California CA 17.97 19.13 47.57 MA: 6.12 NY: 6.12 TX: 5.71 50.65 MA: 6.78 TX: 5.33 NY: 3.55 
Colorado CO 2.10 2.40 15.73 CA: 16.13 TX: 11.29 NY: 6.85 17.97 CA: 11.98 TX: 9.68 VA: 5.07 
Connecticut CT 2.09 2.05 22.64 NY: 12.26 CA: 11.32 NJ: 7.55 22.22 CA: 12.04 MA: 7.87 NY: 7.87 
D.of Columbia DC 0.54 0.35 11.11 NY: 16.67 CA: 8.33 VA: 5.56 7.14 NY: 10.71 VA: 8.93 GA: 8.93 
Delaware DE 0.17 0.30 0.00 CO: 12.90 MD: 9.68 PA: 9.68 0.00 PA: 27.78 IL: 16.67 CA: 16.67 
Florida FL 4.06 5.31 25.68 AL: 8.93 NC: 6.92 CA: 6.92 33.57 CA: 10.95 TX: 7.14 NY: 6.67 
Georgia GA 3.74 3.77 25.64 CA: 11.03 AL: 7.18 FL: 5.90 25.84 CA: 9.56 FL: 8.01 TX: 5.68 
Hawaii HI 0.07 0.15 26.67 CA: 26.67 TX: 20.00 TN: 6.67 57.14 CA: 28.57 WA: 14.29 - 
Idaho ID 0.17 0.18 0.00 WA: 21.05 OH: 15.79 UT: 10.53 0.00 CA: 16.67 FL: 11.11 MT: 5.56 
Illinois IL 4.21 4.37 21.24 CA: 8.63 MO: 6.64 NY: 5.53 22.07 CA: 11.49 TX: 6.44 NY: 6.21 
Indiana IN 1.49 1.65 34.50 OH: 11.70 MI: 6.43 TX: 5.26 38.31 IL: 13.64 OH: 5.84 KY: 4.55 
Iowa IA 0.42 0.65 20.90 MO: 13.43 NE: 10.45 WI: 7.46 32.56 MI: 9.30 TX: 6.98 SD: 4.65 
Kansas KS 0.41 0.49 7.84 MO: 25.49 CA: 11.76 TX: 9.80 9.52 OK: 19.05 FL: 9.52 CO: 7.14 
Kentucky KY 0.73 0.81 25.00 OH: 21.43 IN: 8.33 TN: 7.14 27.63 OH: 11.84 CA: 11.84 TN: 5.26 
Louisiana LA 0.85 1.35 28.57 TX: 27.14 MS: 7.14 AL: 6.43 45.45 TX: 17.05 TN: 3.41 NM: 2.27 
Maine ME 0.23 0.30 16.13 PA: 9.68 NY: 9.68 VT: 6.45 20.83 MA: 29.17 CT: 12.50 NH: 8.33 
Maryland MD 2.11 1.96 24.14 CA: 11.82 TX: 6.90 NJ: 6.40 22.48 CA: 12.84 VA: 10.55 MA: 6.42 
Massachusetts MA 5.04 5.14 28.76 CA: 23.68 NY: 6.02 TX: 4.32 29.37 CA: 23.22 IL: 4.41 TX: 4.41 
Michigan MI 1.64 2.01 25.48 OH: 8.65 IL: 7.69 NY: 7.69 31.18 IL: 12.35 CA: 10.59 IN: 6.47 
Minnesota MN 2.18 1.87 17.10 CA: 14.51 WI: 8.81 NY: 7.25 14.67 CA: 16.44 MA: 5.33 NJ: 4.89 
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Table 4.1. (contd.) 














Top three Out-of-State Acquirers 




Top three Out-of-State Targets 
(As % of Acquisitions By Acquirer State) 
Mississippi MS 0.63 0.44 34.78 TN: 8.70 GA: 6.52 FL: 6.52 24.62 LA: 15.38 TN: 9.23 AR: 4.62 
Missouri MO 1.89 1.32 26.47 IL: 8.09 CA: 7.35 TX: 6.62 18.46 IL: 15.38 TX: 12.31 CA: 7.18 
Montana MT 0.08 0.13 30.77 NY: 15.38 ID: 7.69 WV: 7.69 50.00 ND: 12.50 ID: 12.50 WA: 12.50 
Nebraska NE 0.71 0.35 19.44 CA: 16.67 WI: 8.33 IL: 8.33 9.59 IA: 9.59 TX: 9.59 NJ: 6.85 
Nevada NV 0.50 0.63 23.08 CA: 18.46 TX: 9.23 UT: 7.69 28.85 CA: 15.38 OR: 5.77 NY: 5.77 
New Hampshire NH 0.38 0.55 19.30 CA: 19.30 MA: 14.04 CT: 7.02 28.21 MA: 25.64 CA: 7.69 IL: 5.13 
New Jersey NJ 3.76 3.42 24.29 NY: 14.69 CA: 11.02 PA: 9.60 22.11 CA: 16.20 NY: 12.60 PA: 6.68 
New Mexico NM 0.26 0.38 0.00 MA: 23.08 CA: 10.26 CT: 7.69 0.00 MA: 14.81 CA: 14.81 FL: 11.11 
New York NY 7.82 6.31 35.68 CA: 10.11 NJ: 7.50 TX: 5.82 28.80 CA: 14.96 NJ: 6.43 TX: 4.57 
North Carolina NC 2.95 2.25 35.19 TX: 7.73 CA: 7.30 GA: 6.44 26.89 FL: 12.46 VA: 7.54 CA: 6.89 
North Dakota ND 0.12 0.05 0.00 MT: 20.00 MI: 20.00 WA: 20.00 0.00 CA: 25.00 AZ: 16.67 NE: 8.33 
Ohio OH 3.60 3.27 30.77 NY: 8.28 CA: 6.51 TX: 5.03 27.96 CA: 8.06 IN: 5.38 PA: 5.38 
Oklahoma OK 0.58 0.89 22.83 TX: 19.57 KS: 8.70 NY: 7.61 35.00 TX: 25.00 CO: 6.67 KS: 3.33 
Oregon OR 0.77 1.02 12.26 CA: 30.19 WA: 8.49 NJ: 4.72 16.25 CA: 33.75 MA: 8.75 WA: 7.50 
Pennsylvania PA 4.48 3.97 37.47 CA: 7.30 NJ: 6.33 NY: 5.84 33.26 CA: 8.86 NY: 7.56 NJ: 7.34 
Rhode Island RI 0.21 0.22 13.04 TX: 26.09 IL: 17.39 MA: 8.70 13.64 CA: 18.18 OH: 13.64 NY: 13.64 
South Carolina SC 0.47 0.80 20.48 NC: 15.66 VA: 7.23 AL: 6.02 34.69 FL: 16.33 GA: 8.16 NC: 6.12 
South Dakota SD 0.04 0.08 0.00 IA: 25.00 NV: 12.50 DC: 12.50 0.00 CO: 50.00 IL: 50.00 - 
Tennessee TN 1.95 1.43 22.97 TX: 8.78 GA: 6.76 AL: 5.41 16.83 FL: 6.93 TX: 6.93 CA: 6.44 
Texas TX 8.55 7.74 36.13 CA: 12.38 NY: 4.63 FL: 3.75 32.69 CA: 12.78 LA: 4.30 NY: 4.30 
Utah UT 0.74 0.87 11.11 CA: 13.33 CO: 8.89 WA: 6.67 12.99 CA: 20.78 CO: 12.99 WA: 7.79 
Vermont VT 0.15 0.10 30.00 PA: 20.00 ME: 10.00 IA: 10.00 20.00 MA: 26.67 ME: 13.33 NH: 13.33 
Virginia VA 2.35 2.96 24.18 CA: 11.11 MD: 7.52 NC: 7.52 30.45 CA: 12.76 TX: 6.17 MD: 4.53 
Washington WA 1.66 1.99 23.30 CA: 21.36 NY: 7.77 MA: 4.85 27.91 CA: 26.74 OR: 5.23 MA: 4.07 
West Virginia WV 0.36 0.37 52.63 OH: 15.79 NC: 10.53 TN: 5.26 54.05 VA: 18.92 OH: 5.41 CA: 5.41 
Wisconsin WI 1.24 1.23 30.71 IL: 11.81 MN: 7.87 NY: 5.51 30.47 MN: 13.28 IL: 11.72 CA: 8.59 
























activity in certain large states like California, Texas, New York and Massachusetts, 
among a few others. The pattern of higher propensity for in-state M&A is observed 
for a vast majority of states. On average, only about 2% of sample targets are located 
in a given state but acquiring firms from the state choose in-state targets 23% of the 
time. For 35 states, the majority of acquisitive activities involving targets from the 
state were conducted by home state acquirers.  
 The geography of M&A documented in Table 4.1. also provides evidence that 
proximity preference does not imply only in-state business transactions. It is also 
observed even when we consider “near-home” or neighboring states. The top (i.e, 
most frequent) acquirer and target states for most of the 50 states include either the 
economically dominant states like California, or proximate states. Several top 
acquiring states are contiguous with the target state. For example, Georgia and 
Tennessee acquirers account for approximately 22% of the acquisitions in Alabama. 
This phenomenon is not restricted to states in any particular region. Target firms from 
Iowa in the Midwest have a majority of acquirers from Missouri, Nebraska and 
Wisconsin, together accounting for 31% of the acquisitions of Iowa firms. A large 
proportion (30%) of target firms in Vermont in the Northeast gets acquired by out-of-
state acquirers from Pennsylvania and Maine. Approximately, 26% of Nevada targets 
in the West region of the U.S. get acquired by out-of-state acquirers from California 
and Utah, both of which are contiguous to Nevada. Another fact that is apparent from 
Table 4.1. is the importance of California as a center for business activity. California 
is the predominant exception to the pattern of proximity preference, and the state is a 
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leading hub of M&A activity for a majority of states, irrespective of their 
geographical distance.  
 Tables 4.2. and 4.3. report statistical significance tests based on two alternative 
measures of home bias. Table 4.2. reports our first measure based on the degree to 
which acquirers overweight their home state targets in M&A, in comparison to the 
benchmark, or “unbiased”, weight of the state’s potential target firms. The 
geographical units of observation used in this measure are states. An ideal measure of 
benchmark weight of a state’s targets would reflect the firms located in the state that 
are potential targets for an acquirer, relative to the universe of firms in the U.S. 
However, the distribution of potential target firms is unknown. We construct two 
alternative benchmark weights that are likely to be good proxies of the distribution of 
unbiased benchmark target weights across states.   
 The first method of computing benchmark weights uses the distribution of all 
target firms across states in our sample of consummated M&A deals. In using the full 
sample of target firms, this measure avoids assumptions about likelihood of inter- 
versus intra-industry deals, and allows for the possibility that acquirers are as likely to 
acquire unrelated targets as they are to acquire related targets20. We measure home 
bias as the degree to which acquirers overweight their home state targets during 
M&A, compared to the benchmark sample weight of targets located in the state. The 
home bias measure is positive and significant for most states. All except seven states  
                                                 
20 Relatedness of acquirer and target is measured at the 2-digit SIC code level. If the 
2-digit SIC codes match between two firms, they are classified as being related, and 




Test of Home Bias in Domestic M&A Activity 
 
The table reports the degree of home bias in acquirers, using acquirer states as units of observation. The 
benchmark weight of home state targets is computed (i) as the weight of home state targets in sample, 
or (ii) the sample weight of Compustat firms located in the acquirer’s home state. The actual weight of 
targets in the home state is the % of acquisitions by the acquirer state involving home state targets. 
Home bias is measured as the difference in actual weight and benchmark weight of home state targets 
and t-tests use the binomial probability test: The null hypothesis is that the probability of acquisition in 
the home state by an acquirer is equal to the sample weight of firms in the acquirer’s home state. ***, 
** denote significance at the 1%, 5% level respectively. 
 










Home Bias (%) 
(Sample Targets) 
Home Bias (%) 
(Compustat) 
Alabama AL 0.86 0.63 11.40 10.54*** 10.77*** 
Alaska AK 0.09 0.04 0.00 -0.09 -0.04 
Arizona AZ 1.50 1.14 14.55 13.05*** 13.41*** 
Arkansas AR 0.49 0.41 26.67 26.18*** 26.26*** 
California CA 19.13 13.84 50.65 31.52*** 36.81*** 
Colorado CO 2.40 2.23 17.97 15.57*** 15.74*** 
Connecticut CT 2.05 2.04 22.22 20.17*** 20.18*** 
D. of Columbia DC 0.35 0.28 7.14 6.79*** 6.86*** 
Delaware DE 0.30 0.38 0.00 -0.30 -0.38 
Florida FL 5.31 4.42 33.57 28.26*** 29.15*** 
Georgia GA 3.77 2.16 25.84 22.07*** 23.68*** 
Hawaii HI 0.15 0.21 57.14 56.99*** 56.93*** 
Idaho ID 0.18 0.22 0.00 -0.18 -0.22 
Illinois IL 4.37 3.60 22.07 17.70*** 18.47*** 
Indiana IN 1.65 1.27 38.31 36.66*** 37.04*** 
Iowa IA 0.65 0.50 32.56 31.91*** 32.06*** 
Kansas KS 0.49 0.48 9.52 9.03*** 9.04*** 
Kentucky KY 0.81 0.56 27.63 26.82*** 27.07*** 
Louisiana LA 1.35 0.66 45.45 44.10*** 44.79*** 
Maine ME 0.30 0.18 20.83 20.53*** 20.65*** 
Maryland MD 1.96 1.50 22.48 20.52*** 20.98*** 
Massachusetts MA 5.14 3.89 29.37 24.23*** 25.48*** 
Michigan MI 2.01 1.72 31.18 29.17*** 29.46*** 
Minnesota MN 1.87 2.77 14.67 12.80*** 11.90*** 
Mississippi MS 0.44 0.26 24.62 24.18*** 24.36*** 
Missouri MO 1.32 1.49 18.46 17.14*** 16.97*** 
Montana MT 0.13 0.09 50.00 49.87*** 49.91*** 
Nebraska NE 0.35 0.35 9.59 9.24*** 9.24*** 
Nevada NV 0.63 0.85 28.85 28.22*** 28.00*** 





Table 4.2. (contd.) 










Home Bias (%) 
(Sample Targets) 
Home Bias (%) 
(Compustat) 
New Jersey NJ 3.42 4.39 22.11 18.69*** 17.72*** 
New Mexico NM 0.38 0.15 0.00 -0.38 -0.15 
New York NY 6.31 8.34 28.80 22.49*** 20.46*** 
North Carolina NC 2.25 1.53 26.89 24.64*** 25.36*** 
North Dakota ND 0.05 0.07 0.00 -0.05 -0.07 
Ohio OH 3.27 3.26 27.96 24.69*** 24.7*** 
Oklahoma OK 0.89 0.73 35.00 34.11*** 34.27*** 
Oregon OR 1.02 0.83 16.25 15.23*** 15.42*** 
Pennsylvania PA 3.97 3.92 33.26 29.29*** 29.34*** 
Rhode Island RI 0.22 0.27 13.64 13.42*** 13.37*** 
South Carolina SC 0.80 0.65 34.69 33.89*** 34.04*** 
South Dakota SD 0.08 0.11 0.00 -0.08 -0.11 
Tennessee TN 1.43 1.05 16.83 15.40*** 15.78*** 
Texas TX 7.74 7.84 32.69 24.95*** 24.85*** 
Utah UT 0.87 0.82 12.99 12.12*** 12.17*** 
Vermont VT 0.10 0.18 20.00 19.90*** 19.82*** 
Virginia VA 2.96 2.07 30.45 27.49*** 28.38*** 
Washington WA 1.99 1.51 27.91 25.92*** 26.4*** 
West Virginia WV 0.37 0.17 54.05 53.68*** 53.88*** 
Wisconsin WI 1.23 1.18 30.47 29.24*** 29.29*** 
Wyoming WY 0.05 0.13 0.00 -0.05 -0.13 
Mean(Median) 1.96 (0.89) 1.72 (0.82) 23.23 (24.62) 21.27 (22.07) 21.51 (20.98) 
 
 
have a statistically significant home bias measure based on population weights of 
sample targets. Excluding Hawaii21, the acquirers displaying the highest degree of 
home bias based on this measure are West Virginia, Montana, Louisiana, Indiana and 
Oklahoma. Perhaps surprisingly, these are not states which have a high level of 
business activity, showing that proximity preference is not related solely to 
acquisition opportunities in the home state. On an average, acquiring firms make 23% 
acquisitions in the home state, as compared to the approximately 2% average sample 
acquisition is more than 11 times higher than the ex-ante ‘unbiased’ probability. The  
                                                 
21 Hawaii is a non-continental state and therefore may have geographically unusual 















Alabama 783.31 1562.77 779.47 49.79 15.99*** 
Alaska 2275.27 4674.32 2399.05 51.32 - 
Arizona 1846.54 2198.90 352.36 16.03 2.90*** 
Arkansas 822.09 1529.01 706.92 46.03 6.86*** 
California 1584.13 2583.79 999.65 38.54 24.39*** 
Colorado 1459.31 1808.13 348.82 19.25 5.36*** 
Connecticut 1270.60 1871.62 601.01 31.99 5.53*** 
D. of Columbia 1125.27 1650.09 524.83 31.81 3.19*** 
Delaware 1226.79 1713.40 486.62 28.42 1.45 
Florida 1412.17 2096.09 683.92 32.58 10.43*** 
Georgia 962.42 1572.03 609.61 38.60 11.19*** 
Hawaii 890.53 6418.61 5528.08 86.13 6.21*** 
Idaho 1934.22 2378.84 444.62 18.84 1.57 
Illinois 1037.59 1459.74 422.15 28.93 9.45*** 
Indiana 544.77 1435.36 890.59 62.10 14.28*** 
Iowa 788.57 1513.53 724.96 47.62 6.13*** 
Kansas 1122.38 1531.87 409.49 26.37 3.16*** 
Kentucky 740.98 1441.90 700.92 48.51 6.49*** 
Louisiana 665.99 1717.33 1051.34 61.10 12.66*** 
Maine 776.04 2112.19 1336.16 63.05 5.04*** 
Maryland 1034.53 1650.32 615.79 37.40 6.34*** 
Massachusetts 1766.56 1994.91 228.35 11.47 2.80*** 
Michigan 827.61 1516.30 688.69 45.45 8.17*** 
Minnesota 1328.03 1626.41 298.38 18.38 5.18*** 
Mississippi 659.37 1597.71 938.34 58.92 10.48*** 
Missouri 984.51 1564.26 579.75 37.47 11.98*** 
Montana 729.04 2382.87 1653.83 69.35 4.55*** 
Nebraska 1097.33 1560.54 463.21 29.69 5.61*** 
Nevada 1264.63 2307.19 1042.57 44.80 5.46*** 
New Hampshire 1001.11 1998.08 996.97 50.18 4.21*** 
New Jersey 1129.90 1771.42 641.52 36.18 7.62*** 




Test of Home Bias using Coval-Moskowitz Local Bias Measure 
 
The table reports measures and significance of local bias (LB) following Coval-Moskowitz 
(1999). The reported values are averages across all acquirers in a state. Actual Distance is 
the distance in km between the acquirer and target. Unadj. Benchmark Distance for an 
acquirer is the mean distance in km between all the targets in the sample and the acquirer. 
Industry-adj. Benchmark Distance is the mean distance of the acquirer from all target firms 
in the sample having the same 2-digit SIC code as the target firm acquired. LB in km (%) is 
the local bias measured as difference between actual and benchmark distances (% of 
benchmark distance). t-statistics are reported for tests of the null hypothesis that LB is zero. 





weight of targets in the state. Therefore, the actual probability of a home state only 
states which do not show significant home bias are Alaska, Delaware, Idaho, New 
Mexico, North Dakota, South Dakota and Wyoming. The lack of in-state business 
opportunities may be causing the absence of home bias in states like Alaska and 
Idaho. Delaware, on the other hand, is an outlier in terms of the corporate law regime 
in the state and while it attracts a majority of incorporations, it does not have many 
domiciled firms.  
 The second measure of benchmark weights uses the universe of Compustat firms 
located in the U.S. While our sample includes domestic M&A involving public and 
private targets, the Compustat database only includes publicly traded companies. 
However, the geographical distribution of publicly traded firms within the U.S. is  













North Carolina 847.15 1625.41 778.26 47.86 13.13*** 
North Dakota 1528.51 1799.07 270.56 15.08 1.21 
Ohio 812.68 1484.59 671.91 45.01 12.42*** 
Oklahoma 616.39 1581.04 964.65 61.05 11.55*** 
Oregon 1555.05 2757.16 1202.11 43.71 7.54*** 
Pennsylvania 917.98 1658.09 740.11 44.36 12.32*** 
Rhode Island 1817.35 1968.65 151.31 7.78 0.40 
South Carolina 759.06 1630.36 871.30 53.50 5.57*** 
South Dakota 879.66 1836.21 956.54 52.09 4.34*** 
Tennessee 900.58 1480.55 579.97 39.07 8.96*** 
Texas 1221.61 1742.85 521.24 29.58 14.90*** 
Utah 1019.35 2099.22 1079.88 51.43 11.12*** 
Vermont 474.82 1943.81 1468.99 75.67 5.39*** 
Virginia 1098.43 1644.65 546.22 33.39 6.17*** 
Washington 1484.67 2761.16 1276.49 46.49 11.56*** 
West Virginia 439.66 1510.80 1071.15 70.77 6.91*** 
Wisconsin 681.11 1519.24 838.13 55.04 10.33*** 


























Alabama 783.31 1293.99 512.56 40.39 11.07*** 
Alaska 2275.27 4788.80 2513.54 52.49 - 
Arizona 1846.54 2096.49 242.39 12.41 2.07** 
Arkansas 822.09 1437.08 629.53 45.02 6.89*** 
California 1584.13 2374.96 785.79 32.37 19.00*** 
Colorado 1459.31 1706.76 258.54 15.19 4.12*** 
Connecticut 1270.60 1938.17 604.96 34.92 5.90*** 
D. of Columbia 1125.27 1680.07 567.17 34.70 3.60*** 
Delaware 1226.79 1658.69 416.69 28.05 1.29 
Florida 1412.17 2062.71 656.55 32.30 10.25*** 
Georgia 962.42 1542.36 580.72 40.38 11.57*** 
Hawaii 890.53 6661.39 5913.39 86.91 6.64*** 
Idaho 1934.22 2238.15 303.93 11.72 1.01 
Illinois 1037.59 1428.84 388.21 28.70 9.25*** 
Indiana 544.77 1248.10 706.84 61.23 13.57*** 
Iowa 788.57 1459.69 672.20 47.01 6.05*** 
Kansas 1122.38 1397.63 291.06 22.67 2.53*** 
Kentucky 740.98 1206.81 461.43 38.73 4.42*** 
Louisiana 665.99 1529.12 845.81 55.10 10.45*** 
Maine 776.04 1887.79 1111.76 62.67 4.78*** 
Maryland 1034.53 1588.01 562.80 37.42 6.04*** 
Massachusetts 1766.56 2117.40 356.00 17.64 4.46*** 
Michigan 827.61 1364.47 526.36 40.37 6.49*** 
Minnesota 1328.03 1633.40 302.96 18.30 5.29*** 
Mississippi 659.37 1434.58 766.08 55.48 9.07*** 
Missouri 984.51 1485.96 493.10 34.38 10.74*** 
Montana 729.04 2512.35 1783.31 70.24 4.68*** 
Nebraska 1097.33 1529.16 428.20 28.31 5.34*** 
Nevada 1264.63 2216.30 980.34 44.09 5.20*** 
New Hampshire 1001.11 1992.50 1002.38 54.94 4.85*** 
New Jersey 1129.90 1733.34 614.71 37.83 7.63*** 
New Mexico 1839.54 1918.39 77.00 3.72 0.41 
New York 1285.78 1771.66 489.21 30.05 9.13*** 
North Carolina 847.15 1431.93 573.32 43.86 10.64*** 
North Dakota 1528.51 1775.20 239.27 13.99 1.10 
Ohio 812.68 1299.49 477.40 39.34 9.40*** 
Oklahoma 616.39 1175.76 539.48 45.05 6.34*** 
Oregon 1555.05 2648.53 1096.40 38.95 6.31*** 
Pennsylvania 917.98 1536.99 611.23 41.01 10.55*** 
Rhode Island 1817.35 1907.89 115.09 7.50 0.32 
South Carolina 759.06 1412.09 637.41 49.70 4.50*** 
South Dakota 879.66 1623.59 743.93 47.79 6.45*** 
Tennessee 900.58 1347.71 444.91 33.44 7.06*** 
Texas 1221.61 1561.81 350.81 22.54 10.61*** 
Utah 1019.35 2144.66 1159.16 52.39 11.25*** 
Vermont 474.82 1581.17 1087.70 74.76 4.89*** 
Virginia 1098.43 1607.11 513.80 34.22 6.09*** 
Washington 1484.67 2699.57 1214.69 44.35 10.65*** 
West Virginia 439.66 1138.84 685.06 62.65 4.62*** 
Wisconsin 681.11 1403.17 718.14 53.81 9.75*** 













likely to be highly correlated with the overall distribution of companies across states. 
We compute the second measure of benchmark target weights for states using the 
distribution of Compustat firms. The Compustat benchmark weights tend to be a 
reflection of the sample target weights in a state. Not surprisingly, the results are very 
similar whether we use the sample of target firms or Compustat firms. For almost all 
the states, the measure for degree of home state bias is qualitatively indistinguishable 
whether we use sample targets or Compustat to determine benchmark weights.  
In order to verify the generality of these patterns, we conduct further robustness 
checks across deal size quintiles. It may be expected that smaller acquirers who do 
not have the resources to make big acquisitions find it unfeasible to take over, 
monitor and integrate distant targets. Additionally, small targets may not provide 
sufficient synergies that offset cost of a distant acquisition. So, the size of both 
acquirer and target may play a crucial role in determining whether an acquirer 
displays proximity preference. We use deal size as a proxy for size effects of firms. 
Interestingly, 32% of acquisitions in the smallest size quintile (mean deal size= $13 
mill) are in-state, while 30% in the largest size quintile (mean deal size= $1,999 mill) 
are in-state, the difference being statistically insignificant. Our evidence indicates that 
home bias is displayed across the spectrum of deal sizes. 
 A caveat is in order when we interpret the results of state-level home bias in Table 
4.2. The benchmark weights used do not adjust for industrial agglomeration. In the 
extreme case where most industries are clustered into a limited geographical space, 
the proximity preference observed may be simply due to the higher likelihood of 
potential targets being clustered around an acquirer in the same industry. Our 
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following empirical tests attempt to capture the impact of industrial agglomeration 
and whether this explains the observed home bias in M&A deals.22  
Table 4.3. reports the local bias measures based on geographical distance between 
acquirers and targets, following the methodology of Coval and Moskowitz (1999). 
For ease of reporting, we use states as units of observation by aggregating acquiring 
firm bias measures to the corresponding domicile state level. We compute ex-ante 
benchmark distance of targets from acquirers both as unadjusted and industry-
adjusted measures. The unadjusted benchmark distance for an acquirer is the mean 
distance of an acquiring firm from all target firms in the sample. The unadjusted local 
bias (LB) measures are the difference in actual and unadjusted benchmark distance. 
The LB measures are significant at the 1% or 5% level for most states, except Alaska, 
Delaware, Idaho, New Mexico, North Dakota, Rhode Island and Wyoming. In terms 
of significant LB (%) measures, the states showing highest bias (excluding Hawaii) 
are Vermont, West Virginia, Louisiana and Indiana. Among the states showing least 
local bias are Massachusetts, Arizona, Minnesota and Colorado. On an average, 
acquiring firms show a local bias of 685 km (36% of benchmark distance) while 
choosing targets. In other words, actual targets acquired by firms are on an average 
685 km (≈ 425 miles) nearer than the benchmark target in the sample.  
In Table 4.3., the industry-adjusted benchmark distance for an acquirer is 
computed as the mean distance between all targets in the sample having matching 2-
digit SIC codes with the target acquired. In effect, this benchmark captures the ex-
                                                 
22 In unreported results we also replicate Table 2 using benchmark weights for each 
industry (based on 2-digit SIC and GICS) in each state, and the results are similar to 
the unadjusted results. However, these empirical tests were not amenable to 
presenting as a concise table that could be intuitively interpreted.  
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ante expected distance of a potential target from an acquirer making an acquisition in 
the target’s industry. While for most states the industry-adjusted local bias is smaller 
than the corresponding unadjusted measure, for 13 states it is in fact larger than the 
unadjusted local bias. On an average, acquiring firms display an industry-adjusted 
local bias of around 580 km (33% of benchmark distance). Perhaps surprisingly, 
while the mean values for LB are smaller for industry-adjusted benchmarks compared 
to unadjusted LB, but the median values (825 km and 600 km respectively) are much 
higher. Even within one target industry, acquirers choose targets that are significantly 
more proximate than the average target in the sample. Alternatively, we also used the 
Global Industry Classification System (GICS) industry classifications to match 
targets in the sample while computing benchmarks and the results remain robust to 
which classification system is used.23 These results do not support the notion that 
industrial agglomeration satisfactorily explains the tendency for localized choice of 
target firms in M&A deals.  
As another dimension for benchmark adjustment, we ran robustness checks with 
size-adjusted benchmark distance. While we cannot directly observe the target size 
(due to presence of private targets in the sample), deal size is a good reflection of 
target size. We rank the deals in our sample into size quintiles. For each acquirer, we 
compute benchmark distance as the mean distance of the firm from all target firms in 
the same size quintile as the target actually acquired. The results for size-adjusted 
                                                 
23 GICS is a system developed by Morgan Stanley Capital International (MSCI) and 
Standard and Poor’s (S&P), and was created to form globally applicable standard 
industry classifications. More information on the GICS classification can be found at 
http://www.msci.com/equity/gics.html 
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local bias were qualitatively indistinguishable from the ones reported and we do not 
present them.  
 Additional robustness checks to uncover whether industrial clustering drives 
home bias in M&A are conducted by examining deals involving acquirers and targets 
from different industries. If industrial agglomeration is the primary cause of what is 
perceived as home bias in M&A, then the subsample of related (i.e., same industry) 
deals should be driving the findings. We replicate the measures reported in Table 4.2. 
and 3 for the subsample of acquisitions that involve acquirers and targets which do 
not have two-digit matching SIC codes.24 These deals can be viewed as 
“conglomerate” acquisitions involving firms from different industries. This includes 
about 40% of the 10,342 deals in the full sample used in our study. The results were 
similar for the subsample of unrelated deals, with slightly lower local bias than that 
documented for the full sample. However, both measures of home bias continue to be 
significantly positive, and the difference from the full sample results is not dramatic.  
In summary, the significantly positive home bias shown by acquiring firms during 
M&A activity is not sufficiently explained by industrial agglomeration and pertains to 
intra- as well as inter-industry deals. The clustering is not limited to the economically 
dominant states within the U.S. However, there also exist considerable variations in 
the degree of home bias across acquiring firms. Considering the negligible role of 
speed of information gathering in M&A and corporations’ higher capacity to incur 
search costs as compared to most portfolio investors, these findings may indicate a 
stronger and more compelling proximity preference in corporate M&A investments. 
                                                 
24 We cross-check the results using GICS industry classifications. 
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On the other hand, given that M&A is an investment in real assets by an acquirer, 
necessary post-deal monitoring by the acquirer may be facilitated when the target is 
geographically proximate. In the following sections of the paper, we seek to uncover 
some of the factors that may give rise to the contours in the economic geography of 
M&A and influence the propensity of acquiring firms to display proximity preference 
in choosing targets. 
 
 
4.4. Factors Affecting Home Bias in M&A 
 
The considerable proximity preference in corporate investment decisions vis-à-vis 
domestic M&A, documented in section 4.3., may be driven by several different 
factors. The evidence in previous sections also uncovers substantial cross-sectional 
variations in the degree of home bias that acquiring firms show in their choice of 
target firms. An understanding of the factors that cause these variations sheds light on 
the drivers of M&A in general, and the determinants of home bias in domestic M&A 
activity in particular. Additionally, identifying the factors that impact the choice of 
M&A investments facilitates a deeper understanding of the decision-making 
processes in other forms of corporate investment.  
 We identify some factors that are potentially related to home bias and are divided 
into six categories: (1) economic environment, (2) legal environment, (3) herd 
behavior, (4) acquiring firm characteristics, (5) target firm characteristics, and, (6) 
deal characteristics. While the first three categories of factors are related to factors 
external to the firms, the remaining factors capture firm-specific situations. We do not 
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treat the potential drivers of home bias as mutually exclusive, since the existence of 
one cause of home bias does not preclude other factors also amplifying this 
phenomenon. In this section we discuss the hypotheses related to various factors that 
may have a relationship with the geographical distribution of M&A.  
 
 
4.4.1. Economic opportunities: State economies 
 
The degree of development and growth where a firm is located can be among the 
primary factors affecting the propensity of localized business exchanges. The 
economy of a state is an indication of the size of the market of potential targets in the 
state. Therefore, an acquirer located in a large state has a bigger choice set of 
attractive target firms which are geographically proximate. In effect, larger states can 
induce spatial clustering in M&A deals of firms located in the state. 
 We use state GSP (Gross State Product) as the measure of a state’s economic size. 
The GSP is the sum of three components: compensation of employees, indirect 
business tax and non-tax liability (IBT), and property-type income. It provides the 
most aggregate measure of a state economy, and is computed as the sum of value 
added in production in each industry by the labor and property located in the state. An 
industry's GSP is conceptually equivalent to its gross output (sales or receipts and 
other operating income, commodity taxes, and inventory change) minus its 
intermediate inputs (consumption of goods and services purchased from other U.S. 
industries or imported). By definition, GSP is equivalent to the Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) at the national level. We expect that an acquirer’s tendency to choose 
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4.4.2. Environment: State antitakeover laws 
 
Antitakeover laws are one aspect of law that can substantially impact domestic 
M&A activity. In general, antitakeover mechanisms are viewed as being detrimental 
to shareholders. Legal research shows a strong consensus about the heterogeneity of 
state antitakeover regimes. Between the years 1980 to 1987, there was effectively no 
antitakeover legislation at the state or federal levels. Most standard antitakeover 
statutes, also known as the “second generation” statutes, have been adopted by states 
after 1987 when the Supreme Court upheld the Indiana law.25  
Table 4.4. lists the standard antitakeover statutes adopted by the states and the 
years in which they became effective. There are five standard antitakeover statutes 
that can be adopted by states: control share, fair price, freezeout, poison-pill 
endorsement and constituency. Appendix A describes each of these antitakeover 
statutes. Some of these statutes, like poison-pills, are rarely used in most states other 
than Delaware, but they signal to the acquirer that the target is legally authorized to 
use these defensive tactics and therefore, contributes to defining the legal regime.26 A  
 
                                                 
25Refer Romano (1992) for more information on the adoption of antitakeover statutes. 
 
26 Bebchuk and Ferrell (2002) note that Delaware is the only state that has a well-




State Antitakeover Statutes 
 
The table reports state-level antitakeover law characteristics. The year of endorsement of the five 
standard antitakeover statutes are reported.  Constituency statute requires a potential acquirer to win 
approval from a majority of outstanding disinterested shares, before it is allowed to acquire control 
of the target firm. Control Share Requires a potential acquirer to win approval from a majority of 
outstanding disinterested shares, before it is allowed to acquire control of the target firm. No. 
Freezeouts prohibits acquirers, under certain conditions, from merging with the target for a certain 
number of years (typically 3-5 years). Fair Price ensures that acquirers do not pay a premium for 
control of the target and then after acquiring control, buy remaining shares at lower prices. Poison 
Pill explicitly authorizes use of poison pills as a defensive tactic by the target firm. Number of 
Statutes is the total number of statutes endorsed by the state. 
Effective Year of Statute  




Fair Price Poison Pill 
 





Alabama      0 0 
Alaska      0 0 
Arizona 1987 1990 1987 1987  3 4 
Arkansas      0 0 
California      0 0 
Colorado     1989 0 1 
Connecticut 1997  1988 1985  5 3 
D. of Columbia      0 0 
Delaware   1987   3 1 
Florida 1990 1987  1987 1990 0 4 
Georgia 1989  1988 1985 1989 5 4 
Hawaii 1989 1985   1988 0 3 
Idaho 1988 1988 1988 1988 1988 3 5 
Illinois 1985  1989 1985 1989 3 4 
Indiana 1989 1986 1986 1986 1986 5 5 
Iowa 1989  1997  1989 3 3 
Kansas  1988 1989   3 2 
Kentucky 1989  1988 1988 1984 5 4 
Louisiana 1988 1987  1984  0 3 
Maine 1986  1988   5 1 
Maryland 1999 1989 1989 1983 1999 5 5 
Massachusetts 1989 1987 1989  1989 3 4 
Michigan  1988 1984 1984  5 3 
Minnesota 1987 1987 1987 1991  4 4 
Mississippi 1990 1991  1985  0 3 
Missouri 1986 1987 1986 1986  5 4 
Montana      0 0 
Nebraska  1988 1988   5 2 
Nevada 1991 1987 1991 1991 1989 3 5 
New Hampshire      0 0 
New Jersey 1989  1986 1986 1989 5 4 
New Mexico 1987     0 1 
New York 1987  1985 1985 1986 5 4 





higher number of statutes in place provide more legal channels for target firm 
managers to resist takeovers if they choose to, making it less shareholder-friendly. 
For example, while California has maintained its pro-shareholder stance over the 
decades and not endorsed any antitakeover statutes, states like Ohio and Pennsylvania 
are viewed as having strong antitakeover legal environments with all five statutes in 
place since 1990. As a consequence, the heterogeneity in state antitakeover laws can 
cause segmentation of the legal regimes affecting domestic M&A activity. 
Acquirers that are prone to display home bias in the absence of other offsetting 
effects may be driven to out-of-state acquisitions if the home state’s laws provide 
higher protection to target firm’s management. The expected difficulties for the 
acquirer may be higher if the target is from a stronger antitakeover legal regime. 
These expected and realized costs can be especially high when the deal is not friendly 
Table 4.4. (contd.) 
Effective Year of Statute  




Fair Price Poison 
Pill 
 





North Dakota 1993     0 1 
Ohio 1984 1982 1990 1990 1986 3 5 
Oklahoma  1987 1991   3 2 
Oregon 1989 1987 1991  1989 3 4 
Pennsylvania 1990 1990 1988 1988 1989 5 5 
Rhode Island 1990  1990 1990 1990 5 4 
South Carolina  1988 1988 1988  2 3 
South Dakota 1990 1990 1990 1990 1990 4 5 
Tennessee 1988 1988 1988 1988 1989 5 5 
Texas   1997   3 1 
Utah  1987   1989 0 2 
Vermont 1998     0 1 
Virginia  1989 1988 1988 1990 3 4 
Washington   1987 1987 1998 5 3 
West Virginia      0 0 
Wisconsin 1987 1986 1987 1987 1972 3 5 
Wyoming 1990 1990 1989   3 3 
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or solicited. So, quite intriguingly, heterogeneity in antitakeover laws can possibly 
have the unexpected effect of offsetting geographical clustering of M&A.  
 In summary, we expect that higher legal protection of a potential target firm’s 
management from takeovers in the acquirer’s state, in the form of more potent 
antitakeover regimes, will decrease the propensity for in-state M&A. Strong 
antitakover laws in the acquiring firm’s state, therefore, may mitigate home bias 
during takeover decisions. 
 
 
4.4.3. Herd behavior: Competitive responses 
 
Scharfstein and Stein (1990) develop among the first models on herd behavior 
among managers and its potential implications for various aspects of finance like 
corporate investment, stock markets, and intra-firm decision making. In their model, 
managers tend to mimic each others’ decisions because a manager is less likely to be 
penalized for a wrong strategy when other managers in the industry also followed the 
wrong strategy (i.e., a “sharing-the-blame” effect is implied). Morck, Shleifer and 
Vishny (1989) find empirical evidence suggesting that corporate boards are inclined 
to assign blame to the manager if the poor performance is relative to the industry, 
rather than when there is industry-wide underperformance.  
Herd behavior has distinct implications for M&A decision making by managers. 
In the context of localized M&A, whether or not a manager is predisposed to display 
home bias in choosing a target, she may tend to herd towards the behavior of other 
managers in the industry. In light of the existing literature on herding, the manager is 
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less likely to be questioned for her strategies if other managers in the industry are 
following the same strategy. This herding effect may be exaggerated for the managers 
geographically located near each other and operating in the same industry since they 
are more likely to be compared to each other by an overlapping shareholder base and 
local media. Alternatively, proximately located managers may be more likely to be 
influenced by each others’ strategies due to interactions via social or business 
networks, and a “keeping-up-with-the-Joneses” effect might be in play. An example 
of same-city effects in portfolio investments is Hong, Kubik and Stein (2005) who 
find that money managers located in the same city tend to buy and sell the same 
stocks, interpreted as word-of-mouth effects in trading behavior. In our context, 
competitive strategies of firms may be more correlated at the local rather than the 
national level.  
       In summary, if there is a herding tendency of managers in the manner in which 
they choose targets, they are more likely to conduct localized M&A when other 
managers who form the peer group display a propensity to choose local targets. This 
correlated behavior is likely to be more enhanced for managers in the same industry 
located in geographical proximity. We construct two home bias measures for the peer 
group of an acquirer:  (1) the ratio of the number of in-state acquisitions conducted by 
same-city, same-industry managers to the total number of acquisitions by same-city, 
same-industry managers, (2) the ratio of the number of in-state acquisitions conducted 
by other-city, same-industry managers to the total number of acquisitions by other-
city, same-industry managers, in the year of the acquisition announcement. By “other-
city” we mean firms located in any city other than the headquarter location of the 
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acquirer.27 These home bias measures are unadjusted since they do not capture the 
notion of “abnormal” proximity preference over and above the benchmark based on 
industrial agglomeration in the acquirer’s industry. An alternative adjusted measure 
of peer group proximity preference is constructed using geographical distance 
between acquirer and target, a framework more amenable to measuring ‘bias’. We use 
the industry-adjusted local bias measures as presented in Table 4.3., where the 
benchmark expected distance is based on the portfolio of sample targets in the same 
industry as the actual target. For the peer groups’ local bias, we then use the 
following measures: (1) the natural logarithm of the mean local bias (in km) of same-
city, same-industry acquiring firm managers, (2) the natural logarithm of the mean 
local bias (in km) of other-city, same-industry acquiring firm managers. We primarily 
use 2-digit SIC codes as industry classifications for industry matching, and also verify 
results using the GICS system. 
 
 
4.4.4. Acquirer characteristics: Resources, growth and risk attitudes 
 
A number of acquirer firm-specific factors can help explain the propensity to 
display home bias in its corporate investments. Factors like business resources, 
growth prospects and financial slack can all affect the degree to which geography 
impacts a firm’s decisions and also the proclivity of acquirers to search for attractive 
targets irrespective of geography. To the extent that distant targets are associated with 
                                                 
27 We also conduct robustness tests by including only cities in other states, and not 
other cities in the same state as the acquirer. 
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a higher perceived or real information asymmetry, risk attitudes of the acquirer may 
rationally play a role in the choice of targets when higher information asymmetry is 
related to higher perceived risk. Some firm characteristics, in conjunction with 
macroeconomic conditions, may proxy for the overall risk attitude of an acquiring 
firm and arise out of the contemporaneous business conditions in the economy and 
the financial health of the firm. Firm characteristics are also related to the cost of 
capital for a firm, and its willingness to incur search costs and pursue investments 
perceived as more risky. Firm characteristics may therefore explain some of the 
cross-sectional variation in the degree of home bias. 
 Firstly, the size of an acquirer is likely to have a significant effect on home bias. 
Large firms tend to be less localized in their product markets as well as their human 
capital. These firms are likely to have access to a wider social network and 
infrastructure through which they can obtain information generated from 
geographically distant sources. Additionally, larger firms may also be more willing to 
incur search costs that are related to geographical distance in order to obtain business 
information. Therefore, we expect geography to pose fewer obstacles during the 
corporate decisions made by large firms as compared to smaller firms. We use the 
total market capitalization of the acquirer in the month prior to the acquisition 
announcement as a measure of the firm size, and expect a negative impact of firm size 
on home bias of the acquirer during takeovers. 
 Secondly, the strategic considerations during M&A can be significantly different 
for value versus growth firms. High-growth acquirers may be more likely to seek 
small high-growth targets as compared to value firms. These growth targets have 
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assets that are less tangible and give rise to higher information asymmetries between 
firm insiders and outsiders, on average. Geographical distance from the target can 
further exacerbate these information asymmetries. Growth targets are also more likely 
to require close monitoring. Therefore, proximity to the target firm is a mechanism by 
which acquirers can alleviate information asymmetries through social or business 
networks and interaction and facilitate monitoring. Additionally, growth firms may 
also be more likely to acquire same-industry targets than value firms with limited 
growth opportunities, leading to a higher likelihood of proximate M&A in presence 
of industrial clustering for growth acquirers. We expect that high book-to-market 
firms (i.e, value firms) show less home bias compared to low book-to-market firms 
(i.e, growth firms) in M&A decisions. 
 Finally, we examine the impact of the extent of debt in an acquirer’s capital 
structure on home bias in M&A decisions. Highly leveraged firms are more likely to 
exercise financial caution and be more risk-averse relative to firms with low debt in 
their capital structure. The takeover of a distant target potentially associated with 
more information asymmetry between the acquirer and target may be perceived as a 
risky investment by highly-leveraged acquiring firms. Therefore, these acquirers may 
decide to make an acquisition when they are more confident about their knowledge of 
a potential target firm. We hypothesize that leverage has a positive impact on the 
home bias of an acquirer, where leverage is measured as the ratio of total assets minus 




4.4.5. Target characteristics: Information asymmetries and growth 
  
We hypothesize that some target characteristics may be important factors that 
impact the likelihood of the firm being acquired by a proximate acquirer. 
Unfortunately, data available for the target firms is limited since our sample 
comprises of public as well as private targets. Financial data on target firms is 
available only for the subsample of publicly traded targets and our analyses cannot be 
conducted for the full sample. 
 Among the publicly traded targets, we may expect the smaller firms to be less 
visible and associated with less information availability. We hypothesize that, in the 
subsample of public targets, smaller firms are more likely to be acquired by 
proximate acquirers who have prior familiarity with these firms.  
 The second target characteristic we examine is the firm’s book-to-market ratio. 
Previous studies have shown the considerable differences in performance and 
operations of value versus growth firms. Growth targets may be associated with more 
information asymmetry, exacerbated with geographical distance between the acquirer 
and target. However, acquiring firms looking for high-growth target firms may also 
be more inclined to incur search costs, thereby offsetting the impact of a priori 
information asymmetries.  
 Lastly, we examine the impact of a target firm’s leverage on likelihood of 
proximate deals. Coval and Moskowitz (1999) find that fund managers exhibit strong 
proximity preference especially for highly levered firms. They argue that local 
knowledge may be especially valuable while investing in these firms. Analogously, in 
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case of M&A, we conjecture that acquirers exploit local knowledge and familiarity 
more while acquiring highly-levered target firms.  
 
 
4.4.6. Deal characteristics: Information asymmetries and familiarity  
 
 
Deal characteristics in M&A, like deal attitude and method of payment, among 
others, are likely to be influenced by the degree of information asymmetry and 
relationship between the acquiring firm and the target prior to the deal. However, 
geographical distance between the firms influences the degree of information 
asymmetry or prior familiarity between an acquirer and a target. Given that similar 
factors may help define the spatial distribution of M&A as well as the deal 
characteristics, we expect a significant relationship between geographical proximity 
of a target to the acquirer and the nature of the deal, without any assumptions about 
causality. For example, to the extent that firms cluster due to ‘industry-specific’ 
technical and knowledge spillovers, acquisitions in the same industry are more likely 
to take place proximately. Some of the deal characteristics we examine in our 
empirical investigation are the public vs. private nature of the target, relatedness of 
the firms, method of payment, hostile vs. friendly attitude and whether a tender offer 





4.4.7. Macroeconomic control variables 
 
Macroeconomic conditions can proxy for the component of firm management’s 
attitude towards risk that is influenced by the overall business environment. We may 
expect that stronger macroeconomic conditions increase risk-taking propensity of the 
acquiring firm’s management, and make them more tolerant of potential search costs 
and screening costs of identifying attractive targets. Additionally, macroeconomic 
conditions may impact cost of capital and consequently the nature of corporate 
investments. Therefore, we include S&P500 stock index returns and prime interest 
rates as macroeconomic control variables in our regressions. 
 Additionally, there can be time trends in the degree to which information 
asymmetry plays a role in driving home bias. Peterson and Rajan (2000) find that 
distance is playing a decreasing role in small business lending activity, primarily due 
to advancement in communication technologies and decrease in information 
asymmetry associated with distance. The revolution in communication technology 
has affected almost all business sectors, albeit perhaps to different extents. To 
examine whether there is a time trend in the role played by distance in M&A deals, 
we regress the mean distance between acquirers and targets involved in M&A deals 
each quarter during 1990-2004 with the macroeconomic conditions and a time 















      (2) 
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Here, Time is the quarter time variable, taking values 1, 2,..,56 for the years 1990-
2003. The R-square for the regression is 3%. The co-efficient of the time variable is 
positive and significant, indicating an increasing trend in mean distance over time. 
The estimated regression shows that, ceteris paribus, the mean distance between 
acquirers and targets increases by 374 (=6.8x56) kilometers during the 14 years 
between 1990 and 2003. This evidence is consistent with decreasing information 
asymmetry over time due to improvements in communication technology and 
decreasing transportation costs. We use simple year dummy variables to control for 
time trends in information asymmetry due to communication and transportation costs. 
 
 
4.5. Regression Results 
 
 
We conduct empirical tests to identify some of the determinants of the proximity 
preference in corporate M&A that has been documented in earlier sections. Our 
empirical analyses use two alternative dependent variables measuring acquirer’s 
propensity to show home bias. The first measure is a dichotomous variable indicating 
the in-state versus out-of-state nature of the target firm relative to the acquirer. The 
second measure is based on the geographical distance between the acquiring firm’s 





4.5.1. Propensity for In-state M&A: Logistic Regressions 
 
Table 4.5. presents the state economy, state-level antitakeover laws and herding 
effects as determinants of home bias in acquirers. In these logistic regressions, we use 
the binary outcome of in-state versus out-of-state M&A as the dependent variable. 
The dependent variable assumes a value of one when the target is headquartered in 
the home state of the acquiring firm, and zero otherwise. We report the estimated 
coefficients of the explanatory variables and their marginal effects, with all other 
independent variable is held at median values. We also include announcement year-, 
state- and industry-fixed effects. The baseline regressions separately include each 
category of factors that have been outlined in section 4.4. with macroeconomic 
control variables and appropriate fixed-effects, and finally with all variables together. 
 The coefficient of state GSP is positive and highly significant at the 1% level, 
indicating that in-state M&A is more likely when the acquirer is located in a state 
with a large economy, as reflected in a larger GSP. A one standard deviation increase 
in GSP increases a home state acquirer’s home bias by around 29%. Larger states 
have more companies headquartered in the state and offer more opportunities for a 
potential acquirer, thereby augmenting localization of M&A.  
 Antitakeover statutes have a negative and significant impact on the likelihood of 
in-state acquisitions. A one standard deviation change in number of antitakeover 
statute endorsed by a state decreases the likelihood of in-state M&A by 3.6%. The 
dummy variables for each of the standard antitakeover statutes are negative and 
significant in most specifications. The evidence supports the hypothesis that stronger 
antitakeover laws partially nullify home bias by making targets in the state less  
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Table 4.5. 
Propensity for In-state M&A: Effects of Macroeconomic Conditions, State Law and Herd Behavior 
 
The dependent variable in the logistic regressions is the dummy variable (In-state) which assumes a value of one if the target is 
headquartered in the same state as the acquirer, and value of zero otherwise. Log (GSP) is the natural logarithm of the acquirer 
state’s Gross State Product in $million in the year when the acquisition is announced. No. of Antitakeover Statutes is the 
number of antitakeover statutes that have been endorsed by the acquirer state. There are five types of standard antitakeover 
statutes. Control Shares Statute is a dummy variable with value one when the state endorses a statute which requires a potential 
acquirer to win approval from a majority of outstanding disinterested shares, before it is allowed to acquire control of the target 
firm, and value of zero otherwise. Fair Price Statute is a dummy variable with value one when the state ensures that acquirers 
do not pay a premium for control of the target and then after acquiring control, buy remaining shares at lower prices, and 
assumes a value of zero otherwise. No Freezeouts Statute is a variable with values 0, 3 or 5, indicating the number of years for 
which the state prohibits acquirers, under certain conditions, from merging with the target. This variable has value zero when 
the state has not adopted a no-freezeouts statute, and otherwise indicates the number of years for which the prohibition holds in 
the statute. Poison Pill Statute is a dummy variable with value one when a state endorses poison-pills as defensive tactics, 
explicitly authorizing the use of these tactics by the target firm, and has value zero otherwise. Constituencies Statute is a 
dummy variable with value one when a state authorizes the target’s management to use defensive tactics in the name of non-
shareholder constituencies, such as employees etc., and has value zero otherwise. Home Bias of Same City Mgrs. is computed 
as (No. of Instate Acquisitions)/(Total No. of Acquisitions) conducted by same industry (matched by 2-digit SIC codes) 
managers headquartered in the same city as the acquirer, in the year that an acquisition was announced. Home Bias of Other 
City Mgrs. is computed as the (No. of Instate Acquisitions)/(Total No. of Acquisitions) conducted by same industry (matched 
by 2-digit SIC codes) managers not headquartered in the same city as the acquirer, in the year that an acquisition was 
announced. S&P500 Ret.(12-month) is the twelve-month compounded return on the S&P500 composite index prior to the 
month of acquisition. Interest Rate is the annual average interest rate in year t. %∆p is the marginal effect measured as percent 
change in the probability of occurrence of the dependent variable (at median values for all variables excluding dummy variables 
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-10.62a -1.04a -1.05 0.26 -1.01 -1.00 -1.03 -1.05 -0.97 -0.99a 
Log (GSP) 1.52a  
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        1.23a  
[24.95] 
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       -0.10a  
[-2.04] 
Control Shares Statute   -0.48a  
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   -0.26a  
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[-1.34] 
  
Poison Pill Statute      -0.46a  
[-10.57] 
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attractive to home state acquirers. Therefore, antitakeover laws have the unexpected 
effect of mitigating the tendency of acquiring firms to exhibit home bias. 
We find a positive and highly significant coefficient on the same-city, same-industry 
peer group’s tendency towards home bias. The propensity of managers in the same city 
and industry as an acquirer to choose in-state targets increases the acquirer’s likelihood of 
acquiring an in-state target, and is consistent with our hypothesis on herding behavior. A 
30%, or one standard deviation, increase in the same-city, same-industry managers’ 
degree of in-state acquisitions relative to total acquisitions increases the acquirer’s 
likelihood of in-state M&A by 26%. The industry fixed effects are included to separate 
the impact of herding in in-state acquisitions from the effect of localization in M&A due 
to agglomeration in certain industries and other industry-wide strategic considerations. 
These results hold both for 2-digit SIC (reported in Table 4.5.) and GICS (unreported) 
codes used for classifying acquirers into industries. We also find a negative and 
significant effect of other-city, same-industry managers’ propensity to conduct localized 
acquisitions when we use 2-digit SIC codes for industry classification.28 However, these 
results for other-city, same-industry managers are not robust to the industry classification 
system used. The coefficient becomes insignificant when GICS codes are used to classify 
acquirer industries. So, we do not find any strong evidence to support the idea that 
herding exists in the propensity for home bias among acquirers located in different cities. 
In further unreported robustness checks, the results remain similar when we drop all cities 
                                                 
28 While this finding is somewhat puzzling, it may in some way reflect the location of 
good acquisition opportunities for acquirers. If other-city acquirers are choosing local 
targets, it may indicate that greater economic opportunities are located near these other 
cities. So, acquirers distant to these cities may also seek out attractive targets in these 
other cities, thereby causing the observed negative relationship in the tendency for 
localized M&A. 
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located in the same state as the acquirer while considering other-city managers. 
Additionally, we did not observe any herding among acquirers not operating in the same 
industry whether located in the same city or not, and we do not present these results. 
Interestingly, this evidence suggests that location of an acquirer matters more in herding 
behavior than the acquirer industry. 
Table 4.6. reports regressions examining the relationship between firm characteristics, 
deal characteristics and likelihood of in-state acquisitions. The coefficient of acquirer size 
is negative and significant at the 1% level for all specifications, including regressions 
controlling for year, state and industry fixed effects. Larger acquiring firms are more 
geographically diversified in their infrastructure, networks and markets. They are also 
more likely to be prepared to incur potential search costs associated with obtaining 
information about distant and unfamiliar targets. The negative impact of size on 
proximity preference substantiates these notions. The results for acquirer book-to-market 
ratio indicate that value firms exhibit lower proximity preference than growth firms, as 
reflected in the negative and significant coefficients in three of the four model 
specifications including the variable. Acquiring firm’s debt in capital structure, on the 
other hand, has a significantly positive impact on the propensity for in-state acquisitions, 
at 1% level of significance in almost all specifications of the regression model. If distant 
targets are associated with higher information asymmetries and perceived risk, a 








Propensity for In-state M&A: Firm and Deal Characteristics 
 
The dependent variable in the logistic regressions is the dummy variable (In-state) which 
assumes a value of one if the target is headquartered in the same state as the acquirer, and 
value of zero otherwise. Acquirer Log (MV) is a measure of the acquirer size and is the 
natural logarithm of the market value (in $mill) of the acquiring firm in the month prior to 
the acquisition announcement. Acquirer Log(BE/ME) is the natural logarithm of the ratio 
of book-value of equity to market-value of equity of the acquirer in the month prior the 
acquisition announcement. Acquirer Debt/Assets is a ratio of debt to total assets of 
acquirer. Target Public Dummy is a dummy variable assuming a value of one if the target 
is publicly traded, and zero otherwise. Related Dummy is a dummy variable assuming a 
value of one if the acquirer and target have the same two-digit SIC code, and zero 
otherwise. Cash Dummy is a dummy variable assuming a value of one if the method of 
payment is 100% cash, and zero otherwise. Hostile Dummy assumes a value of one is the 
deal attitude is stated as hostile, and zero otherwise. Tender Dummy assumes a value of 
one if the acquirer made a tender offer, and zero otherwise. Log(Deal Value) is the natural 
logarithm of the value of the deal in $million. Target Log (MV) is a measure of the target 
size and is the natural logarithm of the market value (in $mill) of the target firm in the 
month prior to the acquisition announcement. Target Log(BE/ME) is the natural logarithm 
of the ratio of book-value of equity to market-value of equity of the target in the month 
prior the acquisition announcement. Target Debt/Assets is a ratio of debt to total assets of 
target. Log (GSP) is the natural logarithm of the acquirer state’s Gross State Product in 
$million in the year when the acquisition is announced. No. of Antitakeover Statutes is the 
number of antitakeover statutes that have been endorsed by the acquirer state. Home Bias 
of Same City Mgrs. is computed as the (No. of Instate Acquisitions)/(Total No. of 
Acquisitions) conducted by same industry (matched by 2-digit SIC codes) managers 
headquartered in the same city as the acquirer, in the year that an acquisition was 
announced. Home Bias of Other City Mgrs. is computed as the (No. of Instate 
Acquisitions)/(Total No. of Acquisitions) conducted by same industry (matched by 2-digit 
SIC codes) managers not headquartered in the same city as the acquirer, in the year that an 
acquisition was announced. S&P500 Ret.(12-month) is the twelve-month compounded 
return on the S&P500 composite index prior to the month of acquisition. Avg. Interest 
Rate is the annual average interest rate in year t-1. %∆p is the marginal effect measured as 
percent change in the probability of occurrence of the dependent variable (at median 
values for all variables excluding dummy variables which are discrete).  
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results support this notion since highly levered acquirers are likely to exercise more 
caution and show more home bias.29  
Some additional acquirer-level variables we examine but do not report are R&D 
intensity and undistributed free cash flow of acquirers. R&D intensity is measured as 
the ratio of R&D expenses to assets. Undistributed free cash flows of an acquirer are 
computed prior to the acquisition announcement following Lehn and Poulsen (1979). 
These variables may potentially impact the strategic considerations during M&A 
decisions. However, neither R&D intensity nor free cash flows have a significant 
impact on proximity preference, and are not reported in the table.  
 Certain target firm characteristics were studied for the subsample of public targets 
for which CRSP/COMPUSTAT data was available in the month prior to the 
acquisition announcement. As expected, size of target has a negative impact on 
likelihood of an in-state deal. The size variable is significant at the 1% level in Model 
(2), where acquiring firm characteristics are not included. Larger targets are more 
visible, have lower information asymmetries and require less search costs incurred by 
an acquirer prior to a deal. The negative impact of target size on likelihood of 
proximate deals shows that geography decreases in importance for the acquisition of 
larger, more visible targets. Targets’ leverage variable is significantly positive at the 
1% level in Model (2). Highly levered firms may have greater information 
asymmetries and proximate acquirers potentially have information advantage in 
assessing these targets. Targets’ book-to-market ratio has a significantly positive 
                                                 
29 We also conduct robustness checks by excluding banks and utility firms which 
operate in relatively regulated industries with leverage structures that are different 
from most other industries. However, the results remain unchanged when banks and 
utility firms are dropped from the regression sample. 
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coefficient, indicating that value firms are more likely to be acquired by home state 
acquirers. Based on the need for monitoring, the evidence on target book-to-market 
ratio is somewhat counterintuitive. Growth targets might need relatively greater 
monitoring by the acquirer than value targets, and proximate acquirers are more 
suited for extensive monitoring. Our results may also reflect that acquirers investing 
in growth are more aggressive in their search for attractive targets, and distance is not 
considered a crucial factor.  
  Finally, several deal characteristics show a significant relationship with the 
geographical proximity of the target firm to an acquirer. While a causal relationship is 
unlikely, deal characteristics may be related to some common factors that also drive 
the geographical distribution of M&A activity (e.g, information asymmetry and prior 
familiarity). In Model (3), several deal characteristics are statistically significant. The 
variable representing public versus privately-owned status of the target firm is 
significantly positive at the 1% level. Ceteris paribus, a public target is 5.85% more 
likely to be acquired by a home state acquirer, as compared to privately-owned target 
firms. This result may be unexpected in light of the fact that information asymmetries 
are much lower for publicly traded targets as compared to private targets, making 
their acquisition less risky for distant acquirers. However, public targets may be more 
likely to be in-state acquisitions possibly due to political resistance to takeovers of 
visible firms that are important to a state’s economic welfare and visibility.30 Our 
evidence supports the latter hypothesis since we find a higher likelihood of in-state 
acquisition when the target is public. Related acquisitions are around 1.8% more 
                                                 
30 A recent example is the resistance of the Massachusetts state government to the 
takeover of Boston-based Gillette by Cincinnati’s Proctor & Gamble. 
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likely to be in-state than out-of-state, potentially driven by industrial agglomeration 
within regions. Cash payments are around 2.4% more likely for out-of-state 
acquisitions, supporting the notion that cash is more likely to be used when the 
information asymmetry about firm valuations is higher. Hostile takeover are 9.8% 
more likely to be in-state, potentially due to the prior familiarity and information the 
acquirer has about a proximate target, making the co-operation of the target’s 
management less critical in the post-merger integration phase. Tender offers are about 
3% more likely for out-of-state M&A, ceteris paribus. We also include deal value, 
which is a reflection of target size and is correlated with acquirer size. As expected 
based on information asymmetries, larger deals are associated with less proximity 
preference of acquirer, since these are likely to be more visible targets. In model (4) 
when acquirer characteristics are included with deal variables, only the target’s public 
versus private status dummy remains significant. 
In model (5), where acquirer characteristics are included as explanatory variables, 
target characteristics become insignificant.31 Interestingly, the acquirer’s 
characteristics seem to be more instrumental in defining home bias in M&A than 
target firm characteristics. Extrapolating to the area of portfolio investments, this is 
analogous to the notion that investor characteristics matter more in directing home 
bias behavior than the characteristics of assets they invest in. Related and tender offer 
dummies are the only deal characteristics that are significant in this specification.    
                                                 
31 The target firm characteristics and acquirer characteristics are not significantly 
correlated, so the regressions including both sets of variables do not suffer from 
multicollinearity. 
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 In Model (6), we include acquirer characteristics, deal characteristics, state GSP, 
antitakeover law, herding measures and control variables. Deal characteristics 
become less important when acquirer characteristics are included in the regression 
models, except for the public status of a target firm which remains significantly 
positive. From the various specifications of models reported in Table 4.6., the most 
important determinants of home bias in M&A are acquirer characteristics, state 
economic environment, state antitakeover laws and home bias of peer group 
managers.    
 
 
4.5.2. Propensity for Local Bias: Multivariate Regressions 
 
Table 4.7. contains multivariate analyses explaining the local bias (in km) 
displayed by an acquirer in the choice of the target firm during M&A deals. We use 
the industry-adjusted local bias to factor in industrial agglomeration and are 
computed using the methodology reported in Table 4.3. The dependent variable is 
measured as the natural logarithm of the industry-adjusted local bias (in km) of an 
acquirer. We control for macroeconomic conditions, year-, state- and industry-fixed 
effects in the different specifications of the model. 
Economic size of the home state (GSP) has a positive and highly significant 
impact on the local bias of an acquirer. Acquirers from larger states with greater 
business opportunities are less likely to search for and invest in targets that are further 
away. It is possible that the marginal benefits for these acquirers of finding good 
targets that happen to be distant is not high enough to justify ignoring proximate 
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Table 4.7. 
Factors Impacting Local Bias of Acquirer 
 
The dependent variable in the regressions is log(local_bias(km)), where local_bias(km) is the industry-adjusted local bias 
computed as the difference between benchmark target distance (=mean distance from matched 2-digit SIC as actual target) and 
actual target distance; logarithm is for natural log.  Log (GSP) is the natural logarithm of the acquirer state’s Gross State 
Product in $million in the year when the acquisition is announced. No. of Antitakeover Statutes is the number of antitakeover 
statutes that have been endorsed by the acquirer state. Log(Mean Local Bias Same City Mgrs) is computed as the natural 
logarithm of the mean industry-adjusted local bias in all M&A conducted by same industry managers (matched by 2-digit SIC 
codes) headquartered in the same city as the acquirer, in the year that the acquisition was announced.  Log( Mean Local Bias 
Other City Mgrs) is computed as the natural logarithm of the mean industry-adjusted local bias in all M&A conducted by same 
industry managers (matched by 2-digit SIC codes) headquartered in all cities other than the acquirer’s city, in the year that the 
acquisition was announced. Acquirer Log(MV) is a measure of the acquirer size and is the natural logarithm of the market 
value (in $mill) of the acquiring firm in the month prior to the acquisition announcement. Acquirer Log(BE/ME) is the natural 
logarithm of the ratio of book-value of equity to market-value of equity of the acquirer in the month prior the acquisition 
announcement. Acquirer Debt/Assets is a ratio of debt to total assets of acquirer. Target Public Dummy is a dummy variable 
assuming a value of one if the target is publicly traded, and zero otherwise. Related Dummy is a dummy variable assuming a 
value of one if the acquirer and target have the same two-digit SIC code, and zero otherwise. Cash Dummy is a dummy 
variable assuming a value of one if the method of payment is 100% cash, and zero otherwise. Hostile Dummy assumes a value 
of one is the deal attitude is stated as hostile, and zero otherwise. Tender Dummy assumes a value of one if the acquirer made a 
tender offer, and zero otherwise. Log(Deal Value) is the natural logarithm of the value of the deal in $million. Target Log(MV) 
is a measure of the target size and is the natural logarithm of the market value (in $mill) of the target firm in the month prior to 
the acquisition announcement. Target Log(BE/ME) is the natural logarithm of the ratio of book-value of equity to market-value 
of equity of the target in the month prior the acquisition announcement. Target Debt/Assets is a ratio of debt to total assets of 
target.  S&P500 Ret.(12-month) is the twelve-month compounded return on the S&P500 composite index prior to the month of 





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)  
Independent Variables Coeff. (t-stat) Coeff. (t-stat) Coeff. (t-stat) Coeff. (t-stat) Coeff. (t-stat) Coeff. (t-stat) Coeff. (t-stat) 
Intercept 3.32a (4.08) 5.74a (7.13) 6.67a (6.38) 7.80a (7.45) 5.71a  (6.21) 7.55a  (6.86) 4.66a (5.68) 
Log(GSP) 0.37a (13.87)      0.36a (10.06) 
No. of Antitakeover Statutes  -0.06a (-9.74)     -0.05a (-6.23) 
Log(Mean Local Bias Same City Mgrs)   0.01a (2.75)    0.01a (2.66) 
Log( Mean Local Bias Other City Mgrs)   0.03 (0.33)    0.01 (0.87) 
Acquirer Log(MV)    -0.03a (-4.16)   -0.05a (-5.51) 
Acquirer Log(BE/ME)    -0.02  (-1.30)   -0.05a  (-3.12)
Acquirer Debt/Assets    0.13c (1.90)   -0.05 (-0.67) 
Target Public Dummy     0.05b (2.01)  0.04c (1.92) 
Related Dummy     0.01 (0.48)  0.02 (0.56) 
Cash Dummy     -0.02 (-0.95)  0.04  (1.20) 
Hostile Dummy     0.15 (1.61)  0.25c (1.76) 
Tender  Dummy     -0.01 (-0.22)  0.00 (0.08) 
Log(Deal Value)     -0.03a (-4.32)   
Target Log(MV)
† 
     0.01 (1.46)  
Target Log(BE/ME)
 †
      0.03 (1.41)  
Target  Debt/Assets
†
      0.58a (4.01)  
S&P500 Ret.(12-month) -0.09 (-0.71) -0.08 (-0.65) 0.06 (0.23) -0.06 (-0.86) -0.06 (-0.45) -0.28 (-1.14) -0.07 (-0.70) 
Avg. Interest Rate 0.04a (2.60) 0.03c (1.71) 0.02 (1.41) 0.00 (0.01) 0.02 (1.13) 0.02 (0.70) 0.03 (1.44) 
        
Ann. Year Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
State Fixed Effects NO NO YES YES YES YES NO 
Industry Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Adj.-R2 (%) 
















opportunities that are easier to evaluate and monitor. The degree of antitakeover 
protection offered by a state to potential target firm managers has a significantly 
negative impact on propensity for local bias shown by the state’s acquirers. Ceteris 
paribus, Acquirers domiciled in states that have adopted more antitakeover statutes 
are more likely to invest in M&A involving targets that are further away from its 
headquarters. While the distance-based local bias measure is less intuitively related to 
state-level laws and economic development, the results confirm the overall impact 
documented in earlier sections. The contemporaneous local bias shown by other 
same-city, same-industry managers during M&A has a statistically and economically 
significant positive impact on the observed local bias of an acquirer. For a more 
quantitative interpretation, a 1% increase in local bias of the same-city, same-industry 
peer group causes a 0.1% (= e0.01*ln(1.01)) increase in local bias of an acquirer, ceteris 
paribus. 
 Acquirer size, as measured by the market capitalization in the month prior to the 
acquisition announcement, has a significantly negative impact on the propensity for 
localized M&A. The results for book-to-market ratio are somewhat weak. The results 
point towards the fact that value acquirers may show less local bias, which is 
consistent with the notion that growth acquirers operate in sectors where the levels of 
intangible knowledge and uncertainty are relatively higher and may be exacerbated 
by distance. Additionally, the impact of acquirer leverage on propensity for local bias 
is also not robust to model specification. Public targets are more likely to be acquired 
by local acquiring firms. For deals where the target is publicly traded, the acquirer 
shows 5% more local bias than if the target is privately-owner, ceteris paribus. No 
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other deal characteristics in the regressions are significantly related to the local bias 
shown by the acquirer. There is some evidence to suggest that hostile takeovers are 
more likely for more localized deals. This may be driven by the fact that a local 
acquirer may have better knowledge about the target and the cooperation of target 
firm’s management in the post-deal functioning may not seem vital to the acquirer. 
Additionally, there may be a lower degree of political resistance to in-state hostile 
bidders. 
 By using an alternative measure of proximity preference based on geographical 
distance we verify the impact of factors related to home bias of acquirers. Both the 
local bias measures and home bias measures based on states as geographical units 
have different pros and cons. While distance-based local bias measures are less 
narrow, they form less intuitive decision categories in terms of legal and economic 
environment and make it harder to examine the impact of segmentation in state-level 
factors. On the other hand, using in-state versus out-of-state target choices as 
measures of home bias downplays the significance of geographical distance which 
may be a critical factor during economic decisions. However, on conducting parallel 
analyses for both measures of proximity preference, our overall findings are 
consistent. We conclude that the key results of our study are robust to the alternative 








This paper focuses on documenting and explaining the propensity of acquirers to 
show home bias in choosing targets during domestic acquisitions. We show that firms 
exhibit a strong proximity preference in their investment behavior, consequently 
limiting their choice set of assets, in a manner that is very similar and even more 
compelling than that documented for portfolio investors. Industrial agglomeration, 
concentration of economic activity and acquirer size constraints do not substantially 
explain the observed proximity preference.  
We find that nearly 34% of completed acquisitions involve local targets, while 
firm spatial clustering possibly explains only about 4% of local deals. We define local 
as being within a 100 km radius of the headquarters of acquirers. The frequency of 
deals declines sharply with distance. Our findings converge with other studies 
similarly indicating that ‘home’ lies within a 100 km radius, seemingly suggesting 
that the limited human capacity for managing complex social interactions, 
information sharing and processing may be at the root of the so-called home bias 
puzzle. Shedding light on the state-level geography, firms acquire in-state targets 
about 11 times as frequently as one may expect in the absence of home bias. Local 
bias measures based on geographical distance uncover acquirers’ proximity 
preference of about 580 km when choosing a target, as compared to the mean 
distance from a portfolio of potential targets in the industry of the actual target.  
Our empirical tests show that states with larger economic size encourage in-state 
M&A, thereby inducing localized consolidation of businesses. State-authorized 
protection of target managers via antitakeover regimes dissuades acquisitions by 
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home state acquirers and, as a result, has the unexpected effect of offsetting home 
bias. Acquirers display substantial herding behavior with managers located in their 
city and operating in the same industry in their tendency to display home bias while 
choosing targets. Interestingly, acquirer behavior is not impacted by same-industry 
managers in other cities, or other-industry managers in the same city. We interpret 
this finding as suggesting that acquirer managers care more about or are influenced 
more by the strategies of managers they are likely to be compared with by the local 
media and shareholder base, have more word-of-mouth communication with, or 
compete locally with. Additionally, large, value acquirers show less home bias 
compared to small, growth acquirers. Target firms’ characteristics pale in importance 
once the acquirers’ characteristics are accounted for, indicating that at least in case of 
M&A the investor characteristics drive home bias more than asset characteristics. 
Public targets are more likely to be in-state acquisitions, alluding to potential political 
or managerial resistance to out-of-state takeovers of visible, publicly traded firms.  
 Our findings have important implications for the study of economic geography 
and corporate investments. Results suggest that home bias in M&A cannot be fully 
explained by the ‘localized’ knowledge or pecuniary spillovers that necessitate 
economic agglomeration. The corporate home bias is attributable, at least in part, to 
information asymmetries, cognitive bias and economic opportunities, the same factors 
perceived as responsible for the home bias of portfolio investors. Factors that 
influence corporate investment behavior clearly have implications for policy-making 
geared towards attracting or retaining corporate capital in states. Additionally, given 
that the nature of the domestic market for corporate control is segmented, further 
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research could explore the efficiency implications of this phenomenon on takeovers 
as a corporate governance mechanism. The suggestion of herding in acquirers’ 
proximity preference alludes to possible behavioral drivers of corporate strategy and 
deserves further attention. In the absence of frictions like currency risk, political risk, 
significant transaction costs and communication barriers which may exist in 
international investments, the high degree of segmentation in economic activities into 





 Information is pivotal to all decisions and choices in financial markets. Due to the 
rapid strides the world has made in communication technology and the advent of the 
internet, among other innovations heralding in the ‘information age’, it may be expected 
that the cost of information acquisition is small, and often negligible. However, a 
growing body of research documents that markets are informationally imperfect. In the 
presence of information heterogeneities, we cannot ignore the substantial human element 
to information flows in markets. Recent research shows that there are various informal 
factors that have an important impact on economic decision-making, but have been 
overlooked in classical economic theory. The existence of social networks, word-of-
mouth interactions, peer effects etc., are being increasingly acknowledged as having a 
significant impact on economic behavior. For example, as residents of Atlanta, we often 
keep an eye on Coca Cola’s stock prices. It is a large publicly traded company 
headquartered in Atlanta, with most public information being made easily available 
through electronic and print media. However, if a friend expresses a strong opinion about 
the prospects of the company that diverges from the public information, are we not 
tempted to allocate more value to her opinion than to public information? 
 This dissertation is driven by the notion that the ease of information availability via 
formal channels does not substitute for factors like social information networks, peer 
effects, familiarity etc., which continue to impact decision-making by investors. The first 
essay considers information channels among mutual fund managers (fund-fund networks), 
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and between holding companies and fund managers (fund-company networks). Results 
show that (1) fund-fund (fund-company) information networks help in generating 
positive risk-adjusted returns from holdings in absence of fund-company (fund-fund) 
networks; (2) fund-company networks create information advantage only when the 
networks are relatively exclusive. Superior networks seem to pick stocks which 
outperform beyond the quarter. The second essay examines mutual fund managers’ 
tendency to deviate from the strategies of their peers. Results indicate a significantly 
negative relationship between the managers’ deviating tendency and fund performance, 
suggesting that the average fund manager is more likely to make erroneous decisions 
when they deviate from their peers. The third essay investigates the determinants of target 
choices in corporate acquisitions. Results reveal the influence of various factors, 
including information asymmetries, which may drive this behavior, including economic 
opportunities, anti-takeover regimes, competitive responses to other managers, and 
acquirers’ size and book-to-market ratios.  
 The intent of this dissertation is to study and characterize some of the informal 
interactions and socio-legal processes that play a role in the investment choices and 
outcomes of economic players in markets. Several interesting avenues for future research 
are suggested. For instance, the role of these informal drivers of decisions on economic 
and market efficiency is not clear. Additionally, the motivations and mechanism by 
which information sharing occurs in markets is still understudied. This research has 
important implications for all players in financial markets, including investors, corporate 
executives and policy makers.  
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APPENDIX A 
Description of Macroeconomic and Antitakeover Law Variables 







Natural logarithm of the annual Gross State Product (GSP). GSP is 
defined as the value added in production by the labor and property 
located in a state, and comprises of three components: 
compensation of employees, indirect business tax and non-tax 
liability (IBT), property-type income. 
Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis, U.S. Department of 




Total number of standard antitakeover statutes endorsed by a state. 
The five standard antitakeover statutes are control share, fair price, 
no freezeout, poison-pill endorsement and constituency. 
 
Control Shares Statute Requires a potential acquirer to win approval from a majority of 
outstanding disinterested shares, before it is allowed to acquire 
control of the target firm. 
 
Fair Price Statute Ensures that acquirers do not pay a premium for control of the 
target and then after acquiring control, buy remaining shares at 
lower prices. 
 
No. Freezeouts Statute Prohibits acquirers, under certain conditions, from merging with 
the target for a certain number of years (typically 3-5 years). 
 
Poison Pill Statute Explicitly authorizes use of poison pills as a defensive tactic by 
the target firm. 
 
Constituencies Statute Authorizes the target’s management to use defensive tactics in the 
name of non-shareholder constituencies, such as employees etc. 
 
S&P500 Ret.(12-month) One-year return on the S&P500 composite index compounded 
monthly ending the month prior to the announcement of the 
acquisition by acquirer. 
Source: CRSP (Center for Research on Security Prices) 
 
Interest Rate Annual average of monthly interest rates in year t-1, where t is the 
year of announcement of the acquisition. 
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